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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is about the adaptation of fish-pond farming households to climate-related 
and socio-economic risks in Northern Thailand. Successful fish farming depends on 
weather and climate conditions as well as supplies of sufficient water of adequate 
quality. In Northern Thailand, water is regulated by the Muang Fai (communal 
irrigation system) and state irrigation schemes managed by the Royal Irrigation 
Department (RID) with the latter now predominating. Pond-based aquaculture has 
benefited irrigation, but also suffered from uncertainty in water quality and quantity. As 
a result of rainfall pattern changes, fish farmers have experienced floods, drought, water 
pollution and resource conflicts. Therefore, the study explores (1) the vulnerability of 
fish farming households with small-, medium- and large-scale operations to climate-
related and socio-economic risks; (2) the adaptive capacities of those fish farmers in 
coping with the risks and (3) the role of social capital articulated by various actors with 
bonding and bridging ties in both horizontal and vertical dimensions. Major findings in 
relation to this are as follows: 
Fish-pond farming households are vulnerable to climate-related and socio-economic 
risks. They are exposed to the variations in weather, poor water quality and quantity, 
plus low quality materials, market forces and urbanization expansions, which lead to 
land use conversion to housing areas. As a result, people in the peri-urban places are 




operators, with low financial, social and human capital, are most vulnerable. They have 
less ability to access water and can barely deal with fish deaths or diseases.  
Different fish farmers have different livelihood capitals, which relate to different 
adaptive capacities. Measured by the capacity to recover from stresses and the 
productivity, it is found that large-scale operators with higher financial assets are able to 
buy land with good water access and to develop farming system, and have more 
opportunities to gain knowledge from other external sources than the smaller operators. 
Moreover, the large operators can invest in high quality inputs such as fingerlings, feeds 
and more advanced technologies. Therefore, they can better prevent stress to fish and 
increase productivities. By contrast, the smaller fish farmers who have less lands must 
rely on poor quality water in the canals and have low fish production.  
This study argues that kinship and neighborhood are constructed through bridging 
capital in fish farmer cooperatives and groups. In this way, social capital is mobilized by 
trust, exchange, regulation and collective action. The level of networking social capital 
has an impact on social innovations to prevent impacts from, and to cope with climate 
variability. Fish farmers with strong bonding capital in the community have access to 
knowledge and labor exchange, but less than the farmers with both high bonding and 
bridging ties. The latter farmers have greater trust with external organizations that help 
develop risk mitigation and fish productivity. Fish farmers across scale operations 
negotiate with the Kae Muang (the communal irrigation leader) in attempts to access to 
water resources.  It contrasts with those fish farmers in the community that fully bridges 
with the state rather than bonding with kin and neighbors. Facilitating the information 
transfer from the state and university to local fish farmers is even found in the 
community with minimal levels of bonding social capital. Without trust, knowledge 
exchange and distribution among the group are uneven, thus increasing the possibility 
of fish death and losses.  Above all, this kind of social capital exacerbates water 
shortage and competition among water users without voluntary help and solutions.  
My recommendations are the micro and macro levels of adaptation policy. The 




how to solve the problems. The state projects related to fish and water should be place-
based. The external organizations with various kinds of fruitful and accurate researches 
should distribute their information and provide assistance to the fish farmers while 
taking local people into the participation for more trust and understanding. Moreover, 
those vulnerable fish farmers with low capitals should be supported technologically by 
the state and universities in order to improve the rearing system. To develop irrigation 
systems the state should develop the water allocation plan and its communication. It is 
also important not only to include public participation of the water allocation plan and 
management; but also to socially increase the Kae Muang role. Young people, who have 
more capacities to apply new technologies in irrigation systems and to effectively 
communicate with water users, should be encouraged to take part in the activities as a 
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เล้ียงปลาให้ประสบความส าเร็จคือสภาพอากาศ น ้ าท่ีมีปริมาณเพียงพอและมีคุณภาพดี ระบบ
ชลประทานในภาคเหนือเป็นทั้งระบบเหมืองฝาย (ระบบชลประทานส่วนรวม) และระบบท่ีอยูภ่ายใต้
ความดูแลของรัฐซ่ึงมีบทบาทเหนือระบบเหมืองฝายในปัจจุบนั  ระบบชลประทานท่ีดีจึงส่งผลดีต่อ
การเล้ียงปลา แต่ในความเป็นจริงปริมาณและคุณภาพน ้ ามีความไม่แน่นอนประกอบกับการ
เปล่ียนแปลงปริมาณฝน จึงเป็นปัจจยัท่ีท าให้เกษตรกรผูเ้ล้ียงปลามีความเส่ียงต่อน ้ าท่วม น ้ าแล้ง 
มลพิษทางน ้ า และความขดัแยง้ในการเขา้ถึงทรัพยากร ดงันั้นงานวิจยัช้ินน้ีจึงมุ่งศึกษา (1) ความ
เปราะบางของครัวเรือนเกษตรกรผูเ้ล้ียงปลาซ่ึงมีทั้งรายเล็ก รายกลางและรายใหญ่ (2) ความสามารถ




อากาศและสังคมและเศรษฐกิจ นอกจากน้ียงัประสบปัญหาคุณภาพน ้ าท่ีไม่มีคุณภาพและการ
เปล่ียนแปลงของปริมาณน ้า รวมถึงปัจจยัการผลิตท่ีไม่มีคุณภาพ แรงกดดนัของตลาดและการขยายตวั
ของกระบวนการการกลายเป็นเมือง(urbanization) ซ่ึงน าไปสู่การเปล่ียนแปลงการใชท่ี้ดินไปเป็นท่ีอยู่
อาศยั ท าให้เกษตรกรท่ีอาศยัในเขตก่ึงเมืองก่ึงชนบทไดรั้บผลกระทบจากน ้ าท่วม น ้ าแลง้ มลพิษทาง










ปัจจยัการผลิตท่ีมีคุณภาพ เช่น ลูกปลา อาหาร และเทคโนโลยี ดงันั้นจึงมีความสามารถสูงในการ
ป้องกนัภยัและการผลิต รวมถึงมีโอกาสไดรั้บความรู้จากองคก์รภายนอกมากกว่าเกษตรกรท่ีมีขนาด
ประกอบการท่ีเล็กกวา่ ซ่ึงครอบครองท่ีดินนอ้ยในพื้นท่ีท่ีไดรั้บน ้ าไม่ดีนกั จึงมีโอกาสเผชิญกบัปัญหา
น ้าเสียและน ้านอ้ยสูงและมีผลิตปลาไดน้อ้ยกวา่ 
การศึกษาช้ินน้ีพบว่าเกษตรกรผูเ้ล้ียงปลามีการสร้างความสัมพนัธ์แบบเครือญาติและเพื่อนบา้นใน
รูปแบบใหม่ในลกัษณะของการรวมกลุ่มเกษตรกรผูเ้ล้ียงปลาดว้ยการเช่ือมประสานทุนทางสังคมผา่น





และการผลิตปลา รวมถึงความสามารถในการเขา้ถึงน ้ า เกษตรกรผูเ้ล้ียงปลาทุกขนาดประกอบการ
สามารถต่อรองน ้ากบัแก่เหมือง (หวัหนา้ระบบชลประทานส่วนรวมในระดบัทอ้งถ่ิน)  ในทางตรงกนั
ขา้มชุมชนท่ีมีการเช่ือมประสานกบัภาครัฐมากกว่าความกลมเกลียวระหวา่งญาติมิตรและเพื่อนบา้น
เป็นอุปสรรคต่อการกระจายขอ้มูลข่าวสารและความรู้จากองคก์รภายนอกเพราะขาดความไวเ้น้ือเช่ือ
ใจ ท าใหก้ารแลกเปล่ียนขอ้มูลข่าวสารไม่ทัว่ถึงซ่ึงเป็นการลดทอนความสามารถในการปรับตวัและท า
ใหเ้กิดปัญหาปลาตายและความเสียหายอ่ืนๆมากข้ึน ยิ่งไปกวา่นั้นยงัส่งผลต่อปัญหาการขาดแคลนน ้ า
และการแยง่น ้าระหวา่งผูใ้ชน้ ้ า โดยไม่มีใครอาสาเขา้มาช่วยเหลือและแกปั้ญหา 
การศึกษาช้ินน้ีจึงเสนอนโยบายการปรับตวัทั้งระดบัเล็กจนถึงระดบัใหญ่ กล่าวคือ เน่ืองจากการศึกษา
การปรับตวัของทอ้งถ่ินในงานช้ินน้ีมุ่งสะทอ้นปัญหาให้กบัผูท่ี้มีอ านาจก าหนดนโยบายถึงปัญหาท่ี
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1.1  Rationale 
Social capital is a comparatively new area of interest in climate adaptation among 
development and natural resources. The capital particularly encompasses norms and 
relationships among people that link them together within and into a community (Lin, 
2001). To address climate-related risks, social capital strengthens people’s abilities with 
the connection of their natural, human, physical, and financial capital. Climate 
variability has been changing and has become uncertain over the last decades. It has 
been observed that climate change has direct impact on natural and human systems 
across the continents. The phenomenon caused shrinking glaciers due to higher 
temperatures, warming permafrost, affected crop yields and coastal vulnerability (IPCC, 
2013). A high potential of those capitals have been said to support both individual and 
collective adaptive capacity. Therefore, social capital is one of the capitals expected to 
reduce vulnerability to climate variability.  
There has been plenty of literature-documenting the role of social capital in climate 
adaptation in many aspects. Cases studies in many countries, such as the UK, have 
found that strong constructive bonding networks play an important role toward 
decreasing vulnerability and improving health outcomes. Both the elderly and their 
social contacts can contribute to the knowledge and perception of heat effects and 
transmission of narrative about coping strategies.  The state–civil society cooperation in 
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago towards coastal resource management reduces 
resource conflicts. In Mexico, local farmers facing plantation failure are supported by 
government assistance in building up farmer associations with social security and 




strong organization support. This is because of higher investment costs and increased 
environmental risks while they have less knowledge to deal with the problems. 
In Asian countries like Nepal, the agriculture extension program is built and 
implemented through social capital for more sustainable farming. Although the country 
contains a high diversity of cultures, ethnicity and the caste system, higher levels of 
social capital are highlighted in adopting farming at household levels through collective 
action, ethical norms and reciprocity. In the case of Vietnam, local networks are 
emergently founded to replace the state hazard management and increase people’s 
adaptive capacity. By contrast without a strong social network in Tonle Sap, Cambodia, 
small-scale operators of fisheries have different unequal and vertical social networks. 
Most large-scale operations get more benefits and influences than the small-scale ones 
that are excluded from access to resources.  
Understanding the role of social capital on climate adaptation and many other 
agricultural activities and resource management are increasing, but is still limited in the 
arena of freshwater aquaculture particularly in the Asian region. Its production is also 
influenced by climate variability. According to IPCC (2014), large climate warming 
trends in the Asian sector is >2oC per 50 years in the second half of the 20th century. 
Across Southeast Asia, temperatures have been rising (from 0.14oC to 0.20oC) per 
decade since the 1960s. A number of days, nights are hotter and warmer than before.  
Consequently, IPCC (2014) confirms that a large number of natural fish species are at 
high risk of extinction. This accounts for increases in the development of freshwater 
aquaculture.   
Freshwater aquaculture is important for economic development and domestic 
consumption. The industry has grown steadily in the last five years due to a 
combination of increasing population growth, urbanization expansion, declining global 
capture fishery production; and more development of fish production and distribution 
channels. Inland aquaculture plays a great role in production as the fastest growing 
production sector. It is almost two times higher than marine aquaculture in 2011 and 
2012. From 2007 to 2012, its production has risen from 29.9 to 41.9 million tons to 
serve the higher demands of the population which rises by 0.4 billion. The annual per 
capita fish consumption also increases by 1.6 million tons (FAO, 2014). A large part 
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ofglobal aquaculture production is located in the tropical and subtropical region of Asia. 
Asia distributes 88.50 percentage of the world’s aquaculture production of fish in 2011, 
higher than Americas and Europe respectively. 
Previous ample studies on aquaculture adaptation conducted in Asian countries such as 
Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines focused on the causes, effects and different 
forms of aquaculture development as well as physical and biological management. Few 
social relationships of fish operators were highlighted. It is noted that the ability of fish 
producers in Vietnam and Thailand with access to land and credit is mediated by 
relationships between individuals and the state and its associated institutions.  Hence, 
technical knowledge transmission is more successful from informal channels than 
official attempts. In coastal Philippines, the local people are affected by the top-down 
policy of the conversion of mangrove forests to fishponds. They pursue collective 
struggle to negotiate through the state, since their common resources and the sources of 
local livelihood are threatened.  
Thailand’s contribution of total fisheries production rose up from below 20% in 2000 to 
over 41% in 2010 (Aquadapt, 2013). However, Thailand produced 1,286,122 tons in 
2010 but reduced it to 1,008,049 in 2011 during the time of catastrophic natural 
disasters resulting in a great loss of aquaculture production (FAO, 2014). Fish-pond 
farming is an agroecosystem that relies on seasonal and unpredictable weather and 
climate. Cultured fish is also affected by extreme weather (hotter and colder than 
normal), excessive rainfall, prolonged cloud cover, floods and drought. These 
uncertainties directly results in the instability of salinity, dissolved oxygen, ammonia 
and nitrites, pH, photoperiod and water turbidity. In other words, these factors affect 
fish growth rate, food consumption, feed conversion, and other bodily functions of the 
fish that make it unavoidable for farmers to experience damage to physical materials, 
death of the fish and profit loss. 
Successful fish farming depends on weather and climate conditions as well as supplies 
of sufficient water of adequate quality. Fish farming is promoted in areas in Northern 
provinces with access to water bodies (such as rivers, reservoirs and canals) and 
irrigated areas. In Northern Thailand, water is regulated by Muang Fai (the communal 
irrigation system) and state irrigation schemes managed by the Royal Irrigation 
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Department (RID) with the latter now predominating (Rigg, 1992; Tassanee, 2008). 
Muang Fai institutions that persisted have evolved; some became formal associations 
while others remained informal groups (Neef et al., 2004). It is obvious that water users 
especially fish farmers have less ability now to freely exercise their local power to claim 
and control water for individual benefit; instead they have to follow the new irrigation 
system. If flood and water shortage issues continuously increase without efficient water 
management mechanisms for overall aquaculture products, those fish farmer households 
will thus have to bear all the risks and uncertainties of climate related variability. 
To achieve higher productivity, maintaining water quality and quantity in farming is 
also considerably affected by the capacity of fish farmers, the level of their community 
and the water management strategies. But the fish-related operators’ social relationships 
embedded in fish production are still unmentioned. The key research issue is thus how 
fish farmers use social networks and exercise their power to improve their productivity 
and adaptive capacity in response to changing and uncertain climates. It situates the 
adaptation strategies that social relation within household and community levels are 
taken into consideration in fish farming and water management. Do good cooperation 
between fish farmers, other water users and water institutions potentially drive the 
efficiency of water flow and preserve its quality? 
It is extremely challenging for the households and communities engaging in fish-pond 
farming. Chayanov (1996) (cited Sherbinin et al., 2008) observes that well-endowed 
households with many family workers have more land and more capacities than those 
constrained by labor shortages. The present changing structural households of fish 
farmers have impacts on labor availability, household livelihood options, and land use 
strategies. Rigg (2012) highlights the characteristic changes of the Asian countryside: 
(1) a delocalization of life and living, reflected high level of mobility; (2) a dis-
embedding of households and families that stretches social and economic relations 
across spaces; and (3) a dissociation of the village-community. Again, the new 
community of fish-pond farmers has been founded with common economic interests to 
manage the cultured fish production and marketing system, under undesirable climate- 
related risks and the pressure of Muang Fai system decline. The strength of fish farmer 
cooperatives are dynamic and diversified, dependent on the connectedness of fish 
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farmer members as well as technical production in terms of fish species, its density, 
chemical substances, supplementary feeds, rearing periods, size and weight of fish 
harvest in addition to marketing and distribution by mobile traders (Belton et al., 2008).   
The vulnerability of fish farmers is hence examined in order to seek out how fish farmer 
households in different scales of operation (small, medium and large) can cope with and 
adapt their livelihood to climate-related and socio-economic risks. It would be necessary 
to justify that farm size matter as a key factor in their capacities in responding and 
adapting to the risks. But fish farmers in this study face resource conflicts while local 
people tend to look for more off-farm opportunities rather than farming. To face 
climate-related risks, do different fish operators have different responses to the risks 
upon different stocks of land, labor, money, water and knowledge? Do the livelihood 
capitals constitute vulnerability? One way of adaptation is possible with access to 
resources via social capital. It is skeptical the social capital can leverage climate 
uncertainty and vulnerability as well as social dynamic situations.  
1.2 Research Questions 
The primary research question focuses on how social capital contributes to livelihood 
adaptation in fish-pond farming households and the communities in which they operate. 
There are three secondary research questions that lead up to these main question as 
follows:  
 1.2.1 What are the main vulnerabilities to climate-related risks faced by  
      fish-pond farming household with small- medium- and large scale  
   operations?  
 1.2.2  To what extent does the size of operation of a fish farm influence adaptive 
capacities to cope with climate-related risks? 
1.2.3 To what extent does social capital enhance adaptation to the changing 
climate of vulnerable pond-farming households and the communities in 
which they operate? 
 
 
  6 
 
1.3  Research Objectives  
The primary research objective is to study the role of social capital in building up the 
livelihood adaptation of fish-pond farmers. There are three secondary research 
objectives as follows: 
 1.3.1 Scrutinize vulnerability, resulting from climate-related and socio  
economic risks, faced by fish farming households of small- medium-  
and large-scale of operation 
1.3.2 Evaluate the effects of scale of operation on adaptive capacities 
in coping with climate-related risks  
1.3.3 Identify the role of social capital in relation to adaptation of vulnerable  
farmers at household and community levels  
1.4 Operational Definitions 
1.4.1 Fish farmers with diverse activities divided into four types. There are       
  the farmers who (1) raise fish only; (2) raise fish and grow crops; (3)  
  raise fish plus livestock plus cultivation, and (4) raise fish plus  
  nonfarm activities. 
1.4.2 Community of fish farmers means fish farmer cooperatives. The  
   cooperatives are a self-organizations implemented by fish farmer  
   members with trust, reciprocity, and exchange under accepted  
   regulation and common interests. The organizations aim at achieving  
   their common interests in accessing funds, knowledge, labor and so on;      
   factors useful for fish productivity. In addition, the fish groups are related to    
   water irrigation institutions. Here, water users including farmers, fish  
   farmers and villagers are taken into account. 
1.4.3 Risks define both natural extreme events and socio-economic contexts.  
Natural events become more hazardous to human life in various areas  
and to societies that result in disasters and loss of life and material wealth. 
Physical risks refer to climate-related risks (floods, droughts, and climate 
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variability), location (up-, mid- and downstream), adjacent land use 
(the fish pond farms is surrounded by rice paddy fields, fish ponds and  
non-farm activities), and ecosystem (fishes are eaten by snakes and  
birds). The seasonal floods, droughts and climate variability will 
unexpectedly affect agricultural and aquaculture activities each year. 
Because of the rapidly changeable weather and temperatures, fish-pond 
growth is sensitive to fluctuating amounts of oxygen and plankton in the 
pond. Moreover, socio-economic risks are the structural institution that 
constraints human capacity and response to external hazards. In this sense, 
market uncertainty, weak irrigation systems, labor availability and wages, 
rice mortgage policies and urbanization affect vulnerability in leading to 
unequal access to resources, malnutrition, and poor health.  
1.4.4 Vulnerability is a function of both climate risks and social construction.  
  It is determined by physical capital, natural capital, financial capital, 
  human capital as well as social capital. These capitals of individuals   
  or households convey their abilities and diversities of- resource access. 
   In this sense, the perception of risk based on culture and social 
  norms and the lack of knowledge may limit decision-making about      
  adaptation.  
 1.4.5 Adaptation means the adjustment of agencies that respond to, cope  
  with, adapt to and recover from the stresses. Each agency’s capacity to 
  adapt is fundamentally based on their five capitals of livelihood 
  strategy. Their capitals can be diversified, combined and transformed to 
  increase ability of access profile, income opportunities and productivity. 
  1.4.6  Scale of operation is divided into three groups: small, medium, 
   and large. It is defined by an aggregation of indicators such 
  as the total sizes of fish-ponds. In Phan, one to four rais of 
  fish pond are considered small scale; five to ten rais is  
  medium-sized while more than 11 rais is large.  In Sansai, small scale    
  counts one to two rais, three to five rais is medium and more than six rais    
     means large scale. Meanwhile, small scale in Phayao is about one to four 
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 rais, five to eight is medium and more than nine rais is counted as a 
  large-scale of operation. Most large scale operations employ wage labors 
  but this is hardly seen in medium and small ones. Productivity depends 
  on the farm’s size and investment costs.  
1.5  Literature Review 
The literature review mainly focuses on adaptation of fish farming households under the 
vulnerability of climate-related and socio-economic risks. Thus, I have organized the 
literature reviews in accordance with two major conceptualizations: (1) vulnerability 
and adaptation to climate-related and socio-economic risks and (2) social capital as a 
livelihood strategy. 
 1.5.1 Review of Theories and Concepts  
The concept of vulnerability and adaptation of the study is chosen to explore the 
weaknesses and strengths of the fish-pond farming households prone to climate-related 
risk and socio-economic risks. In this regard, I divide the notion into two sub-
conceptualizations: vulnerability as a result of climate-related risks, and adaptation as a 
response to climate-related risks.  
1)  Vulnerability as a result of climate-related and socio-economic risks 
Climate-related risk results in vulnerability. Here, many schools of 
thought have their different concepts. Beginning with the natural 
hazards approach, Burton et al. (1978) from the pioneer study of “The 
Environment as Hazard” argue that risk as natural extreme events 
becomes more hazardous to human life in various areas and societies 
that result in disaster of life and material wealth ( also see Lebel et al., 
2010). Hazardous events are marked by six characteristics: (1) 
magnitude is the intensity of physical action; (2) frequency introduces 
the rate of events; (3) duration refers to how long the hazardous event 
persists; (4) areal extent identifies hazard-affected space; (5) speed of 
onset refers to the period of time between the first event appearance 
and its peak; (6) spatial dispersion shows the pattern of hazard 
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distribution over an area that can determine the mitigation of its 
effects. Burton et al. (2005) also add seven key indicators of 
vulnerability not only resulted from climatic (magnitude, timing, 
persistence and reversibility of impacts and probability of occurrence), 
but non-climatic conditions (potential for adaptation; distribution to 
reduce vulnerability; and value of vulnerable system). More 
significantly, the rise of disasters is also forced by population growth 
and an increasing number of people moving to vulnerable places with 
many catastrophic hazards particularly in developing countries 
(Burton et al., 1978).  It seems that the hazard school considerably 
highlights the hazards towards vulnerable groups of people settling 
down at risk areas. However, it does not address the social causes of 
vulnerability and talks less about how different kinds of people are 
differently vulnerable.  
Next, the human ecology school explains vulnerability as the 
characteristic of a person or groups who cope with, and recover from, 
the natural hazards based on class, caste, ethnicity, gender, disability 
and age. Hewitt (1997) claims that vulnerability is a property or a 
circumstance of persons, activities and sites, seen in six basic forms: 
(1) exposure to dangerous agents which are determined by location of 
home, the structure of housing and workplace; (2) weakness of 
persons, communities, buildings or activities to stresses; (3) lack of 
risk protection; (4) lack of the resources that affect risks or response to 
danger; (5) lack of resilience and capability to avoid, endure, offset 
and recover from disasters; and (6) powerlessness to protect and 
relieve from loss. However, the weakness of actors remains unclear 
without influential context.  
That is a good reason why political economists contest the 
vulnerability meaning coined by the human ecology school and 
political ecologists emphasize more on the social risk. The risk results 
from not only hazards but also structural institution. Blaikie et al.’s 
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“At Risk: Natural Hazards (1994)” emphasizes the “pressure and 
release” model (PAR) to understand how disasters happen when 
natural stresses affect vulnerable people. Dynamic pressure translates 
the effects of root cause into the vulnerability of unsafe conditions. 
The release idea is the reduction of disaster, the pressure and 
vulnerability. Global processes (population growth, rapid 
urbanization, land degradation and conversion, global environmental 
change and war) affect vulnerability in leading to unequal access to 
resources, malnutrition, and poor health. 
Another aspect is geography. Many geographers perceive social 
vulnerability in terms of time and space. Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 
(2003) quantitatively use social vulnerability in the United States on 
1990 data to identify the individual characteristics of people 
comprising of age, race, health, income, type of housing unit and 
employment. Those social factors result partially in the social 
inequalities and influence the susceptibility and response of various 
groups to harm. Furthermore, place inequalities are influenced by the 
attributes of communities and the constructed factors such as 
urbanization and economic growth.  Those affected people experience, 
respond to and adapt to hazards, but in turn they are influenced by 
economic, demographic, and housing characteristics. Nevertheless, 
this methodology works quite well by using the quantitative Social 
Vulnerability Index (SoVI), but it is not a perfect system yet since not 
all factors are equal. There is no analysis of the local sub-national 
conditions and social differentiation of vulnerability. Accordingly, the 
weighting is required for further development by integrating social, 
environment and the indicators of natural hazard to develop hazards 
assessments and mitigation. 
On the contrary, the more qualitative livelihood approach put people 
at the center of the context of vulnerability from the external 
environment. The vulnerability of people is fundamentally increased 
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by critical trends, shocks and seasonality. Trends may be predictable 
influence of population, resource use, economy, governance and 
technology on chosen livelihood strategies. Shocks of human health, 
nature, economy and conflict not only destroy those people’s assets 
but also force them to leave their assets as a part of coping strategies. 
The uncertainties of the market, job availability and food make it 
difficult for the poor in developing countries (DFID, 2000).  The study 
thus begins with an investigation of people’s assets and their 
livelihood objectives or outcomes and the livelihood strategies. 
In terms of assets, Sen (1981) identifies famine results from 
entitlement failures in the exchange or market mechanisms even in the 
fertile places. It is said that (1) vulnerability to famine is a direct cause 
of poverty; and (2) poverty directly results in a number of tangible 
assets owned by households.  Therefore, vulnerability is dependent 
upon tangible assets. Still, Swift (1989) widens Sen’s argument that 
famine can be triggered by indirect factors (eg. extreme climate 
events, disease, and war) and direct cause (assets). The assets can be 
invested, stored and claimed in the production, exchange and 
consumption process. Households are able to invest in, and store 
physical capitals (education or health), and claim their resource 
ownerships. With this notion, assets are basically correlated with 
access (Blaikie et al., 1994). The access model includes how 
individuals, groups, or communities use their resources to secure their 
livelihoods in a society. The resources comprise of information, 
money, rights to resources, tools and social networks.  
It is obvious that the livelihood approach rarely underlines natural 
hazards and the influence of structural institutions (state and market or 
organization). The hazard school puts too much weight on physical 
risk while human ecology considers human action without influential 
contexts. At the same time, political ecology too focuses on different 
actors who have unequal power relation towards natural resources.  
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Although the geographer has stratified on space and scale, it seems 
more quantitative without actor differentiation analysis. Thus, Adger 
(2006) concludes commonalities in vulnerability research that 
vulnerability includes exposure and sensitivity to external stresses, 
and the adaptive capacity. Exposure denotes the nature and degree of 
the system that experiences environmental (magnitude, frequency, 
duration, and degree of the hazard) or socio-political stress. Sensitivity 
is the degree that the system is affected by undesirable events 
(exposure and sensitivity defines risk). Adaptive capacity is the ability 
and response of a system to environmental threats or state policy. 
To break down two dichotomies of physical and social risks, Brooks, 
Adger and Kelly (2004) views risk on social-ecological systems 
(SES). Physical climate hazard and socially constructed vulnerability 
are combined through the relationship, “risk= hazard x vulnerability.”  
Vulnerability is measured by resource access and the diverse sources 
of income, as well as asset ownership of individuals or households 
(Adger, 1995).  Brooks, Adger, and Kelly (2004) divide key indicators 
of vulnerability that limit adaptation into three broad categories: 
health (consumption, life expectancy and maternal mortality), 
governance (participation in political process) and education (access 
to skillful jobs and information). Adger et.al (2009) and Eiser et al. 
(2012) also add values and ethics, risk, knowledge and culture as 
limitations of adaptation. The perception of risk may also restrict 
decision-making about adaptation if the society is not concerned about 
the risks to kick off any action. In addition, those people who lack 
awareness about future climate hazards that can result in loss of place 
and culture often delay their adaptation actions. They lose their 
identity, power of decision-making and encouragement.   
At this stage, I aim to employ the social-ecological systems (SES) idea 
that is a combination of both physical risks and socio-economic risks 
to vulnerability of agencies. Physical risks from the hazard school are 
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the biophysical risks (e.g. droughts, floods) and their effects on 
production failures. Exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity will 
also be taken into account. Social risks include market uncertainty, 
weak irrigation systems, labor availability and wage, rice mortgage 
policy and urbanization. Furthermore, Adger’s idea will be adopted to 
understand vulnerability covering exposure, sensitivity and adaptive 
capacity. It means an inability of an agency to cope with the stresses, 
to access resources and to diversify income sources. In this sense, 
being vulnerable or adaptable to hazards is dependent upon their five 
capitals (human, natural, physical, financial and social capital) 
elaborated further in the livelihood concept.  
  2)  Adaptation as a response to climate-related risks 
A vision for adaptation is specified by Pelling (2010) in order to build 
up the policy process and governance by linking adaptation and 
development into three pathways: resilience (maintaining the status 
quo), transition (incremental change by asserting full rights and 
responsibilities), and transformation (radical change by reform in 
political-economy regimes and cultural discourses on development, 
security and risk). Pelling’s work inspired Bassett and Fogelman’s 
2013 idea on classifying adaptation into three literal types: adjustment, 
reformist, and transformative adaptation. They reviewed many papers 
talking about adaptation and found that 70% of the papers focused on 
adjustment adaptation approaches that see climate stress as the key 
cause of vulnerability. A smaller share (27%) refers to reformist 
adaptation to deal with both social risks and biophysical hazards. The 
lowest percentage (3%) relates to the social roots of vulnerability that 
urge the change of policy and economics to achieve transformative 
adaptation. 
Beginning with the smallest share of transformative adaptation, the 
political ecology views transformation as adaptation in terms of 
winner and loser. O’Brien and Leichenko (2003) underline winners 
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and losers as another idea of the transformative adaptation category. 
Winners and losers are naturally and socially constructed. Being a 
winner and a loser are determined by climate sensitivity and 
biophysical vulnerability and social and political construction. In 
terms of globalization, winners or losers may be measured by 
increased or reduced or losing income, gain or loss of employment and 
of productivity and so forth. With climate change, the nations that lose 
less are understood as the relative winners, while the nations losing 
more are the relative losers. Pelling (2010) underlines adaptations in 
the light of addressing root causes and forcing transformation. Radical 
changes must come from socio-political interventions designed to 
transform development and driven by industrialization, which is 
associated with climate change. In this way, human rights will also be 
reasserted to basic needs to balance the unequal world.  
The second biggest share is reformist adaptation. Human ecology 
emphasizes that the contribution of economic development can build 
up adaptation and reduce vulnerability. The school also pays attention 
to socially exposed units such as household, farms and organizations 
(McLaughlin and Dietz, 2008). They hence have different degrees of 
adaptation upon fragile and defenseless persons, class structure, 
governance, economic dependency, property and communities 
(Hewitt, 1978). To lessen vulnerability, Bassett and Fogelman (2013) 
strongly propose the role of human agency and the change of 
institutions through political action. In this sense, the idea of access to 
and control of resources, entitlements, incorporative governance have 
been taken into account (Brooks, Adger and Kelly, 2004; Pelling, 
2010). Moreover, the livelihood approach widens the access concept 
that poor people are supported to build up their assets to access and 
strengthen access to assets. The institutions and policies can influence 
access to assets by creating assets, determining access, and influencing 
rates of asset accumulation. Those with more assets tend to have a 
greater range of options and an ability to switch between multiple 
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strategies to secure their livelihoods. In other words, different assets 
are required to achieve different livelihood outcomes (DFID, 1999). 
The hazard school argues with the human ecology school that the 
increased economic activity seems unlikely to reduce vulnerability, 
but technology advancement can. The school draws a highly 
contribution to the IPCC and UNFCCC policies (2007) in terms of 
adjustment adaptation. It is a way a number of technical mechanisms 
illustrates how science and politics are mutually constructed and 
create top-down policies. Four types of national policy have been 
made: (1) disaster relief plan; (2) control of natural events plan by 
using engineering solutions; (3) plan to integrate technology, 
information, and monitoring system; and (4) combined multi-hazard 
management by establishing various kinds of administrative 
organizations (Burton, Kates and White, 1978). For instance, the New 
York City Panel on Climate Change (NPCC) promotes iterative or 
flexible adaptation pathways by using technological advancements 
and programs (Yohe and Leichenko, 2010).  Thus, adaptation level 
can be checked from the state of acceptable levels of risks that 
maintains the status quo. On the other hand, human ecology argues 
that the discourse of hazard management through engineering and 
technology fails to engage with the political and structural causes of 
vulnerability within society. 
To decrease vulnerability through technology, the hazard school 
believes that people living in prone areas have systematic rational 
decision-making analysis with four patterns of behaviors (Burton, 
Kates and White, 1978). People will deny and ignore the hazard 
exists; will tolerate the potential loss passively; will prevent impacts in 
their location; and will take significant action including abandoning 
the hazard zone. However, different people perceive hazards and 
adjustment differently depending upon the behavior of the individual 
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unit, experience, material wealth, personality, and role of individual in 
a social group.  
Since top-down solution sometimes fails to solve climate problems, 
Birkman (2007) argues that the state policy always ends up with 
conflicts because it isolates society, the economy and the environment 
from sustainable development. A paradigm shift is therefore highly 
required to link and keep the three factors balanced. Thus, Van et al. 
(2008) also propose bottom-up community risk assessments (CRAs) to 
engage participatory methods to deal with current climate risks and to 
reduce vulnerability to climate change. Furthermore, Cutter et al. 
(2012) voice out to policy makers that those managing risk or extreme 
events should consider local places and local actors. Adaptation would 
also be strengthened by using structural and technical responding 
mechanisms and proactive actions of local actors. 
To build up human capacity of adaptation, the IPCC (2010) and 
Pelling (2010) underline the influence of socio-ecological systems 
(SES) theory to construct resilience of the interrelation between social 
learning and self-organization. Social learning is a property of social 
collectives with new values, ideas and practices. Self-organization, 
without direction from the state or other higher-level actors, refers to 
the tendency of the social collective to form new formal organizations.  
Moreover, Adger (1995) argues that coping strategies are counted as a 
kind of adaptation. But adaptation itself is a change of the institutional 
arrangements and the livelihood strategies. Coping may be defined as 
acting to survive within the existing rules falling into three categories: 
(1) initial use of assets (intra-household transfers and loans; and 
selling non-productive assets such as jewelry); (2) disposal of key 
productive assets including livestock; agriculture tools; and sale of 
land; and (3) destitution and suffering migration. Meanwhile, 
adaptation involves alternative income sources, migration or other 
significant changes as well as state interventions. 
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For my study, I cannot take each school of thought for granted in 
isolation because they are related to one another. Adaptation will not 
be achieved unless technical solution and human action are mutually 
constructed and work in cooperation.  In my context, the fish farmer 
households attempt to maintain the status quo without the capacity to 
radically change the hazards and social structure. Therefore, the idea 
in the arena of adjustment is preferable in studying the process of 
adaptation. Social learning and self-organization (Pelling, 2010) will 
be embedded in human capital of livelihood strategy (DFID, 1999). 
 3)   Role of Social Capital in Livelihood Strategy 
The livelihood approach is an important actor-oriented perspective in 
development studies. The case studies for the research are centered on 
fish-pond farming households. How they cope with, resist, and 
recover from the environmental hazards depend upon their livelihood 
assets and their ability to access those assets. 
‘A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both 
material and social resources) and activities required for a 
means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope 
with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or 
enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, 
while not undermining the natural resource base’ (Chambers 
and Conway, 1992). 
The livelihoods framework developed by the Sustainable Rural 
Livelihoods Advisory Committee aims at improving our 
understanding of livelihoods, particularly those of the poor that are 
shaped by different shifting forces and factors (DFID, 2000). People-
centered analysis begins with people’s assets, their objectives 
(livelihood outcomes) and livelihood strategies to achieve these 
objectives. The strategies analysis begins with people’s five assets 
which are human capital, natural capital, physical capital, financial 
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capital and social capital (DFID, 2000). Human capital represents the 
skills, knowledge, as well as the ability to labor and good health. 
Natural capital is the natural resource stocks that provide resource 
flows and services. Physical capital comprises the basic infrastructure 
and producer goods needed to support livelihoods. Financial capital 
denotes the financial resources that people use to achieve their 
livelihood objectives. Social capital means the social resources 
networks and connectedness, membership of more formalized groups 
and relationships of trust, reciprocity and exchanges.  
The livelihood outcome will be achieved through the relative 
dynamics of those five asset capitals. An analytical framework of 
Bebbington (1999) claims that people’s access to the five types of 
capital asset can combine and transform to build up livelihood 
viability and to reduce poverty. In addition, social capital (family, 
communities, the state, market and civil society) can widen their 
access to resources and other types of capital assets (produced, human, 
natural, social, and cultural).  Moreover, their assets can be organized 
and enhanced to capabilities for better living and to change dominant 
rules to control, distribute and transform resources in society. Even 
though Bebbington’s main focus on peasant viability and poverty is 
not consistent with my scope of study, asset capital transformation 
will be applicable to understanding vulnerability and climate 
adaptation.  
Access has many dimensions as raised by many scholars. Sen (1981) 
points out access with conditions to gain resources and rights, the so- 
called entitlement. It is such a given right or what people should have.  
In contrast, Leach et al. (1999) argue that entitlement does not refer to 
people’s rights in a normative sense; instead it is the range of 
possibilities that people can have. Entitlement is based on endowment 
which is defined as a person’s initial ownership of land or labor 
power. Entitlement becomes endowment through negotiation. In other 
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words, informal access can be negotiated to be institutional 
endowment as long as it can turn into formal rights of access and vice 
versa.  
However, the concept of entitlement relied on initial capital assets 
might not give people ability or empowerment to claim their rights. 
Some community might have less capability to achieve or increase the 
level of access through institutional negotiation. In fact, access is 
better to start from individual ability in accessing to resources. Ribot 
and Peluso (2003) succeeded in expanding the idea of access beyond 
the fixed bundle of rights of property. Access embedded in property is 
hence based on the difference between ability and rights. The ability is 
akin to power in two senses: (1) as the capacity of some actors to 
affect the practices and ideas of others; and (2) as an emergent form 
that is- not always attached to people. Power has to be obviously seen 
as emerging and thus inherent in certain kinds of relationships.  
Livelihood diversification is another way of access to resources. 
Hussein, Karim and Nelson (1998) claim that people construct their 
sustainable livelihood via three main interrelated strategies: 
agricultural intensification; livelihood diversification; and migration. 
Due to agricultural intensification failures, they not only diversify 
their livelihood but also migrate to access to higher income sources 
and other capitals through two factors. Push factors refer to 
environmental risk, falling incomes and pull factors means changing 
terms of trade, perceptions of improved opportunities.  
Under the current transformations of global, national and local 
unstable economies, livelihood diversification is expected to be more 
complex and diverse. Family members tend to work both on-and off-
farm activities to afford incomes and to reduce environmental risk 
(Stard and Johnson, 2004). Similar to de Sherbinin et al. (2008), they 
link environmental variables to the demographic variables that result 
in multiple pathways: fertility, migration, morbidity and mortality, and 
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lifecycles. It is observed that households depend on natural resources 
intensification when human and social capital are lost through adult 
morbidity, and mortality. Moreover, environmental factors influence 
household decision making on fertility and migration. In fact, the idea 
cannot generalize all types of people because of differences faced by 
people who are poor, middle-class, or rich. They are all driven by 
institution and crucial market forces that determine their decisions on 
fertility, migration and lifecycles. 
The research will use the five livelihood assets: human capital, natural 
capital, physical capital, financial capital and social capital (DFID, 
2000) which are exposed to both climate and social risks. Meanwhile, 
some people diversify and other specialize their livelihood in response 
to the risks and to increase ability to combine, to transform the forms 
of assets (Bebbington, 1999) and to access to resources (Ribot and 
Peluso, 2003). In this way, access ability to resources conveys the 
level of access profile and income opportunities (Blaikie et al., 1994). 
Yet, the level of access will not increase unless social capital is taken 
into account. 
Social capital can reduce vulnerability and build up livelihood 
adaptation within fish-pond farming households and among 
communities. Tracing back to historical social capital concepts, Field 
(2003) criticizes Bourdieu that (1970s-1980s) for focusing too much 
on material social capital since he adheres to Marxian unequal access 
and power to resources. People are able to use cultural symbols arising 
from habitus as determinant of the social status. Habitus means 
lifestyle, values, charterer of particular groups gained from every life 
experience. Some types of cultural taste enjoy more status and power 
than others.  Years later, Colemen (1988) has had a much wider 
influence than Bourdieu. He argues that the individuality without 
social capital is a thread of distribution of skills.  
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Social capital is a key element to enhancing livelihood security, 
reducing environmental risk, and to solve economic instability, but 
social capital can also exclude certain groups etc. It is not necessarily 
a good then for everyone, but an empirical question. In sociology, 
social capital is defined as: (1) a social control source; (2) a benefit 
source of the family, and (3) a source of non-family networks, with 
the benefits of a material and informational collection (Adger, 2003). 
In this way, the relationships between individuals, households, intra-
households, organizations, regional and macro economies can be 
incorporated to enhance wellbeing, sustainability of livelihoods and 
poverty alleviation (Bebbington, 1999). The economic point of view 
argues that social capital within household does not favor collusion. 
Thus, the non-family network is rather effective form to reduce 
transactions costs. Traders with better connections build up larger 
scales and more value is added than those with less (Fafchamps and 
Minten, 1998). However, the number of contacts is a measure of 
social capital output in this study, so it blinds us from the 
characteristics of actors and related social context.  
To have a clearer scale of social capital, in contrast with Bourdieu, 
Coleman, and other economists, Putnam (1993) pays more attention to 
the resources. He introduces two basic forms of social capital: 
bridging (or inclusive) and bonding (or exclusive). Bridging social 
capital tends to involve diverse people whereas bonding social capital 
tends to reinforce exclusive identities and maintain homogeneity. 
However, Woolock (2001) writes that Putnam’s argument on ties 
between different people in dissimilar situations, particularly that of 
outsiders, enable people to influence a wider range of resources than 
are available within the community. In reality, social ties are 
embedded in vertical and horizontal ties. Two types of relationships 
are based on the position of each group of people. The horizontal 
dimension represents the ties of those people who have similar 
positions or work at the similar level within the group. The vertical 
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refers to the different levels of interaction between two groups of 
people in superior-subordinate relationships. Putnam argues that 
vertical bonds might be less helpful than horizontal ties that might 
undermine the capacity for collective action and the ability to access 
as well as influence over state and market (Bebbington, 1999). On the 
other hand, those areas based on horizontal social relationships (with 
trust and shared values), participation of people in social organizations 
and networks are high.  It is seen that Putnam and Bebbington 
likewise highlight the importance of horizontal linkages, but neglect 
power inequalities from the vertical dimension mentioned in DFID 
(2000). It is noted that social capital means the social resources 
through both vertical or horizontal networks and connectedness. The 
network is able to increase people’s trust and collective action while 
expanding their access to wider connections.  
However, Putnam’s bridging and bonding idea has influenced many 
scholars. Group progress is related to not only the locally availability 
of social capital but also the collaboration from government and 
voluntary agencies (Pretty and Ward, 2001). Adger (2003) also claims 
that collective action and social capital inform the nature of adaptive 
capacity and the direction of adaptation policies. He divides social 
capital into four extreme cases. First, a “well-functioning state with 
low level of networking social capital” can provide the necessary and 
social security for marginalized groups. Second, a “well-functioning 
state with high levels of networking social capital” promotes social 
and policy learning through democratic participation and 
environmental governance. Moreover, “a dysfunctional or absent 
state with low levels of networking social capital” (coercive states) 
excludes or undermines social capital. Thus, conflict and 
marginalization are found. The last one is “a dysfunctional or absent 
state with high levels of networking social capital”. Networking social 
capital is built to replace some government roles. 
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Still, Bebbington and Perreault (1999) argue that social capital 
formation cannot be achieved without the state’s help. It occurs at 
wider geographic scales achieved by the creation of organizations and 
networks. The vertical relationship from civil society and state actors 
plays an important role in widening the ability of household with 
horizontal connection and encourage the communities to access 
different types of capitals. The network can widen access resources, 
claim making, defend and transform assets.  On the contrary, Pelling 
(1998) argues that vertical social capital distorts horizontal 
relationship since it shapes access and excludes local participation 
from national and international resources. For example, marginalized 
groups with limited capitals tend to be excluded from local 
participatory and decision-making in the environmental management. 
As a result, they are still struck in perennial vulnerability to climate 
risk. However, prior to relying on external ties, Ribot and Peluso 
(2003) claim that individuals or actors can build up emerging ability 
to access that is- not always attached to people and reliant on other 
helps. With this idea, people can develop their DIY ability as a way to 
strengthen their further bridging and bonding. 
Social capital here is bound up with the reciprocity of the wider 
network, exchange through trust, shared value, common interests, 
common rules, norms and sanctions(Adger, 2003; Pretty and Ward, 
2001). Granovetter (1985) cited in Tonkiss (2004); and Fu (2004) 
claim that trust is a social mechanism embodied in structures of 
personal relations and networks. Fu further elaborates that trust and 
social capital are interrelated. Social capital brings about trusting 
relationship and vice versa. Moreover, trust can be mobilized for 
financial capital and other resource accesses (Tonkiss, 2004). James 
Coleman (1988) cited in Tonkiss (2004) the example of the quasi-
economic capital of the Jewish family and community. Up to the 
1980s, the wholesale diamond traders in Brooklyn used their cultural, 
social and family ties and shared norms to operate the local trade. To 
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alleviate economic risks, the relationship provides exchange security 
and reduces associated costs 
There are two types of trust: trust in family relations and in non-family 
networks. Tonkiss (2004) argued that familial relations are bound up 
with trust, voluntary obligations and compelling norms. But trust in 
either networks or organizations, is more complex (Fu, 2004). Trust 
derives from regulations, rules and so called structured relations of the 
organization (McCauley & Kuhnert, 1992). Nevertheless, Granovetter 
(1985) cited in Tonkiss (2004) and Granovetter (1973) argue that 
social ties are more useful for people seeking work in communities 
with weak ties than in the strong ones. They have more potential to 
access information and enhance new contacts outside their usual 
circles.  
Where is trust from? Prusak (2014) and Putnam (1993) cited in Fu 
(2004) proposes that people trust someone they know from repeated 
exchange, sharing and reciprocal relationships. Collective action of 
bounded solidarity can also be transformed into power as long as the 
group members selflessly sacrifice for the collective good. Collective 
action is also passed on by individuals through kinship or through 
interactions with the state, market, and the civil society (Pelling, 2010 
cited in Portes, 2010). This kind of interaction becomes generalized 
and gets embedded in the norms.  In addition, trust is developed from 
the transparency of the organization by means of meetings, weekly 
reports and working progress to keep the group members updated. Fu 
(2004) adds that trust indicates a willingness of persons to follow 
another party based on the belief in their skill and capability, their 
reliability and their openness (Nahapit and Ghoshal, 1998 cited in Fu, 
2004). In this way, fair and just leaders in organizations create trust 
and high social capital between supervisor and subordinate 
relationships (Prusak, 2014). 
 
  25 
 
To measure intangible social capital, Paldam (2000) reviews many 
means as follows. The first mean is to measure trust and ease of 
cooperation. Trust payoff can measure social capital as the amount of 
benefits persons can draw on the trust build. Ease of cooperation is the 
ability of people to voluntarily work together for a common purpose 
of the groups and organizations. Likewise, Fukuyama (1995) cited in 
Tonkiss (2004) distinguish ‘high-trust’ from ‘low-trust’ societies 
based on forms of voluntary association. Fu (2004) proposes that 
people with high trust are more willing to participate in social 
exchange and interactions. They have durable reciprocal labor 
relations to reduce transaction costs and increase the efficiency of 
work performance (Levine & Tyson, 1990). The outcome of the social 
interaction is innovation to solve the collective problems and to 
achieve common goals. Additionally, Putnam’s instrument can be 
used to count the density of voluntary organizations, the 
frequency/intensity of the contacts. Also, the lines between voluntary 
and state organizations, as well as between voluntary organizations 
and private businesses, should be drawn. In terms of networks and the 
trust-cooperation-complex, network payoff refers to the social capital 
of a person. It is the total amount of benefits he/she can draw on 
his/her network. Furthermore, the measurement can be used to ask 
trust questions, particularly about money loans. Network density 
measures also helps map people’s networks and weight each link of 
formed person.  
In short, social capital is bound up with both the qualitative analysis 
and quantitative measurement.  In this regard, Putnam’s idea (1993) of 
social capital in terms of bridging (household) and bonding 
(community and fish farmer cooperatives) will be used to coincide 
with the DFID (2000) statement through networks and connectedness, 
either vertical or horizontal dimension (Adger, 2003). Moreover, 
individuals and the network are strengthened to expand access (Ribot 
and Peluso, 2003) to wider institutions with relationships of trust, 
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reciprocity and exchanges.  These elements will be measured by the 
scale of social capital (household, community and external 
institutions) and by the payoff of trust and network in terms of 
innovation, exchange and sharing as well as Putnam’s instrument. 
 1.5.2  Review of empirical studies 
The aim of this research is to examine social capital as a tool of vulnerability and 
adaptation to climate-related risks. Thus, I review two issues: vulnerability and 
adaptation to climate-related risks; and social capital under vulnerability. 
Climate change seems to increase as a result of physical climate and human 
intervention. Eissa and Zaki (2011) emphasize that rising sea levels and climate change 
are predicted to affect a number of aquatic animals and those people who rely on the 
resources. Nowadays, dams cause dramatic changes in flow and fluctuations in water 
supply. As a result, increased flooding or water scarcities destroy ecosystems and 
humans. Weatherhead and Howden (2009) also highlight the interlinked problem 
between land use and limited water resources in United Kingdom. Competing water use 
becomes high in response to population growth, agriculture, industry, and infrastructure.  
This case reminds me of urbanization towards fish pond farming that negative impacts 
of water stress possibly degrade fish growth, thus generating less income for fish-pond 
farmers.  
Moreover, the-socio economic context worsens the livelihood of a different kind of 
people prone to climate risks. Azga (2011) studies those people of Gaibandha District of 
Bangladesh who have adapted to live with perennial flood. Low-incomes people are 
found to be the most vulnerable groups because of their limited access to land and 
livelihoods. Many family members of the poor also rely on single income. Moreover, 
the vulnerability to flooding is increasing due to the pressure of increasing population 
and high cost of investment in intensive modern cultivation techniques, maltreatments 
of power, corruption, urban bias, gender disparity and existing religious practices. 
Similar to the changing weather braved by the rural mountain people in Nepal, the poor 
has faced crop failure and are vulnerable due to limited land ownership and limited 
support from the local organizations.  The well off and middle-class, which own 
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irrigated land, have better access to agriculture services provided by local organizations 
and state agencies. They then sell their labor force and seasonally migrate to India 
(Gentle and Maraseni, 2012). 
Pond aquaculture ultimately maximizes local natural resources and total agricultural 
production by combining aquaculture, fruit, rice and livestock together. Phong et al. 
(2007) studies Integrated Agriculture Aquaculture (IAA) systems in the Mekong Delta 
of Vietnam. They argue that it is easier for the rich farmers who have good farming 
skills and capital to decide to intensify their farming systems. By contrast, the poorer 
farmers tend to diversify their livelihood. Some stop farming and become hired labor 
for rich farmers. Some do off farm in the city. Khin (2013) also argues that well-off 
farmers strategically manage the risk through various actions, such as substituting or 
trading-off or combining their available resources. Still, most poor farmers access the 
labor market through migration with the help of kinship or social networks.  
In terms of the scale of aquaculture farmer operation, small, medium and large units 
have different strategies for survival under the pressure of climate and socio-economic 
risks. Chiep (2001) studies the excluded fisher farmers’ responses for legitimacy in 
obtaining access to fishery resources in Tonle Sap, Cambodia. He explores the 
complexity of the social relations of each scale, either among the kinship group or with 
influential people in competing for gaining access to fish resources. His findings show 
that only a limited number of the large-scale of fish farmers benefits while the majority 
remains disadvantaged.  
Even though doing small-scale fishing and fish farming face high risks of uncertain fish 
production and exposed location, migration or mobility might not be a solution for the 
fish farmer staying put in their farms. Thus, diversifying livelihood into more than one 
income source can diminish the possibility of risks (Allison and Ellis, 2001). Bosma and 
Verdegem (2011) mainly discuss that the intensification of aquaculture system is the 
most sustainable way to increase aquaculture production. All scholars agree that the 
poor producer can employ new technologies to make the financial and social factors 
more sustainable and more resource-efficient. Khondker and Diemuth (2011) add that 
the integrated aquaculture-agriculture (IAA) training helps increase food consumption 
and better nutrition of the small-scale farmers in Bangladesh. Longoni (2011) also 
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introduces the education model, specifically semi-subsistence, to make small-scale fish 
farming both more environmentally and more economically sustainable.  
Technology and knowledge utilization as a significantly worthwhile way for fish 
farmers’ adjustment are led by the younger generation and social networks. Pickering et 
al. (2011) claim that the reproduction, growth and survival of the tilapia farming are 
expected to be sensitive to the increase of temperatures, salinity and oxygen level 
changes. Moreover, floods caused by cyclones and more extreme rainfall events are at 
risk to tilapia ponds constructed close to rivers. According to advice from social 
network, locating and constructing ponds are a way of adaptation to reduce any effects 
of warmer pond temperatures and to increase the mixing of water or turnover as the way 
to balance plankton blooms as natural food which helps minimize the cost of 
supplementary feeding. The claim coincides with what Ford and Smit (2004) have 
studied regarding the adaptability and resilience of indigenous Arctic groups. Owing to 
cultural and social changes, the young adopt new technology and distribute this to 
others with the help of strong social networks. They extend experience and knowledge 
for more flexible use of the environment (Fabricius and Cundill, 2010).  
The adaptation concept here typically focuses on resistance, adjustment, mobility and 
diversification of vulnerable groups of the poor, but social networks are rarely found. 
To increase and improve the sharing of resources, cooperation and mutual interest can 
be a promising option for fish farmers. Social relation within household and community 
levels will be taken into consideration. Individuals and family members have different 
ability to cope with or adapt to climate change under socio economic dynamics. 
The dichotomy of mobility and social capital has been raised by many scholars. It is 
noted that high mobility will be made in any place in which the degree of social capital 
is low (Kusakabe et al., 2003). Farmers tend to have access to the means of production 
and consumption in different places. On the contrary, without social connectedness 
construction, the rate of mobility is high in Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Mali. The poor 
migrate to earn remittance to relieve rural credit constraints. Social connectedness also 
reduces risk and maximizes household utility of rural investment (Dercon and Krishnan, 
1996 cited in Hussein and Nelson, 1998).   
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In terms of vertical and horizontal ties, Belton (2012) provides a comparative analysis 
of knowledge transmission in Vietnam and Thailand. In both cases, informal channels 
are more successful than official attempts to extend technology in aquaculture.  The 
transmission grows in interpersonal relationships such as local kinship, reciprocity, 
obligation implied in relationships in addition to location-specific historical contexts 
and the particular groups of institution. However, the horizontal relationship is not well 
successful without the vertical help like in the case of the Mozambique people 
vulnerable to low maize production because of low rainfall. Thus, the strategic formal 
agricultural associations in Nwadjahane have been working in cooperation with the 
local community, local government and international non-government organizations 
(NGOs). They aim at addressing local vulnerability to drought promoting food security 
and poverty reduction (Osbahr et al., 2008).  
Nevertheless, social ties are different depending on place-based characteristics. Adger 
(2003) examines two case studies of social capital formation: (1) the collaborations 
between state and civil society in coastal resource management in Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago; and (2) the state roles replaced by the networks towards hazard 
management in Vietnam. In Tobago, positive cooperation between the government and 
local communities to protect marine areas had been facilitated to solve conflicts and set 
up a new institution in the late 1990s. In contrast, in the mid-1990s, due to the 
decentralization and the collapse of agricultural cooperatives, local communities 
founded the planning and a system of coastal hazard prevention in Vietnam to substitute 
for the state. Both cases examine the nature of social capital from institution structures 
depending upon culture and place-specific characteristics. Additionally, Mexican 
farmers who suffered from coffee plantation failure have shifted to grow sugar-cane, 
which requires less labor and is supported by government programs. The programs also 
provide social security and healthcare through farmers’ associations. In Argentina, 
without organization support, those farmers growing soy faced profit cuts due to higher 
investment costs and increased environmental risks. They had little ability to integrate 
local knowledge of environment and land management. Thus, most small- and medium-
sized family farmers abandoned their farms, deciding to rent out their farmlands to 
larger-scale farmers or outside capitalists (Hallie et al., 2009). It is found that both 
vertical and horizontal ties in different contexts are important driving forces for the 
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local people’s decision-making about vulnerability to climate-related and socio-
economic risks. For my study, both relationships are thus essential to determine the way 
social capital empowers people’s ability to access resources at household and 
community levels.  
1.6  Conceptual Framework 
In this research, my main objective is to understand how social capital builds up the 
livelihood adaptation of fish pond farmers. The secondary questions are firstly, how fish 
farming households of small-, medium- and large-scale operations face the 
vulnerabilities. The second question is how the scale of fish farm operations influences 
adaptive capacities to cope with vulnerability. Finally, social capital will be examined in 
relation to their adaptation at household and community levels.  
Let’s begin with risks. Households and communities are exposed and sensitive to both 
physical and socio-economic risks as drivers of vulnerability. The physical risks include 
droughts, floods, rainfall pattern and climate variability. The socio-economic risks 
comprise of market uncertainties, weak irrigation systems, labor availability and wages, 
rice mortgage policies and urbanization. With different abilities, the small-, medium- 
and large-scale fish farmers respond to these stresses in different ways. Being 
vulnerable to risks is indicated by the inability to cope/adapt as well as resource 
conflicts. To reduce vulnerability, the three groups of fish farmers can develop their 
abilities via social capital to differently resist, cope with, adapt to or recover from the 
risks. Their social connectedness also reinforces access profile, high income 
opportunities and high productivity. 
The role of social capital will be essentially highlighted in climate adaptation. Social 
capital is inextricably entwined with money, labor, land, water and information/ 
knowledge. These capitals can be transformed to and combined with each other to 
increase ability of access. The social capital analysis is divided into family and non-
family networks. The first network comprises households and neighbors while the latter 
means state agencies, agro-food companies, universities, irrigation groups and village- 
committees. Fish farmer cooperatives and Muang Fai members are reckoned in both 
types of networks. In addition, the levels of analysis are fish farming households and 
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their communities. Thus, types of households are categorized based on scale of 
operation into small-, medium- and large scale. Furthermore, the fish farmer 
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1.7  Research Methodology 
 17.1  Research Site 
The number of sites varied among three villages in three provinces with the main idea of 
covering rural and peri-urban sites, density of intensive fish-pond farming and disaster 
experiences including conflicting access to water; and the pressure of socio-economic 
change on agricultural and aquaculture activities. From figure 1.1, the rural site is 1) 
Sanpakhee Village in Sanklang Sub-district, Phan District, Chiang Rai. The village is 
regulated by a Sub-district Administrative organization1 that is considered as a small town. 
It has the highest commercial tilapia productivity in Northern Thailand under the Mae Lao 
and Mae Souy small irrigation system; 2) Maekaedluang Village in Nongchom Sub-district, 
Sansai District, Chiang Mai is under sub-district municipalities. The site is considered as 
the tilapia supplies are in a peri-urban area (a big city) and reliant on the Maefaek-Maengat 
Irrigation project and Mae Ngat Somboon Chol Dam. Muang Fai system is predominated 
by the Royal Irrigation Department. The last local site is 3) Tamphralae Village, Ban Tam 
Sub-district, Muang District, Phayao, under sub-district municipalities. The site in located 
in a medium town.  The tilapia source is in the watershed areas in the small basin. Water 
users here consume water from Huay Hiek Catchment constructed in 1996, Champathong 
Waterfall, Mai Yang Weir, Champathong Waterfall and Khuntam Waterfall. Water 
allocation is regulated by Kae Muang (communal irrigation leader). 
 
                                                          
 
1 The local government system in Thailand consists of  
(1) municipalities which are divided into city municipalities (with at least 50,000 citizens), town 
municipalities (with at least 10,000 citizens) and sub-district municipalities in any other area.   
(2) Administrative organizations that are divided into provincial administrative organizations and sub-district 
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Figure 1.1 Research sites 
Sanpakhee Village is located about 43 kilometers from Muang Chiang Rai district. It is also 
close to the Asian Highway, which connects it to other main markets in provinces such as 
Phayao, Lampang, Phrae, Nan and Uttaradit, including Chiang Mai. Moreover, the village 
is near Rajamangala University of Technology Lanna Chiang Rai which introduces 
sustainable energy particularly biogas to communities. From Muang Chiang Mai district to 
Maekadluang Village, it is about 13.5 kilometers to Maejo University, the oldest 
agricultural institution in the country. The institution has published research on freshwater 
aquaculture and agriculture while producing a large number of graduates who work in feed 
companies and in the fish trade. Tamphralae Village is 15 and 30 kilometers away from 
Muang Phayao district and Phayao University respectively. The university has launched 
projects and extensive research to address water pollution before flowing to the Ing River. 
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It is noted that both Maekadluang and Tamphralae are regulated by the municipal 
government. 
1.7.2 Unit and Level of Analysis 
Unit and level of analysis are based on Putnam’s (1993) bonding and bridging idea. 
Bonding focuses on the household unit and level. Ties within a social group have been 
shown as bonding social capital. There are the homogeneous family, kinship and 
neighborhood. The household is a decision-making unit under one roof in lessening or 
raising the problems, based on the capacity of family members. Blaikie et al. (1994) also 
claim that a member of a household unit has a profile of assets that determine his/her 
certain ability of access related to income opportunities (cash, wages, gain and 
remittances), information, rights to the means of production, equipment or technologies and 
social networks. When faced with stresses such as drought, flood, fish diseases and death, 
some members decide to employ livelihood strategies and coping mechanisms.   
Table 1.1 Thirty two selected households in three sites 
Scales / Villages 
Number of households 
Sanpakhee Maekaedluang Tamphralae 
Large 3 3 3 
Medium 3 4 3 
Small 3 4 3 
Exit from fish pond culture 1 1 1 
Total 10 12 10 
Bridging of networking social capital is made up of economic and other external ties in the 
community unit and level. The network refers to fish farmer cooperatives and groups 
cooperating with state, agro-industrial companies, other fish-related sources and market 
channels. The groups aim to have access to funds, information/ knowledge, labor and water 
in order to maintain and increase fish productivity and distribution. From table 1.1, the total 
32 case-studied households are categorized into four groups in each site: three households 
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of large-, of medium-, and of small-scales as well as one farmer who completely exited 
from fish-pond farming. Fish farmers in the case studies include both commercial and 
integrated farming in order to examine the relation between the farming systems and risk 
management. The last case study is used to determine social capital impact whether or not 
it encourages fish farmers’ decision to carry on fish farming over climate-related risks. To 
seek for more information in various aspects, 16 key informants from the government 
Department of Fisheries, Royal Irrigation Department, universities and feed companies 
were interviewed. In addition, fish farmers are a part of the Muang Fai group at the 
community level, in charge of water allocation and management. Based on the relationships 
of relatives and neighbors, they share water portions and collaborate in social activities. 
However, the strong local relationship has weakened nowadays through the changing water 
management system and more diversification of agriculture activities and land use. 
Table 1.2 Number of farm types in three villages 
Farming types / Villages 
Number of farm 
Sanpakhee Maekaedluang Tamphralae 
Intensive - 10 6 
Integrated 10 2 3 
Subsistence - 1 1 
Total 10 12 10 
Besides size operation, the case studies are divided into the ones who implement integrated 
and intensive fish-pond farming (table 1.2). Both farms comprise of different farm 
characteristics on inputs, investment cost and exposure. Here you see that all the fish 
farmers in Sanpakhee adopt the integrated pig-fish farming system. The majority of fish 
farming is intensive (83%) in Maekaedluang. Two out of ten fish farmers implement 
integrated chicken-fish farming, whereas there is just one subsistence system from the ex-
fish farmers who exited from the fish group and turned to work fulltime off-farm. Intensive 
fish farming in Tamphralae is 60 %, integrated system 30% and the rest is subsistence 
farming also implemented by the ex-fish farmers who are out of the fish group.  
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1.7.3 Data Collection 
I used both primary and secondary data for the research. The first kind of data was gathered 
from the fieldworks. The field data collection duration was divided into three periods of 
time at the end of 2012 to the beginning of 2014: dry season (February- May), rainy season 
(May- October) and winter (October-February). The allocated period is a good time for 
studying the different climate impacts on pond-based aquaculture. This is because fish is 
sensitive to different climate variations and seasonal fluctuations throughout the year. 
Collecting data on their responses to risks is indicative of various fish farmers’ coping 
capacity and adaptation. Qualitative studies were undertaken by thematic process research 
based on secondary data collection, participant observation, household dairy and in-depth 
interview of household and related key informants.  
1.7.4 Researcher Identification   
It was very important for me to position myself prior to and during the field visits. I was 
both insider and outsider in the three villages. The village where I live in Chiang Mai was 
near Maekaedluang Village, which made it easier for me to understand the contexts as well 
as historical and social movements. I also became very familiar with the villagers and 
quickly understood the nested linkage of the case studies that made the social capital issue 
more complex and accurate. However, my position was not viewed completely positively 
because I am a daughter of one fish groups out of the three with commercially competitive 
relationship to one another. Some of them naturally had bias against me. I therefore 
informed and explained to them my objectives and the scope of the work in order to clarify 
my position and ask for social acceptance.  
Again being an outsider in Sanpakhee and Tamphralae obstructed me from gaining 
information. The villagers and fish farmer cooperatives and groups felt strange and difficult 
at the first because they were both commercial competitors with each other and with 
Chiang Mai traders. Thus, I tried to avoid approaching them with the topic about financial 
interest but via the cultural and social issue. For instance, when talking about family and 
the way of fish farming in Chiang Mai, I encouraged them to be open-minded and got them 
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interested in exchanging information. This approach was beneficial for me in gaining new 
knowledge and experiences. Once I started visiting the fields more often, I became more 
familiar with them and kept them updated on my progress. To win the case studies over, I 
became like a coordinator who exchanged and shared available information from the 
communities to the others. Some fish farmers in the three sites asked me about the material 
uses in different places so that they could improve their farming. The more they shared and 
exchanged information from different contexts, the effective more I became and the more 
precise the data.  
 1.7.5 Secondary Data Collection 
Prior to and during the fieldwork, I collected documents and articles related to the research 
content from various sources such as theses, statistics of water irrigation from the Statistical 
Forecasting Bureau of the National Statistical Office, Mae Lao Transmittal and 
Maintenance Project, Mae Faek Mae Ngad Operation and Management Project and Phayao 
Operation and Maintenance Project, the Royal Irrigation Department and Thai 
Meteorological Department. The information covered a timeline of about 30 years of both 
hazard events and the main events related to agriculture and freshwater aquaculture 
development. The source of the studies also included household demographics and farming 
and off-farming activities. The information was gained from the sub-district municipalities 
and the sub-district administrative organizations. Pond-based aquaculture policy was 
collected from the Department of Fisheries (DOF). The information on fish productivity 
data and group members of the fish group were also offered by fish farmer cooperatives and 
groups as well as related feed firms.  
 1.7.6 Participant Observation 
The participant observation method was important for my data collection. The information 
needed was gathered from individual households in terms of their knowledge of fish feed, 
technology implementation and their geographical locations prone to risks in addition to 
their risk perception, their family members’ profiles and their daily lifestyles as well as 
their social networks. In terms of social capital data, I observed how fish farmers with 
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different scales of operation interact with each other and in community to explore their 
power relations and assistance. Moreover, in order to gather data on adaptation methods 
used by individuals and community, I spent time within the community to immerse myself 
in the situ and to observe the people’s practices, while taking notes, recording and taking 
photos.  I spent 3-4 days on each site collecting data each time. I visited Sanpakhee and 
Tamphralae 8 times each, and 14 times in Maekaedluang which was near my hometown. I 
often followed and helped them while working in the farms such as feeding fish, 
implementing aerators, feeding either pigs or chickens, making herbal feed and so on. 
While participating in their work, I took the opportunity to observe who played a role in 
farming; and their feelings and perception on what they had done in farming. This helped 
me immensely to understand the reasons behind their choosing to farm, whether it was a 
must in order to deal with household burdens or working hard just for accumulated wealth. 
It was useful to clearly understand how much experience they had which could determine 
the adaptive capacities. Above all, the empirical data was used to cross check with the 
secondary data about adverse weather events and hazards and with other villagers. 
 1.7.7 In-Depth Semi-Structured Interviews  
In total, interviews with 16 external key informants and 32 case studied households were 
carried out. It was necessary to understand the background of the sites before selecting the 
16 key fish farming informants. Firstly, this selection consisted of semi-structured 
interviews from the key informants including feed agencies, fish farmers and the agencies 
of the DOF and RID. Furthermore, village headman and village committee gave me the 
general village information, their livelihood and the impacts of climate-related risks as well 
as the state role on disaster prevention and solution. In terms of water irrigation 
management, Kae Muang and RID agencies were key informant. They were keen on the 
geographical waterway, flood and drought histories, water management problems as well as 
water management strategies.  In addition, interviewing DOF agencies and feed agencies 
allowed me to understand government policies regarding flood insurance and new 
technological development used in the farming system. The policies propelled fish farmers 
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to adopt either livelihood diversification or intensification to change farm resources and 
market opportunities.  
Later on, total 32 households as the case study were selected. I basically followed 
ethnography which was rooted from the cultural anthropology and conveyed a cultural 
description and understood another way of life from the native point of view (Neuman, 
2006). In this way, the information included their livelihood information and their capital 
assets.  There were their livelihood profiles: knowledge, age, experience, household income 
and labor, a burden of household expenditure, investment cost, kinship, and friendship 
within household and external people, which offered the analysis of their adaptive capacity 
to climate related risks. In addition, since the social capital was an abstract concept, the 
quantitative questions were needed for more measurable analysis.  
The social connections questions were hence asked with regard to the intensity and 
frequency in their circle of family members, neighbors, friends and other external 
organizations who offered help and whom they trusted. Then the trust questions were used 
to support the trust payoff, especially what kind of collective activities they were willing to 
do and share together. The questions were asked as follows. (1) Whom in your circle of 
networks do you trust with their advice and example? (2) Whom in your circle of networks 
do you think trusts you with your advice and knowledge? (3) How do you trust them and 
they trust you? (4) Are you willing to share, cooperate with and help the ones you trust? (5) 
Do you follow who you trust and the regulation of the fish group, and how? (6) If so, why 
do you change your action? (7) If not, why do not you change your action? Here, a recorder 
was necessary to record the implicit and explicit information emerging naturally without 
hesitation and bother from the key informants. 
 1.7.8 Data Analysis 
This study was qualitatively based on key household and informant narratives. The 
recorded data were taped and transcribed from local Northern Thai dialect to the Central 
Thai language. Selected parts were then translated into English according to the main 
themes of the research. In this process, thematic analysis was implemented as a common 
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form to pinpoint and examine the themes within the data in accordance with research 
questions. The data was concerned with the climate and socio-economic risks, the 
vulnerability of the fish farmers, their adaptive capacity and the role of social capital in 
their adaptation. Based on rapid appraisal, analysis was based on informality of collecting 
data; flexibility of field visit time and sites; data triangulation to compare data between 
sources to check its reliability. The method also enhances the relevance of the local people 
in verifying the findings. This process made the three essential techniques, which are semi-
structured interviews, participant observation and secondary data, high potentialities for the 
purpose of this study and for validity and accuracy.  
1.8   Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis contains six chapters. This analysis is presented with reference to a series of 
qualitative empirical studies conducted in Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai and Phayao provinces, 
Thailand. 
Chapter 1 describes the study, background, research questions and research objectives. 
Literature review is also related to (1) vulnerability to climate-related and socio-economic 
risks; (2) adaptation of fish farmers; and (3) the role of social capital in livelihood 
strategies. In addition, research methodology and data analysis methods are elaborated.  
Chapter 2 identifies the contexts of aquaculture development from national level to 
northern level and to the study areas. The study also highlights the physical and socio-
economic contexts of the three villages: Sanpakhee Village in Chiang Rai, Maekaedluang 
in Chiang Mai and Tamphralae in Phayao. The physical contexts comprise of location, 
topography and water management. Socio-economic contexts are population, production 
system, land use, fish pond system and fish production. In addition, the study explores the 
reasons for pond-based aquaculture implementation and fish farmer cooperative 
development. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the main vulnerabilities of fish farming households with different 
scales of operations. In this regard, small, medium and large fish operators in each village 
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have been differently exposed and sensitive to the incidents resulting from multiple climate-
related and socio-economic risks. Access levels of water resources and degree of 
urbanization mediate site vulnerability. Household vulnerability is measured by aging, 
personal wealth, frail family member, labor availability, investment costs, fish death and 
fish weight; thus where and what kind of people are most vulnerable is also investigated.  
Chapter 4 elaborates the adaptive capacity of households and communities in response to, 
to cope with, adapt to, and recover from hazards. The chapter identifies how fish farmers 
convert capitals to access as adaptive capacity; how they with different scale operations 
cope with climate variability; and how fish farmers adapt to climate-related and socio-
economic risks. Many technologies and experience as well as much knowledge are 
highlighted as key tools to constitute their adaptive capacity.  
Chapter 5 examines the role of social capital in climate adaptation. The social capital 
analysis is divided into kin, neighbor groups and external networks. Bonding networks 
comprise of households and neighbors while bridging networks refer to state agencies, 
agro-food companies, universities, irrigation groups and village committee. The study 
focuses on the reconstruction of bonding through bridging fish farmer cooperatives.  By 
linking the relationship, social capital components are studied on how they increase level of 
adaptive capacity. How bonding and bridging network play an important role on water-
related stresses is elaborated in the last chapter. 
The last chapter concludes the thesis by elaborating upon the main research findings and 
results. It presents some theoretical reflections on academic distribution and further 





Development of Freshwater Aquaculture 
This chapter provides an analysis on how aquaculture development, moved from the 
global to regional, then to the local level until it is implemented in Thailand’s upper 
northern provinces. Three villages are the main focus of the study. These are 
Maekaedluang Village in Chiang Mai, Sanpakhee Village in Chiang Rai and 
Tamphralae Village in Phayao according to the aquaculture initiative. The sites are 
characterized by their particular physical and socio economic contexts. For more 
information, the study takes into account the location, topology, irrigation system, 
population, production system, land use and the number of fish farms. The reasons for 
adopting pond-based aquaculture and fish farmer cooperation development are also 
taken into consideration. 
2.1  Development of Aquaculture at National Level 
Nile tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus) is considered in this study as this species of fish 
constitutes a large share in global production. Ranked third after carps and salmoinds, it 
is cultured in more than 100 countries around the world (El-Sayed 2006). Native to 
Africa, tilapia originally belongs to the family Cichlidae. It was introduced into many 
countries during the second half of the 20th century. The Nile tilapia became popular for 
aquaculture because they grow fast, are tolerant to stress and diseases, various 
environmental conditions such as salinity, dissolved oxygen (DO) and temperature as 
well as its taste (Falvey, 2000). In 2006, the total global fish production was about 
1,988,726 tons of which more than half came from the Asian region. China produced 
around 1,111,461 tons during 1982-2006. Next was Egypt with 258,925 tons. The Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in the US reports that the tilapia consumption 




freshwater aquaculture initially developed in 1922 after the Chinese carp was imported 
to Bangkok for culture. In 1951 the Department of Fisheries (DOF) started promoting 
an aquaculture program of the following five species: Nile tilapia, hybrid catfish, silver 
barb, giant river prawn and snakeskin gourami (FAO, 2009). On March 25, 1965, Nile 
tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus) was introduced to Thailand as an official gift to the King 
(Abdel-Fattah, 2006). At that time Emperor Akihito, His Royal Highness, the Crown 
Prince of Japan, sent His Majesty the King 50 Nile-tilapias that were 9 centimeters in-
length and 14 grams in-weight. His Majesty the King fed them in the Chitlada Palace 
garden for five months. He gave the fish a royal name, "black tilapia” or “Nile tilapia” 
(or called “Pla Nile” in Thai). To raise this fish for his population, on March 17, 1966, 
His Majesty the King allowed DOF to feed and breed 10,000 fish with 3-5 cm body 
length at the Experimental and Breeding Plan, Bangkhen campus and other 15 fishery 
stations throughout the country before distributing to the people nationwide (DOF, 
2014). 
From the mid- 1960s, since water supplies were not stabilized as a consequence of 
diminished harvest of wild fish, aquaculture became widespread and vital in alignment 
with the demands of an increasing population. During the decade, globalization had 
emerged and boosted economic activities and massive investments across the national 
level (Belton and Little, 2008). Significantly, between the 1940s and the 1970s, 
Thailand underwent rapid social and economic transformation from an agriculture-
based economy to an export based industry as well as rapid urbanization through the 
Five-Year National Economic and Social Development Plan in 1961 (Phrek, 2002). 
Green Revolution technology was introduced to promote new commercial crops, 
infrastructure support, modern farming techniques, along with more inputs of labor, 
capital and pesticides. The more farmers invested, higher the return expectations, 
according to the intensive agriculture system. Higher inputs may maintain soil fertility 
and productivity that would otherwise be lost. However, their production might fall in 
the face of uncertain market prices and natural disasters like droughts and floods that 
unexpectedly affect their paddy fields. Thus, some farmers diversified themselves away 
from agriculture farming into more stable and higher income sources as a component of 
their portfolio of household activities (Bush, 2003). At that time, Bangkok also became 




DOF played a significant role in distributing the fish species by introducing techniques, 
providing support and training aquaculture producers. Agro-industrial corporations 
especially the Charoen Pokphand Group (CP) were major in introducing aquaculture 
development in Thailand. CP introduced contract farming systems for integrated 
chicken/pig and fish-farming (Belton and Little, 2008). Since then, the fish farming 
practice shifted from the traditional semi-intensive system to more intensive production 
systems that required the employment of high-stocking densities of cultured species to 
maximize the production yield. Significant levels of integrated farming promoted in 
conjunction with pigs and chicken were introduced in many Northern provinces with 
access to water bodies and irrigated areas. The systems depended on artificial feeding, 
water reuse and/ or exchange, high levels of technology and management tools. 
Transportation and communications involving producers, wholesalers and retainer 
middlemen also helped expand aquaculture and made tilapia marketing more 
competitive. Nile-tilapias are now distributed throughout the country and have become 
popular. Production has risen to more than 200,000 tons per year (DOF, 2008). This 
provides various kinds of jobs and skillful careers associated with the fish nursery and 
fish feed industry, the production process, market trade and freezing storage (Belton and 
Little, 2008).  
Freshwater aquaculture is greatly developed and cultured in an earthen pond and cage 
culture. It is noted that the male Nile-tilapia grows faster and are more cost-efficient 
than their female counterparts resulting in higher demand of male fish rather than for a 
mix of gender. Some breeders try to develop the gender changing process used around 
the world, where the female fry temporarily become male. The process has higher 
production costs of male hormones mixed with feed for the fry. Later on, transsexual 
Nile- and red hybrid tilapia (Oreochromis mossambicus, or “Pla Tubtim” in Thai) were 
raised particularly in cage cultures all over Thailand. Tilapia has 44 percent of the total 
number of fish production holding, followed by walking catfish (Pla-Duk) and the 
common silver barb (DOF, 2003). It is noted that fifty six percent of fish culture is for 
sale. Moreover, 339,887 Nile-tilapias are widely fed in earth ponds in a number of fish-




Fish systems have become more specialized and commercialized in order to participate 
in the market. In the last few decades, the fish-pond culture was previously a traditional 
cheap protein source for household viability and generating extra income. Native fish 
species were favored such as cultured common carp, Nile tilapia and silver barb. They 
could be found in natural water resources or traditional ponds. Today, due to its high 
popularity the Nile tilapia fish-pond culture is characterized by its commercial aspect. 
With different purposes of the rearing practice, Pornpimon et al. (2013) state that Nile 
tilapia is raised in the three types of pond systems: (1) the commercial system using 
intensive pellet feed; (2) the integrated system using natural food through pond 
fertilization and supplementary feeding (with pigs or chickens); and (3) the subsistence 
system mainly for home consumption, which can be mixed with other kinds of fish and 
raised during unconditional period.  The first two systems are run during the controlled 
period of the rearing practice. 
To develop Thailand’s fish quality, the DOF has launched the Good Aquaculture 
Practice (GAP) standard for export-led development since 2011. The main objectives 
are quality, safety, non-chemical contamination and non-use of prohibited drugs and 
chemical substances. For more livelihood security and sustainability, the fish farmers 
are required to learn how to rear fish to meet the GAP standard and produce safe fish for 
customers. According to the regulations, the rearing practices have to be improved and 
developed. Fish farmers are required to register for farming and follow the rules. The 
first rule is to locate the pond within easy access to clean water in order to avoid water 
pollution and to be able to change the water regularly.  Secondly, fish farmers should 
follow the academic guidelines and make a farm map. Thirdly, the farm should be 
convenient for transportation and for releasing water that is under the standard control.  
In case of fish diseases, urgent use of chemicals is prohibited, but rather changing water 
or running an aerator is allowed. If it is out of control, the registered fish chemical 
substances are preferable to avoid mistreatment as well as to prevent perennial diseases 
that might contaminate the food at risk for further consumption. In this way, the fish 
farmers have to report to the related DOF agencies.  In terms of water management, 
polluted water and waste from households should be separated or avoided. Purifying 




farmers are required to record the use of feed and chemical substances from production 
to distribution. The process is beneficial for problem analysis and improvement. The 
GAP standard is implemented in fish farming nationwide by the DOF agencies. The 
actual standard is applied into various kinds of rearing practices (Freshwater 
Aquaculture Research and Development Center, 2011).    
Nowadays, tilapia fillet under the GAP standard are exported by several big agro-
industrial companies processing fish products to the US, European countries and 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, the number of the exported product is still low 
since many fish farms do not meet the GAP standard. The export price is also unfair 
compared to the domestic trade because the transportation distance, far from the US, 
makes it harder for Thailand to compete with other closer production countries. Thus, 
89 percent of fresh tilapia production is mostly for domestic consumption, just 5 percent 
for fish processing, 3 percent for grilled fish and the rest for other forms of fish 
processing (DOF, 2014). 
2.2 Development of Aquaculture in the Northern Region 
The development of the economy and water supplies make widespread aquaculture 
viable. The freshwater aquaculture initially from Central Thailand has been introduced 
to other regions of the country. In the past, peasants in Northern Thailand aimed to 
achieve food production and food security (Yos, 2008). Villages relied mostly on 
(glutinous) rice cultivation subsistence during the rainy season, and practiced 
commercial irrigated crops during the dry season. However, subsistence agriculture 
started to diminish, while cash crops according to the market influence were increasing 
(Bruneau, 2012). According to A Siamese Tragedy (1998), rural farming in Thailand 
was declining. This showed the ongoing failure of development theory, policy and 
practice in the country (Rigg, 2001). Rural dwellers are now confronted with degraded 
environments, debts, widespread inequality and the decline of rural communities (Goss 
and Burch, 2001; Ben and Little, 2008). At the same time, aquaculture has become vital 
for livelihood income. 
Various institutions such as DOF agencies, universities, overseas development agencies 




(Belton and little, 2008). The Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
(BAAC) offer credit for a large number of farmers (Belton and little, 2008).  In other 
words, commercialization of aquaculture has been adopted nationwide and upper 
Thailand is one of the biggest bases of fish pond farming. From figure 2.1, measured by 
the number of farms, Chiang Rai is the biggest production base in upper Northern 
Thailand, followed by Lampang, Chiang Mai, Nan, Phayao, Phrae, Lamphun, Tak and 





















Figure 2.1 Fish production in 2010 in upper Northern Thailand (Kilogram)  
(Source: Department of Fisheries, 2013)  
Most fish cultures in earthen ponds in upper Northern Thailand are intensive and 
integrated. The use of artificial feed, drugs, hormones, fuels, etc., is unavoidable in 
intensive culture practices. To have high returns, it is mandatory to put in more massive 
investments than the integrated system. In terms of feed, the feed company agencies 
suggest using catfish feed these days to replace the tilapia feed for intensive and 
integrated farming in all sites. The catfish is a carnivore, but the tilapia is an 
herbivorous fish. If it is fed with catfish feed, the growth rate will be faster and the fish 
heavier. Nonetheless, reducing pellet feed and increasing pig and chicken manure 
instead can reduce the cost of investment. However, the system is in turn claimed to 
pose environmental and socio-economic impacts. Consequently, the GAP standard is 




Rai and some in Sansai District, Chiang Mai and Bantam Sub-district, Phayao. Fish 
farmers raise pigs on top of fish ponds whereas a few of fish farmers especially in 
Chiang Mai, implement fish-chicken farms. The manure from pigs or chickens 
generates algae and plankton for fish feed. This system requires frequent changing of 
water; otherwise, the water quality in the pond will be poor with high ammonia that 
destroys the fish immune system. Fish farmers in Phan are resisting following the GAP 
standard, unlike most fish farmers in Bantam Sub-district and some in Sansai District. 
2.3  Overview of Community Structure and Irrigation System 
To respond to the aquaculture development, His Majesty the King paid attention to 
water sources, and issued the order to build up water catchment and weir to deal with 
either drought or flood. Since he realized that aquatic animals were a protein source 
beneficial for his subjects, fisheries and aquaculture were required to develop in line 
with the water sources (RID, 2014). The water systems had impacts on local water 
systems and the livelihood of water users. 
Tracing back to the past, water users were united and bonded at both household and 
community levels.  Kinship relations of fish farmers and other farmers had been a solid 
foundation of community unity. Most of the villagers were relatives while a few 
outsiders were found via marriages. They supported credit among social networks 
inside the villages (family, sister-brother and patron-client relations). They also relied 
on Muang Fai systems (communal irrigation systems) that were different in particular 
local places. With past keenness in water resources development, the self-reliant 
farmers in the Muang Fai system built irrigation systems to supply water to all the 
members in the community. In this way, Sanya Muang Fai was drafted under the 
agreement among all water members with the irrigation administrators such as the Kae 
Muang or local communal irrigation leader, Rong Kae Muang (deputy chair), Phuchuai 
Kae Muang (assistant) and the water users.  
Water users, who identified themselves as Muang Fai members, honored the plan and 
participated in the collective activities or functions, particularly during the weir- 
repairing time around June (Tassanee, 2008; Vanpen, 1998). The system had long 




and public participation, communities were formed as an organization in charge of 
systematic water usage for cultivation to cope with unpredictable water levels at the 
beginning of the monsoon season, as well as to share water during the dry season 
(Vanpen, 2005). Muang Fai managers adhered to the principles that all members should 
be equally treated and that all management activities should be transparent and 
accountable to the members in the community (Tassanee, 2008). 
2.4  Village Contexts  
The national aquaculture development is driven at local and regional levels. This study 
is conducted in three villages in three provinces of the upper Northern Thailand. These 
are namely Maekaedluang Village in Chiang Mai, Sanpakhee Village in Chiang Rai and 
Tamphralae Village in Phayao. The three villages are located in the northern river 
basins with different historical backgrounds as well as physical and socio economic 
contexts. The sites are located in different degrees of urbanization and irrigated zones 
under the different water regulations. Chiang Mai, most influenced by urbanization, is 
one of the biggest fish market while Chiang Rai is a bigger core fish supplier than 
Phayao. Both of the production sites distribute to the upper Northern provinces 
including Chiang Mai. Prior to elaborating the chronological contexts of Northern 
aquaculture development, it is important to generate the overview of its irrigation 
systems. Then, the contexts of Maekaedluang Village as the first kicking off the fish-
pond system are given, followed by Sanpakhee and Tamphralae respectively.  
2.4.1 Maekaedluang Village 
Maekaedluang’s name does not appear in any evidences, but it literally 
means a small village. Mae means mother, Kaed is small but Luang is big 
creating a contrast between the last two words.  Due to the density of 
population and household expansion, the village was separated into 
Maekaedluang and Maekaednoi (small). Thus, there are both big and small 






1)  Physical contexts 
Sansai, a district of Chiang Mai, is close to Mae Rim, Mae Taeng, Doi 
Saket, San Kamphaeng and Mueang Chiang Mai. The district is 
subdivided into 12 sub-districts (tambon). Maekaedluang is one of the 
villages in Nongchom Sub-district under the Sub-district municipality.  
Located in the low river plain, the villagers have experienced several 
flood events. Nowadays, the area is influenced by urbanization 
expansion. Large pieces of agricultural lands have been converted into 
residential estates while some have been left idle or are for sale. 
The water flowing to Maekaedluang Village relies on the Maefaek-
Mae Ngat Irrigation Project, which receives water from Mae Ngat 
Somboon Chol Dam. The water management system is mainly 
regulated by the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) that controls the 
Muang Fai system. In 1984, the RID in Chiang Mai built Mae Ngat 
Dam and completed Mae Kuang Dam in three years later. Maefaek-
Mae Ngat Irrigation Project was developed from the Muang Fai 
system used for more than 700 years. The weir was built from local 
materials like bamboo, wood, pebble and sand. However, the local 
weir was often broken, so the RID was assigned by His Majesty the 
King Rama VII to construct a concrete one in Chiang Mai in 1928 on 





















Figure 2.2 Irrigation canals in Maekaedluang Village 
The Mae Ngat Somboon Chol Dam was built in 1952 and targeted to 
supply water to agricultural areas all year round for generating 
electricity as well as fisheries. To improve management and efficient 
water utilization, the Maefaek-Mae Ngat Irrigation Project and Mae 
Ngad Somboon Chol Dam were combined and controlled by the RID. 
The irrigated areas are divided into LMC (left main canal) and RMC 
(right main canal) for better management and distribution. The first 
part, which includes 1 to 8 smaller canals, receives water before the 
second comprising of 9 to 17 smaller canals. Maekaedluang Villager 
belongs to the RMC. The area not only receives water mainly from 
canals 15 and 16,  out of  a total of 16 canals, but also from canals, 13 
and 14, which are released from the Maefaek-Mae Ngat Irrigation 
Project. In figure 2.2, water from the main irrigation canal is 
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discharged to such small canals at the same time. The canals, 13 and 
14, which are stocked by the local and state weirs, flow into canal 15.  
The water level of the last canal is therefore always slightly high, 
although it is out of the water allocation time. In addition, some fish 
ponds receive water from canal 16, which releases downstream to 
meet the water in canal 15. 
Water allocation is systemized by RID while the Kae Muang as 
irrigation volunteer is assigned to regulate and freely design the 
allocation for more distribution and equality. He then assigns other 
local people, whose houses are settled at the irrigation doors, to open 
and close the water as much as the given amount of water and the 
restricted date controlled by the RID plan allowed. The water utility 
focuses mainly on agriculture activities that use water twice a year 
without affecting the pond-based aquaculture’s need, which uses 
water all year long. In other words, fish farmers can get water for the 
rice production period. 
Water allocation is different in different years. During the rainy 
season (the end of June - the end of November), the amount allocated 
each year is slightly different depending upon the agreement of RID 
and Muang Fai groups. Allocating water during the dry season takes 
turns between LMC and RMC, and between opening 3 days/closing 4 
days and opening 4 days/closing 3 days. For instance, in 2013, water 
flows for the water users in the LMC was opened for 4 days and 
closed for 3, but the RMC part followed another system. In 2014, the 
turn of opening 4 days and closing 3 days was converted for water 
users in the RMC.  
Water fees are also collected. Prior to the Mae Ngat Dam construction 
in 1985, water users in the past were required to pay a water fee via 
two bucket of rice. The water fee became a consented norm and 
sanction among the users. With the social commitment and 




the Kae Muang or his assistants, the fee now is 30 baht/ rai (Thai land 
measurement unit is equal to 0.64 hectares) for farmers and 50 baht/rai 
for fish farmers changed from 200 baht/pond. On the other hand, there 
is no standard rate of fish size. Some people have a lot of ponds but 
pay the same rate as those who have a smaller number of fish ponds. 
Breaking the rule will make it difficult for them to socialize with 
others who pay the water fee. In addition, the fee is used to be the Kae 
Muang’s yearly salary and partly for irrigation maintenance costs. All 
water users also have to participate in clearing canal activities around 
July or August every year. Anyone who misses the participation will 
be fined upon the Kae Muang’s judgment. 
Water flow is abundant for both agriculture and aquaculture, but the 
resource conflicts remain. The top-down RID demand does not 
receive good cooperation from the local water users. For instance, the 
doors used to open and close the waterways are left uncared for, and 
have been broken into by farmers who illegally release water to their 
farms. In addition, farmers and fish farmers do not report the actual 
farm sizes to the RID that determines the water allocation schedule. 
The amount of water, as a result, is not enough to meet the real 
agricultural demand, thus leading to resource conflicts.  At the local 
level, fish farmers upstream release poor water to other water users 
downstream, causing fish death and diseases as a consequence. 
2)  Socio-economic contexts 
According to table 2.1, Maekaedluang Village contains 206 
households with a total of 638 villagers, comprising of 295 men and 
343 women. The average age of the farmers is 57.6 years old who are 
part of the aging generation. One hundred and ninety households earn 
a living from off-farm jobs, followed by 40 households operating fish 
farms and 20 households practicing agriculture farming. In the past, 
the majority of villagers essentially did farming. After finishing in-




soy-bean, chili and tomato for agro-industrial factories. They used a 
large amount of pesticides to cope with reduced soil nutrients and 
pests. After the factories closed down, most farmers tended to grow in 
and off-season rice; some grew chili, maize and cabbage during the 
dry season.  
Table 2.1 Summary of village profile 
 (Source: Nong Chom Sub-district Municipality, Sanklang Sub-district  
Administrative Organization and Bantam Sub-district Municipality)  
Study areas 
Sansai District, Chiang  
Mai 
Phan District, Chiang 
Rai Muang District, Phayao 














Households 206 190 250 273 
Male 295 337 473 459 
Female 343 369 426 440 
Total 638 706 899 899 
Average age of 




20 130 202 250 
Fish farming 
household 40 72 82 10 
Off-farm 
household 190 20 16 70 
Completely exit 
household from 
fish farming  
3 2 1 4 
Location of water Midstream Upstream Upstream and midstream 
Irrigation system RID and Muang Fai RID Muang Fai 
The agricultural production failure often occurs as a result of the 
environment variability and market price fluctuation. Due to 
urbanization influence over the village, most farmers then seek off- 
farm opportunities that offer a more stable income than farming. No 
longer is there crop intensification, but numerous villagers instead 




household consumption, as well as longan and mushroom for sale. At 
the same time, many of the farmers who lost their profits from 
commercial crops, converted their lands to fish ponds- while five fish 
farmers raised chickens in addition to their ponds. Other animals like 
cows, catfish, frogs and fighting roosters are raised for sale.  
 
Figure 2.3 The commercial system of fish farm in Maekaedluang 
 




The village lands were previously used as rice paddy fields 
surrounding the residential zone. But due to the low geographical 
lands, most farmers perennially experienced flooding. Their perpetual 
production failures motivated those farmers to shift this production 
type to the safer and more profitable fish farming. Fish farms were 
expected to block the uncontrollable, uncertain and excess water flow 
in the rainy season and to make more money than agriculture farming. 
As a result, more than half of overall lands were taken over by a large 
number of fish ponds along the canals while few paddy fields were 
seen. Since the urbanization area expansion, many rice paddy fields 
were filled up and sold to new comers or outsiders.  
A large piece of land located upstream of canal 15 that has long been 
idle, was sold to build residential estates. Many agriculture lands have 
been filled up to build dormitories, rental houses and buildings. 
Furthermore, two vast filled lands downstream are also on sale. 
Undoubtedly, the land price has risen from 40,000-48,000 to 240,000- 
400,000 baht/ hectare (6.25 rai) within 5 years causing difficulties for 
fish farming investors. Investing in fish farming with high risks might 
not be worth it in the short run compared to selling or leasing the land 
to other landlords. Some fish farmers losing their profit decided to 
lease the ponds to other investors including migrants. Some leave the 
ponds idle for too long while collecting money for further investment. 
Meanwhile, other villagers also put aside a partial compound of their 
houses to build rented rooms for migrant workers who live together as 
a big community. The rental fee is usually about 1,000-2,000 baht/ 
room/ month. 
In terms of labor, the average labor age is about 40-70 years old, none 
of the offspring is working in agriculture farming but there are a few 
in fish farming. The majority of villagers tend to work off-farm while 
supporting their children from farming.  Since the last decade, due to 




machines have been adopted to reduce the hardship and time spent in 
the fields. Tractors, axial flow rice threshers and harvesters have 
become so popular that they have replaced a number of reciprocal and 
hired labors. The hire cost increased to 200 - 300 baht/ day regardless 
of the recent labor wage policy. Thus, labor costs in rice cultivation 
and harvesting are about 464 baht/ hectare excluding fertilizers and 
chemical costs of about 320 baht/hectare (6.25 rai). 
By contrast, most fish farmers with limited lands rely on their labor 
forces as well as family members. Except for the small and large 
operators, they mainly hire migrant workers who can get through 
harder work than the local Thai people. In this way, the former 
migrant workers urge the new comers to seek for jobs in the area that 
expands the size of their community. The more migrant workers there 
are, the more local trade gain benefits. They work as independent 
employees in collecting chili, growing rice, and other works. In the 
fish industry, they are hired in the morning as fish harvesters with a 
daily wage (total daily fish weight divided by a number of fish 
harvesters). Most of them are not only fish harvesters, but also fish 
retailers which sometimes causes conflicts of market interest with 
some local Thai retailors. Their children also study nearby at the Thai 
school that includes a larger number of Taiyai (who predominantly 
live in the Shan State of North East Myanmar) children than local 
Thai. 
 3)  Fish pond implementation  
Chiang Mai Province has a huge growing population with high 
consumption demand. As a result, the aquaculture demand is higher 
since the urban dwellers are unable to find and capture natural fish 
like in the past (Belton and Little, 2008). The freshwater aquaculture 
here was initiated in 1982 before the Mae Ngat Somboon Chol Dam 
construction. Common carp with egg breeding was promoted in rice 




vegetables, coconut residue, household leftover and boiled rice. Then, 
the DOF played an important role supporting feed and selling fish for 
farmers after harvest. In 1995, with cooperation from DOF, the agro-
food industrial company (CP) arrived and urged farmers to raise 
chicken in addition to operating fish-ponds. It is fundamentally the 
initial stage of aquaculture development. A large number of farmers 
converted their rice paddy fields to semi-intensive fish and chicken 
farming. The BAAC also was also an essential driver offering loan for 
those farmers.  
The chicken system was made through the contract farming system 
managed by the agro-food agencies that often gave advice to the 
farmers. The chicken manure would fall into the fish ponds, causing 
the fish to grow faster. Without pallet feed, fish raised for three 
months weighted only half a kilogram. During 2001- 2002, 90% of 
fish farmers stopped raising chickens after suffering from Avian 
Influenza and summer thunderstorms a year later. The coops were 
collapsed and a lot of chickens were drowned. Then, fish farmers 
gradually chicken farming but continued raising raising fish. There are 
now just 5 chicken farms left out of 32 farms.   
“No money from fish and chicken. Everything’s gone. I 
have no money left and doubt what to do.  Fish investment 
cost is dam high. Fish farmers have to adjust,” said one 
fish farmers in Maekaedluang (12-06-2013). 
2.4.2 Sanpakhee Village 
Sanpakhee in Phan, Chiang Rai denotes the highlands (San) of local 
vegetable (Pakhee) plantations. 60 to 70 years ago, there were large 
numbers of both giant and tiny trees but these had died naturally; they were 
cut for house building and have virtually disappeared today. This village is 




Here, the image of the village is presented as fertile, allowing many 
opportunities for agriculture and aquaculture activities throughout the year.   
1)  Physical contexts 
Phan District is in the southern part of Chiang Rai Province, close to 
Wiang Pa Pao, Mae Suai, Mae Lao, Muang and Pa Daet of Chiang Rai 
Province, Mae Chai of Phayao Province and Wang Nuea of Lampang 
Province. The district is subdivided into 15 sub-districts (tambon). 
Sanpakhee Village belongs to the Sanklang Sub-district in Phan under 
the Tambon Administrative Organization (TAO). The area is high- 
land with access to upstream water. 
Water runs from Mae Souy Weir, built between 1999 – 2002, in the 
Mae Souy Sub-district, Mae Souy District, Chiang Rai, and meets the 
Mae Lao Catchment located in Dongmada Sub-district, Mae Lao 
District and Thanthong Sub-district, Phan District. The catchment was 
completed in 1963, covering 23,734 hectares (148,337 rai) of irrigated 
area. It also receives water from Mae Fang River in Chiang Mai. The 
RID is responsible for water allocation to the area of around 29,449 
hectares (184,000 rai) concluding in the Muang District, Mae Lao 
District, Phan District in Chiang Rai and partly, Mae Chai District, 
Phayao. The main canals, 4L, 5L and 6L, out of a total 8 canals, run 
through Sanklang Sub-district, which has the biggest fish supply in 
Phan. In figure 2.5, Sanpakhee Village relies on the canals, 5L and 6L, 
which divide the village into the left and right sides. The village is on 
the left of the river and has access to the upstream river from the main 
canal before it flows downstream. Moreover, there are natural water 
canals namely Rong Leuk and Mae Pond, which result from natural 
upstream source in the hill and receive water from the man irrigation 
canal. Rong Leuk canal meets 5L, which makes the water level 
enough for many activities. The largest number of fish ponds is 
located along the canal 5L. The second largest are those along Mae 















Figure 2.5 Irrigation canals in Sanpakhee Village 
Water management is mainly by RID who turn to the Kae Muang to 
be an irrigation volunteer. The latter’s salaries are 1,200 baht per 
month. They are required to control over 320 - 480 hectare (2,000 - 
3,000 rai) of lands. The volunteers are selected mostly for their farm 
location, one from upstream and another one from downstream. They 
are supposed to be either the village headman or a respected person. 
Their work encompasses the distribution of irrigation news, dealing 
with local conflicts and clearing the canals. They mainly work to 
allocate water during the dry season but the allocation is based on the 
RID plan for the rainy season. If any conflict gets out of hand, RID 
agencies are required to take the role of mediators and conflict solvers.  
In the past, the Kae Muang played a role on water management and 






Main Irrigation canal 
Constructed Irrigation canals 
Natural streams 
Culvert under the main irrigation canal 
Water direction 






access to water as much as possible and shared it with others. As time 
passed, the Kae Muang got older and few younger people voluntarily 
took that role. Once the local irrigation system in 1963 has been 
replaced with the modern Mae Lao Weir directly regulated by the 
RID, the traditional earthen canal was replaced with concrete. Thus, 
collective maintenance is now no longer required from the water 
users. The Kae Muang role has been transferred to a hired water 
volunteer or water leader in charge of each canal. In this way, the 
water allocation plan is scheduled by urging local water users to 
attend public meetings before the in- season rice period. They are 
required to declare their possession of farms and orchards so that the 
RID can calculate the amount of water use. The RID also mainly 
discharges water for five days a week to canals 5 and 6 and the other 
two streams in Sanpakhee Village. In fact, the information 
communication is not as widespread as before as the water volunteers 
do not fully play their roles. In addition, the RID allows the volunteers 
to independently manage water along the small canals and deal with 
resource conflicts. No water fee is imposed, but a water maintenance 
fee for each canal is collected among the local users. 
“If there is a little problem, we will let them solve it by 
themselves because we have too few RID agencies to take 
care of all the people,” said one RID agency (10-04-2014). 
Water users can gain water as much as they want. The allocation 
organized by RID is used in the dry season. Table 2.2 gives an 
overview of water allocation during the dry season from January 1, 
2013 to May 31, 2013. There are three rounds as shown by the 
numbers, 1, 2 and 3, which release water for 5 days per round in order. 
It is agreed that the water will be opened for 5 days and closed for 10. 
The canals, 15 and 16, belong to round number 2; then the village 
irrigation volunteers allocate water according to the local decision and 




all users have to first release their current water. After discharging the 
used water, those upstream will obtain the ‘new’ water first before 




Table 2.2 Water allocation during dry season from January 1, 2013 to May 31, 2013 
(Source: Royal Irrigation Department, Maelao District, 2013) 
Month Date 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
January 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 
February 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3   
March 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
April 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3  
May 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3  
 
Note: Number 2 in the table means a period of water allocation in Sanpakhee Village, the number 1 and 3 belong  






1)  Socio-economic contexts 
Sanpakhee Village has 190 households and 706 people comprising of 337 
men and 369 women.  The average age of the farmers is 57 years old, which 
is slightly lower than that of the Maekaedluang’s villagers. A majority of 
villagers (130) are agriculture farmers, followed by 72 fish farmers and 20 
farmers doing off-farm respectively. Agriculture practices have changed 
after the irrigation construction was completed in 1963. In the past, due to 
inefficient irrigation systems, farmers could only plant several crops such as 
cucumber, garlic, shallot and tomato. Once the irrigation system was 
developed with abundant water, fish farmers basically used water as much 
as available. 5 years ago, farmers increased their production frequency and 
changed the crop type. Most of them grew Thai rice both in- and off- 
seasons. Then several farmers decided to grow Japanese rice, after the 
Japanese rice company “Thanagrain” set up in nearby the village- and 
started selling their production at a higher price than ordinary-Thai rice. 
Through the contract farming system, farmers have to buy seed, fertilizers, 
and chemicals and hire agricultural machines with the payment regulated by 
the company.  
After the pioneering farmers gained more income than those with Thai rice, 
the latter started to follow suit one by one via word of mouth until a larger 
number of farmers decided to grow Japanese rice. It happened during the 
implementation of the Thai mortgage policy when the Puea Thai Party 
pledged to pay rice farmers above market prices at 15,000 baht/ ton. 
Unfortunately, the program has run into the long-overdue payment problems 
and some farmers have not been paid for months. It is no doubt a large 
number of farmers shifted to Japanese rice for it is commonly seen that large 
areas of agricultural lands have been used for intensive Thai rice and 
Japanese rice as well as earthen ponds. Seventy-two fish farm households 
(38%), which include 9 fish farm case studies, basically raise pigs in 




them raise fighting roosters for sale and leisure while others grow Chinese 
cabbage around the pond during the off-rice or rainy seasons. 
 
Figure 2.6 The integrated system of fish farm in Sanpakhee Village 
The related state organizations support agriculture production development 
through different means such as the association led by the village headman 
who formally gathered farmers together with some funds provided by the 
state for 6-7 years. The fund is divided up to invest in fertilizers and in 
housewife groups. The members are allowed to borrow fertilizers with 
interest, at 30-40 baht/ bag while the housewives invest in pork processing. 
The income generated is then used for further investment. Moreover, the 
village-related associations with the state money can give loans to both 
farmers and fish farmers who meet their criteria and are able to repay. To 
make use of a large amount of pig manure besides fish feed, the village 
headman decided to consult with the Rajamangala University of Technology 
Lanna Chiang Rai with TAO cooperation. Thus, the biogas project was 
implemented initially on 24 fish farms where the manure and other waste 





In response to a labor wage policy, wages of laborers in construction and 
agriculture are similarly aligned at 300 - 350 baht per day. However, these 
laborers are rarely found among their offspring generation who tend to study 
and work off-farm in the city. Some send remittances to their parents but 
others do not. A few return home to help their parents with fish farming and 
its related activities such as working as fish farm employees, fish 
wholesalers and checkers. Most fish farmers have to rely on their aging 
labor force while a few big farms hire local labor and migrant workers from 
Laos and Burma. In terms of farming, exchange labors have been declining 
noticeably the last two years and have been replaced with mechanization. 
Most farmers have to pay for many things from seedlings to harvesting cars. 
Prior to starting agriculture farming, the decision whether farmers and fish 
farmers are allowed to run their activities is supposed to be passed by public 
hearing and agreement from all the water users. Although the community 
structure has loosened due to the mobility, villagers significantly still 
participate in social activities. Agriculture and fish farmers labor as well as 
off-farm employees continue to help hold important social events, especially 
religious ceremonies. They often find spare time to help prepare things and 
set up the location for these ceremonies. Often the fish farmer cooperative 
with its large number of farmers in the village not only assists the organizers 
but also donates money.  
Sanpakhee is an important agriculture and aquaculture base with sufficient 
water sources.  Most of the huge areas undoubtedly contain rice paddy fields 
and fish-pig farms. Due to low urbanization influence, the land price is as 
about 80,000 baht/hectare lower than that in Maekaedluang Village. The 
price has risen up between 40,000 to 48,000 baht in the last three years. The 
land prices are now highly speculated on by many outsiders but the local 
villagers seem uninterested in meet their demands; instead, they are likely 






 2) Fish pond implementation 
Pond-based aquaculture kicked off in 1995. According to the Royal Project 
of Joint Plantation, farmers were encouraged to grow either hog plums or 
longans. But the soil is unqualified with few nutrients and unsuited for these 
kinds of plants. So one farmer initially converted the farm owned by his 
mother, into a fish pond instead. At that time, his mother disagreed and was 
angry with him, but he tried to overcome her objections. He fed 4,000 
breeding fish bought from the local fish hatchery while raising fish in the 
pond, but they died. Then he bought 2 pigs with 7,500 baht each, but one 
pig died, resulting in worsening the relationship between his mother and 
him. However, he did not give up and decided to sell the fish. He initially 
earned 30,000 baht, his mother relented, allowing him to increase the 
number of fish ponds, which were originally paddy fields. He fed the fish 
with low- cost feed such as duck manure and mixed rice bran and boiled 
rice. Since then he has not suffered any losses but now gains 2-300,000 baht 
per crop of fish, which is higher than farming. 
At that time, few markets were available, so fish farmers asked their 
neighbors who were unemployed or free to sell fish in the morning. Then, 
the markets started to expand naturally, but they had to avoid selling to the 
same market as other traders. Most of them put the fish into the basket at the 
back of their motorcycles. To meet the increasing demands of the expanded 
markets, they adapted to use a sidecar with more carrying capacity. Still, the 
sidecar was not enough for a large amount of fish and for travelling longer 
distances to markets. They eventually decided to buy pickups for large tons 
of fish. It was noted that fish farmers used to gain high profits, but after the 
number of farmers started increasing, the profit margins fell.  
The fish farmers here independently decided to be a part of any fish groups. 
Some followed their kin and neighbors while others chose the group they 
liked. Phan comprises of 20 fish groups that exited from the Pha Thong 
group founded 20 years ago. In Sanpakhee Village, most fish farmers 




(pseudonym) and the rest was with other groups. Each fish group did not 
cooperate with the other. Fish products are harvested in the early morning 
since between 5 to 10 o’clock. Farms can hire fish harvesters from their fish 
group for 250 baht each and the owners were expected to serve breakfast to 
their stakeholders.  
2.4.3 Tamphralae Village 
Muang Phayao is the capital district of Phayao about 40 kilometers from Chiang 
Rai. The neighboring districts are Mae Chai Phukamyao and Dok Khamtai of 
Phayao Province, Pa Daet of Chiang Rai Province, and Ngao and Wang Nuea of 
Lampang Province. The district comprises of 15 sub-districts. Tamphralae is one 
of the villages in the Bantam Sub-district under the sub-district municipality. This 
study takes place in both Tamphralae Mu1 7 and Mu 11, which used to be part of 
the same village. Because Tamphralae Village previously contained a dense 
population of around 523 households; dividing it into two smaller villages made 
the development project and administration fund more efficient and widespread 
1)  Physical contexts 
Tamphralae is located in between outside villages and inside villages with 
the same name “Tam” which represents river flow. The outside villages are 
Tamdonmoon (high land of sediment), Tampalan (forest land), Tamnamlom 
(surrounded by amount of water) and Tammon (high hill) respectively. The 
inside villages are foothill Tamklang (the middle) and uphill Tamnai (the 
furthest inside) respectively. Thus, these villages rely on related common 
water flow. Tamphralae’s river flow areas can be easily recognized by the 
beautiful Buddha image with the turned head. The village landscape is made 
up of foothills that were previously safe from floods and droughts due to the 
efficient water upstream. However, the villagers recently faced flash floods 
and recurrent drought. Similar to farmers in Tammon, Tamnamlom, 
Tampalan and Tamdonmoon, they often suffer from flooding and low flow. 
                                                          
1 Thai Village (muban) represents the actual settlements of the village. It can be called mu, 




The villagers thus only do in-season rice a year and leave the land idle for 
the rest of the time. So fish pond farming is rarely seen downstream. 
There are six main natural water sources shown in the Figure 2.7: (1) Huay 
Hiek Reservoir constructed in 1996. The reservoir was developed by the 
Phayao Irrigation Department in response to the Royal Project edict. The 
aim of the project is to reserve water for agriculture and consumption. The 
reservoir has a capacity of 595,000 cubic meters that is distributed to the 
256 hectares (1,600 rai) of land during the rainy season and 64 hectares 
(400 rai) during the dry season (RID, 2014). The water is also supplied for 
daily use in the Tamphralae Village. However, the water level is low from 
deforestation without serious control from the National Park officials and 
polluted from pesticides and upstream fish-pond farms. As a result, the 
villagers no longer use and drink the water; buying water bottle has become 
a new way for survival.  
The rest of the water sources are naturally constructed; (2) Mai Yang Weir 
gains water from Champathong Waterfall and then releases it (3) Thung 
Klong Catchment (built in 1983) before flowing to (4) Tontakhienkhu Weir 
and agricultural lands. The irrigation system nowadays has higher capacity 
to support water for widespread agriculture; (5) Champathong Waterfall, a 
source of water from Doi Luang National Park. Here a big organic-related 
product company has established itself upstream for rubber plantation. 
Finally, (6) Khuntam Waterfall, an important natural water source with 
fertile forest but it has been deforested for growing numerous commercial 
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The irrigation system in Bantam Subdistrict, Phayao District is under 
the subdistrict municipality control of overall water management and 
construction. RID role partly offers knowledge and academic 
information to support water allocation. In fact, Muang Fai groups are 
assigned to run the system. The Kae Muang adopts the discursive 
water management plan, allocates water and clears the resource 
conflicts. Moreover, he is a representative to attend meetings and to 
voice out the local problems for all water users. In the past, the Kae 
Muang role was once significantly important in managing earthen 
water ways and maintaining natural wooden weirs. But the Royal 
Irrigation Department cooperated with the municipality to replace the 
earthen canals and the traditional weirs with concrete that is beneficial 
in preventing the absorption of water in soil and secure the water flow for 
more than five meters. As a result, the common activity of clearing the 
water-ways is less necessary than ever. 
In terms of Muang Fai activities and its role, one communal irrigation 
leader is responsible for each irrigation zone during the duration of in-
season rice planting. Furthermore, either farming or fish farming has 
to pay water fee at the same rate of 100 or 200 baht per pipe 
depending upon the agreement of each Muang Fai group. Every water 
user is asked to clear the waterways. The one who takes too much 
water will be fined 100 - 300 baht. In this regard, the Kae Muang is 
required to transparently inform all water users the overall expense’ 
plan which is divided into two parts, namely, (1) the Kae Muang’s 
salary; and (2) irrigation maintenance fund. If it is not enough for 
maintenance, he will raise new funds from the users. The common 
activity of cleaning the waterways basically begins in May. For 
example, if the weirs collapse, the Kae Muang will encourage water 
users to solve the problems by hiring a backhoe car to fix the canals or 
fixing it themselves. Anyone who does not participate in the activities 





off-rice season, water users are asked to solve the problems by 
themselves. In some Muang Fai group, led by the local irrigation 
head, water will be allowed for farmers in daytime and for fish 
farmers at nighttime. 
2)  Socio-economic contexts 
The two Tamphralae villages have a total of 523 households. M.7 
contains 250 households with 899 people comprising of 473 men and 
426 women. There are 273 households in M.11with a total of 899 
people covering 459 men and 440 women. The average age of the 
farmers who are family leaders is 52.6 years old in M.7 and 54.5 in 
M.11, which are roughly similar to the other two previous villages. 
The largest number of people in both villages is in agriculture 
farming. In M.7, 202 households are farmers; 82 are fish farmers 
(including 9 fish farmer case studies); 16 are off-farm workers as well 
as 1 household exiting from fish farming. M.11 has 250 households of 
farmers, 10 fish farm households, 70 employee households and 4 
households exiting from fish farming. It is noted that a number of 
people are overlapping across careers because some are not only 
employers, but also farmers and/ or fish farmers as well. However, the 
way to study here is combining the two villages into one community 
that share the common diversification occupations, household 
structure and land and water use.  
The villagers rely chiefly on agricultural activities. The villagers who 
are mostly farmers have their agricultural lands outside the village. 
With sufficient natural water sources, their previous main occupation 
was agriculture growing in-season rice and crops in the dry season. 
These days, based on figure 2.8 and 2.9, many farmers converted their 
land into commercial fish ponds. Some large fish operators essentially 





scale operators raise fish and other animals such as cows, pigs, 
chickens and ducks. Since there is a lot of agricultural land, crop 
varieties are so diverse including in-season rice, maize, bean, longan, 
pumpkin and rubber trees, influentially promoted by the state 3 to 4 
years ago. For the last 3 years, most farmers, who could access water 
particularly under the Thung Klong Weir throughout the year, could do 
both in- and off-season rice. The rest of the farmers just leave their 
land idle; some grow garlic mainly for household consumption, and 
for sale. Furthermore, it is noticeable that most villagers tend to grow 
vegetables in the front and backyards of their house for household 
consumption and for sale. Each early morning, women will sell their 
products in the central market of the community to their neighbors and 
the middle women who have their own shops in the villages. 
 






Figure 2.9  Integrated system of fish ponds in Tamphralae Village 
The labor shortage situation is similar to the earlier villages in that few 
of the young generation work in the farm. But labor exchange remains 
practical here. Several local villagers basically help each other do 
some agriculture activities such as seedling, growing and harvesting. 
Nevertheless, the number of laborers is still so rare that it has forced 
some poor farmers to involuntarily use their own work force. Some 
with enough money can hire people and machine. Therefore, this 
image of mechanization has become a normal part of agriculture 
activities. Most fish farmers meanwhile use their own labor to feed 
fish but large-scale operators have decided to hire local people. 
Even though the village is located in the capital district of Phayao 
Province, it can be said that the village is situated between local and 
urban areas. It is observed that there is a high number of shifting land 
ownership. Large pieces of land in the village and at the hill are leased 





temporary land right title for smallholders or the landless to do 
agricultural activities and are not allowed to buy, sell or lease. In fact, 
the local owners illegally lease to landlords or outsiders including 
local politician, businessmen and policemen. The land price is now 
80,000 - 112,000 baht/ hectare (6.25 rai). This is more expensive than 
the SPK4-01 which is an upland area priced between 16,000-48,000 
baht/ hectare. Most of them invest in rubber plantations and fish 
farming. It is seen that many villagers claim the land over the national 
park after which they later ask to transfer the land title into SPK4-01. 
As a result, the number of forest lands is reducing.  
In terms of land use, most fish ponds and agriculture lands are settled 
upstream along those water sources. In other words, the poor used 
water releases downstream that impact villagers in Tamphralae, 
Tammon, Tamnamlom, Tampalan and Tamdonmoon orderly. 
Apparently, most dense fish ponds are located upstream under the 
water sources especially Mai Yang Wei. There are a lot of commercial 
crops such as rubber, maize, bean and pumpkin upstream with 
intensive use of chemical substance that affects the water users and 
villagers downstream. Moreover, several rice paddy fields are taking 
place downstream under the fish ponds and the reservoir. Some fish 
ponds are located along the canals and even in places with no water 
flow. It is because even though fish ponds use up a larger amount of 
water than rice, there is efficient water with more opportunities to get 
higher investment returns than rice. They prefer relying on 
underground water. Rice paddy fields as a result, surrounded by the 
pond expansion that indirectly pressures the conversion of the rice 







 3)  Fish pond implementation 
In Phayao, most fish farming in Bantam started with the fish-chicken 
integrated system implementation surrounded by rice paddy fields. 
Four to five years later, local farmers founded a chicken cooperative. 
Unfortunately those farmers experienced fly impacts while the central 
market hit the northern chicken that made many farmers difficult to 
continuously run their business. Then the cooperative relatively 
stopped. They also could not continue the rice paddy fields because it 
was flooded from the fish pond water. Thus, many fish farmers tended 
to convert their farming into fish farming completely. 
The Phayao fish product was started after they were given support 
from the state. It is because the number of natural fish in Phayao Lake 
was reducing from time to time because fishermen caught fish during 
its egg laying period and other environmental factors. DOF fully took 
action to conserve the Giant snakehead and Sand Gody, which 
increases the supply of pond-based aquaculture. The fish-pond 
farming was booming after the district and provincial authorities drew 
attention to the success of Mr. A (pseudonym) who was rewarded as a 
fish expert and an excellent fish farmer in 1993. This reward also 
inspired other farmers to do fish farming. At the first time, 8 fish 
farmers gained financial support from DOF, which then expanded to 
others. 
2.5  Reasons for Adopting Pond-Based Aquaculture 
Many fish farmers not only work in farming but also seek off-farm employment. Thus, 
with the differentiation, those fish farmers adopt pond-based aquaculture for the 
following reasons. Firstly, it is to escape from natural disasters and agricultural losses 
because Maekaedluang is lowland that is prone to perennial flood. In the rainy season, 
the rice paddy fields are sometimes flooded with the increasing level of water without 





result, many farmers have lost their benefits. They have to pay for higher-cost chemical 
substance, but in turn, their products are as unstable and uncontrollable as their 
incomes. 
Secondly, it is to maximize the return of investment since they have been promised that 
fish-pond farming has more commercial value than other cash crops. Even if it has 
higher risks, there is still an opportunity to gain more returns. In this way, gaining profit 
between rice paddy fields and fish farming is different depending on the geographical 
landscape and water access. It is evident that Bantam Sub-district with its more limited 
water supply can grow just in-season rice. Thus, it would be more cost effective to raise 
fish for 2-3 crops a year. The fish price is also higher than rice per crop and the fish 
farmers have more income opportunities from off-farm. By contrast, some farmers in 
Sanpakhee refuse to adopt the fish system because they are concerned that fish is riskier 
than rice and has a higher cost of investment. They can basically produce rice twice a 
year while some can do three times a year with a higher return of income but with less 
risk than culturing fish. 
The third reason is to follow other neighbors who have gained profit from fish-pond 
productivity. Due to good word of mouth, most of them are convinced that fish farming 
does generate more income. Even though they have little knowledge and experience in 
rearing fish, they decide to take a risk. In addition, some of the fish farmers inherited the 
farms from their fish farmer parents. Others were pressured by the fact that their rice 
paddy fields were increasingly surrounded by large numbers of fish ponds. Therefore, 
the farmers decided to join in the fish pond farming. 
2.6  Fish Farmer Cooperation Development 
It is noted that fish farmer cooperatives everywhere are set up to manage production and 
marketing. The three provinces are interrelated in terms of marketing and sometimes 
knowledge sharing. 
The first fish farmer cooperative named “Pla Thong” was initiated in 1995 by about 550 





than 10 new groups. Most large operators today set up groups because they have enough 
skills, experience, knowledge, market bases and funds to afford expensive materials. 
Most members were medium and small operators. Each group in Phan runs their 
business independently from processing applications from fish farmers, employing staff, 
dealing with the harvest process and managing to marketing. A fish farmer is allowed to 
apply to join more than one group. Some are members of a group because of their 
personal relationship with their kin groups or have patronage relationship. 
Some are private groups while others have set up a kind of fish farmer cooperative. The 
private group management works faster than the cooperative. Their aims are mainly for 
increasing the owners’ business. The private group is advantageous when fish shortages 
occur because they can speculate on the price. Conversely, the cooperative is more 
reliable under the enactment of fish cooperatives while enhancing the relationship of the 
members with trust through meetings and regulations “the cooperative is for all your 
benefit, not for the individual.” However, such collective activities are rarely seen in the 
private groups. The cooperative provides feed at reasonable prices but the private group 
will sell these for profit.  
Fish farmer groups in Maekaedluang Village are developed at the village level. In the 
past, middlemen harvested fish once a year with their provided equipment. The fish 
price was cheap around 20-30 baht/ kilogram with the weight of 4 grams. From 1999 - 
2000, without queue management, fish harvesting became more competitive. Thus, 
those fish farmers decided to form a cooperative. They managed a sequential queue of 
harvest and negotiated the fish price with their members. A member quit from the 
cooperative due to a difference of ideas. He felt he was not heard at meetings since the 
majority of the members were relatives and did not trust others. Several years later, the 
old group was broken up two small groups due to a conflict of financial interests. No 
member gained any collective money from the group. Then, each group started seeking 
for new members, developing and expanding the marketing with their own abilities and 
expertise. Today, the number of ponds is increasing and is quickly expanding to other 





“Union is a kind of strength. Getting together we live; separating we 
die. We grow up, we connect and we survive,” claimed one leader of 
a fish farmer group in Maekaedluang (02-02-2014). 
There are three big groups of fish farmer cooperatives. The organized production is 
taken into account. Fish production has become more commercialized and farmers have 
shortened the rearing duration to meet the faster and higher consumer demands. The 
market also demands a bigger size of fish. Hence, the rearing practice duration has 
reduced to 3 - 6 months and organized teams now do the harvesting. The fish farmers 
have also learned to examine how to choose and use fingerlings, feed and use chemicals 
wisely. Some farmers started to compare different types of feed for their protein level 
and price. If the price were slightly different, they would choose the one with high 
protein. But, investment cost is higher nowadays because they use a lot of machines, 
technology and chemicals to help sustain the survival rate of fish. Furthermore, most 
large-scale operators in each particular fish group were the ones who strongly 
implemented the GAP standard.  
In Tamphralae, the local cooperatives in 1996 had started with more than 30 fish 
farmers. Fish marketing was not as effective then. There were few fish wholesalers and 
natural fish was only enough for domestic consumption. At first, it was necessary to ask 
harvesters and traders from Phan who could provide fish materials and marketing, for 
help because the cooperative was not really organized and methodical yet. Fish price 
then was quite cheap, fluctuating at around 35 baht/ kg. At that time, Mr. A 
(pseudonym), the leader of the fish cooperative, got to know the chairman of the Phayao 
Chamber of Commerce who aimed to make Phayao fish more famous than others. Fish 
sold in Phayao was not actually from Phayao. Although there was the big Phayao Lake, 
natural fish unfortunately were rare. Worse still, the customers misunderstood that fish 
sold in Phayao was from Phan.  
The chairman therefore wanted to develop the pond-based culture to increase the mass 
fish productivity. He then suggested that Mr. A met the provincial governor who was 





other areas. In 2006, the provincial governor in 2006 decided to fund 1,000,000 baht for 
the fish cooperative before he was assigned to take the same role in other provinces. 
That same year the Department of Fisheries also provided funds and formally named the 
group “Bantam Phayao fish cooperatives”. The group was registered as a formal 
cooperative. The membership doubled from 100 to 200 people. After that, the DOF, 
Phayao and Maejo universities often showed up and offered assistance. The networks 
such as Maechai Group and Dokkhamtai Group also expanded to other districts nearby. 
Later, however, the cooperative decided to limit its network scope to just Bantam in 
order to control the fish quality and standard (clean and not fishy- because of good 
quality upstream water sources). It is clear that the increasing number of fish farmers 












Figure 2.10 Fish production information in 2013 given by the biggest fish 
 cooperative in each province (in kilograms).  
(Source: Major fish farmer cooperatives and groups in the three sites by Santita, 2014a). 
According to figure 2.10, it is seen in 2003 that Phan District has the highest production 
with a total of 1,923,517 kilograms, followed by Bantam with 552,447 and Sansai with 
236,999. To examine the productivity of each community, the data was collected from 
the biggest representative fish farmer groups and cooperatives as provincial 





whom are located in the studied villages. There are 235 fish farmers in the big 
cooperative in Chiang Rai, 80 in Maekaedluang, Chiang Mai, and 190 fish farmers in 
Bantam Sub-distict, Phayao. Still, the number amount of producers does not include the 
more than 20 smaller fish groups in Phan and individual fish groups who extend fish 
chains in Bantam as well as other 2 smaller groups in Sansai.  
It is evident that there are different freshwater aquaculture adoptions and development 
with different opportunities. Phan, Chiang Rai, not only has the highest capacity of fish 
production due to sufficient water. The transportation system is well-developed offering 
opportunities for Phan traders to expand their products to numerous main provincial 
markets such as Chiang Mai, Nan, Phayao, Phrae and Lampang and Lamphun. They 
hire local people to harvest fish, sometimes fish farmer members and sometimes their 
children during school break. Most fish traders are Phan big wholesalers. Meanwhile, 
Bantam, Phayao, is well supported by the state attempts to increase their fish production 
capacity and produce their own brand since it is known as a fertile province with 
Phayao Lake. The harvest teams are made up of local people who are either farmers or 
fish farmers. Fish are distributed to other provinces like Phan’s community chain but in 
smaller amounts. Fish traders are from Phan, other neighboring provinces and Bantam 
itself. However, Sansai in Chiang Mai has the lowest capacity due to resource 
competition and limited land regardless of urbanization domination. Fish farmers thus 
hardly expand their production base. The fish is harvested by migrant workers who are 
hired by the fish farmer cooperatives. The farmers are also retailers with sidecars like 
other local people who are either farmers or do off-farm work. Most big wholesalers are 
from local communities and from fish-cage culture. Some of Phan traders who are based 
in Chiang Mai market often buy fish from Sansai and sometimes from Phan. 
2.7  Summary 
Apart from agricultural loss resulting from climate disturbances and market 
fluctuations, pond-based aquaculture has become an alternative choice with the belief 
that fish pond farming increases economic value. The pond-based aquaculture 





production system, land-use and labor availability. In addition, the initial stage of fish 
farming is quite similar to agricultural systems that the fish systems are developed from 
the mixed system among agriculture, livestock and poultry. Maekaedluang in Chiang 
Mai is the first adoption, followed by Tamphralae in Phayao and Sanpakhee in Chiang 
Rai. 
The Department of Fisheries together with agro-industrial companies widely promotes 
rearing practices. The evidence drives farmers to adopt two kinds of systems: 
commercial and integrate. In this way, fish farmers in different areas are given differ 
income and knowledge opportunities as well financial supports from external 
organizations. Phayao is fully reinforced by the state to build up the fish farmer groups 
in order to develop their production. Meanwhile, Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai have to 
develop on their own. At that time, fish farmers in different sites have formed fish 
groups or fish farmer cooperatives to manage production and marketing. In this way, 
income opportunities from related fish farming are generated for many fish-related 
people such as fish farmers, fish group staff, fish retailers, wholesalers and harvesters. 
All of them are one of the factors of such productivity in each site.  
It is found that at the association level, Phan has the highest production and market base 
coinciding with the market share of Bantam and Sansai District. Fish production is yet 
uncertain and sensitive to climate related risks including extreme temperatures (hot and 
cold), excessive rainfall, prolonged cloud cover, floods and droughts. At this stage, risk 
and vulnerability are taken into consideration. It is interesting and useful to study the 
fish farmers and how they are vulnerable to uncontrolled and uncertain climate related 





Vulnerabilities of Fish-Pond Farming Households with Scale Operations 
This chapter identifies the main vulnerabilities of fish farmers with different farm sizes 
in order to find out how they deal with variability in climate. The climate impacts result 
from not only from nature itself but also from socio-economic processes particularly 
urbanization, which in turn impacts land title, labor availability and local resources. 
This analysis is guided by the social-ecological system (SES) and livelihood 
framework. The SES idea is a combination of both physical and socio-economic risks 
that make an agency vulnerable. To understand risk and vulnerability, I adopt Adger 
(2006)’s idea that vulnerability includes exposure and sensitivity and adaptive capacity. 
Exposure is the degree to which a system experiences physical or socio-economic 
stresses. Sensitivity is the degree to which a system is affected by undesirable events 
(exposure and sensitivity define risk). Adaptive capacity is the ability with which a 
system responds to environmental hazards or market changes. In this chapter, the degree 
of exposure and sensitivity is used as the main focus to study place and household 
vulnerability.  
The studies are differentiated into household and community levels. In each village, the 
households are categorized into 4 groups: large-, medium- and small-scale as well as the 
ex-fish farmers who stopped (commercial) fish farming. Household vulnerability 
depends on their five capitals elaborated in the livelihood framework. It includes human 
capital, natural capital, physical capital, financial capital and social capital. The 
community level comprises of wider networks of fish farmers who have relationships 
with the government department of fisheries, universities and feed companies. The first 
three groups are members of fish farmer groups but the last is not. The ties with water 
users at the community level are also highlighted under the local irrigation system and 
the state authority. The small, medium and large fish operators in each village, whether 





different hazard experiences and effects result in the differentiation of high, medium 
and low risks. Some fish farmers might survive while some give up. This chapter 
highlights (1) the incidents resulting from multiple climate-related and socio-economic 
risks; and (2) the identification of that people is vulnerable to hazards.   
3.1 Incidents Resulting from Multiple Climate-related and Socio-Economic Risks  
According to IPCC (2014), warming trends and increasing temperature extremes have 
been observed across most of the Asian region over the past century. The climate 
change impacts on food production and food security in Asia also cause a decline in 
productivity. This is evident in the case of freshwater aquaculture, which is exposed to 
both socio-economic and physical risks. The social risks are market demands, state 
policies of cash crops and the influence of urbanization. These factors intensify the 
impacts of climate-related stresses that comprise of extreme temperatures (too hot or too 
cold), excessive rainfall, prolonged cloud cover, floods and droughts. To respond to the 
stresses, sensitivity is the degree to which the capitals of fish pond farmers (human, 
natural, physical, financial and social) are affected by undesirable events. Fish farm 
operators with unbalanced or low capitals have high possibilities of suffering from 
production failures (fish deaths, diseases and loss). The results influence their decisions 
on further adaptation. Hence, the chapter aims to identify how multiple climate-related 
and socio-economic risks influence the livelihoods of those fish farmers with small-, 
medium- and large-scale operations. My discussion draws on data from the last 30 years 
during the time of fish-pond initiation, which corresponds with my exploration from the 
end of 2012 to the beginning of 2014. Before moving to discuss the climate-related 
risks, I would like to elaborate the relationship among temperature, rainfall and human 









3.1.1 Temperature  
The first point to be considered is the extreme hot and cold weather1 
interplaying in water temperatures, which has an impact on water quality. 
Water temperature is affected by sunlight and air temperature. The 
difference between the water temperature and the cooler weather, from the 
absorption of solar radiation through the surface and bottom level of the 
water, causes stratification in the pond (AQUADAPT, 2013). 
Tilapia is sensitive to de-stratification or water turnover which leads to low 
dissolved oxygen (DO) and high concentrations of ammonia. Warm surface 
water has a higher DO level from photosynthesis than cool surface water 
(Patcharawalai et al., 2013). Cooler bottom water lowers DO levels and 
accumulates nitrogenous waste from uneaten feed and feces. In turn, when 
the temperatures drop, de-stratification or remixing of thermocline occurs. 
The surface layer is cooler and denser than water in the bottom layers. It 
then sinks and forces the water at the bottom to rise up to replace the surface 
layers. As a consequence, DO level drops and nitrogenous waste like 
ammonia that affects fish survival in the ponds, increases.  Ammonia is the 
first form of nitrogen discharged when organic matter decomposes. It 
becomes toxic when water temperature and pH increases, and it is 
dangerous to fish blood and tissues (Patcharawalai et al., 2013). Hence, 
different temperatures resulting from sunlight and rainfall patterns stimulate 
de-stratification.  
 1)  High temperature 
Starting from high temperature, the strong sunlight shining into the 
bottom of the pond also reduces the level of dissolved oxygen in the 
fish ponds (Pornpimol et al., 2013). However, the hot and cold 
weather that 
                                                          
1 Thai weather is divided into three periods of time: dry season (February - May), rainy season (May - 





affects fish health and survival is uncertain and unpredictable. 
Consequently, fish death will be found in almost every single pond in 
every village if the fish farmers are not well prepared for risk 
prevention.  
In 2013 and 2014, Northern Thailand had higher yearly and monthly 
average temperatures than normal, particularly during the dry season. 
As shown in figure 3.1, the bars represent the monthly average 
temperature. The temperature in February went up sharply from the 
normal average by 1.3 0C; dropped dramatically by 0.6 0C in March 
and 0.5 0C in April. Summer starting at the end of February, was later 
than usual by about 2 weeks and ended by 18 May, which was normal. 
As a result, the northern part of the country was successively hot 
throughout the season. Although the weather was cool in the 
mornings, it was hot in the daytime. In 2014, during late February and 
almost the whole of March, the upper Northern Thailand was affected 
by hot conditions. Monthly mean temperatures were around 0.8 - 1.8 
0C above average and it was the same in April (TMD, 2004).  
 
Figure 3.1 Monthly average temperature (Degree Celsius) in 2013 (Source: Thai 
Meteorological Department, 2014 by Santita, 2014a) 
In the dry season with stronger solar radiation than in other seasons, 





commercial systems (Patcharawalai et al., 2013). It is because the high 
load of nutrients and fertilizers causes phytoplankton blooms that 
consume a lot of oxygen at night and in the day when there is no light. 
Most integrated culture is in Chiang Rai; others are in Phayao and 
Chiang Mai. 
2)  Low temperature  
Low temperatures especially in winter reduces fish feeding capacity. It 
is because fish digestion systems work ineffectively and slower than 
normal during this time (AQUADAPT, 2013). During my field visits 
from the end of October in 2013 to the beginning of February 2014, 
the cold weather was different from the previous years. The rearing 













Figure 3.2 Minimum average daily temperatures in Northern Thailand during 2003 - 
2014 (Degree Celsius) (Source: Thai Meteorological Department, 2014  
by Santita, 2014a) 
From figure 3.2, January generally had the lowest minimum 
temperature, followed by December, February, November and 





though it was winter, the minimum temperature trend during the last 
12 years has been gently increasing. The temperature in December 
2004 was significantly the lowest among the following years. Similar 
to the trend in January, it was slightly lower than the year after 2009. 
More focus in 2014, the temperature in January and February was 
lower than the previous years. The upper part of Thailand in particular 
was covered by the influence of a dry condition with cool and cold 
weather from November 2013 to the beginning months of 2014. In 
December, the average temperature in Northern Thailand was below 
normal by 1 - 2 0C. Furthermore, the mean temperature was around 15 
0C below normal in January and February 2014 (TMD, 2014).  
In 2014, the weather turned colder than the last 5 years. Upper 
Thailand and places in the upper south were covered by cold weather 
from the extended China ridge during most of January. The minimum 
temperature broke the record cold that occurred mostly in mountains 
areas and mountaintops. During the first half of February, the weather 
condition was periodically dominated by the high-pressure area from 
China. These led to cool weather that was below normal of 0.2 0C 
(TMD, 2014).  
It is found that temperature and tilapia interacts significantly. Tilapia 
can tolerate temperatures as low as 7 - 10 0C for a short time. Longer 
exposure to low temperatures of about 16 0C will certainly lead the 
fish to mass mortality and reducing or stopping feeding (El-Sayed, 
2006). In other words, the cold weather retards fish growth and causes 
a longer rearing period. During my fieldwork in January, the 
temperature was cold at about 13.3 - 25.8 0C in Chiang Rai and 14.8 - 
32.17 0C in Phayao and 16.7 - 35.9 0C in Chiang Mai respectively 
(TMD, 2014).  Fish farmers in the three sites encountered similar 
problems of fish disease disperse (Trichodina infestation), feeding 
reduction ratios, slow fish growth, seed shortages as well as prey such 





years. Yet, the fish death level was at the lowest compared to other 
weathers.  
3.1.2 Climate-related risks towards livestock and poultry 
A large number of fish farms in Sanpakhee and some in Tamphralae face 
another risk in raising pigs which is mostly sensitive to dry and rainy 
seasons. In summer, the pigs are at risk of cholera and get stressed while 
some bite each other. So the fish farmers have to provide small water 
containers at the corner of the pigsty to release their stresses. Though the 
fish pond lacks water exchange, the pond water is enough for cleaning the 
pigsty. During rainy seasons, the pigs also contract diarrhea, pneumonia and 
uncertain Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome (PRRS); and 
may catch colds. However, all the symptoms can be prevented early by 
injecting vaccines and providing the pigs with a safe and convenient 
farming environment. Some medium and small fish farmers in 
Maekaedluang who raise chickens are also prone to the different season 
changes. Chickens are likely to catch colds during the rainy season, but do 
not have any diseases in winter. Still, the possibility of chicken death is high 
during the dry season. The hotter the weather, the more the chickens crowd 
to get some wind and air. Consequently, fish farmers have to turn on fans 
and set up water springers on top of the chicken coops to reduce the heat.  
Above all, the chickens risk diseases such as Influenza A virus subtype 
H5N1 known as Avian Influenza (“bird flu”). It was widespread once in the 
2000s and forced people to kill their chickens. Most of the fish farmers 
suffered huge losses and ran into debt, which eventually made them 
reluctantly decide to exit from chicken farming. 
3.1.3 Rainfall pattern 
Moving from temperature variation to rainfall pattern, it is evident that 
rainfall that is physically fluctuating and uncertain through several years 
increases the possibility of floods and droughts as well as changes in 





and rainy days, de-stratification reduces dissolved oxygen levels (El-Sayed, 
2006). Integrated and commercial systems are highly exposed to this 
consequence because such farms contain high fish-stocking densities and 
organic matter inputs in livestock wastes. Even more severe, this is an 
important feature that the level of flood, water shortage and remixing of 
thermocline are relatively ameliorated by irrigation management, 
geographical landscape and land use.  
All case studies similarly agree that the first rain is most dangerous because 
it is not within the fish’s capacity to adjust itself to the changeable 
temperatures. Pickering et al. (2011) claim that the reproduction, growth and 
survival of the tilapia are expected to be sensitive to the increase of 
temperature, and salinity and oxygen change. Temperature affects the 
physiology, growth, reproduction and metabolism of the tilapia. Salinity 
determines the ability of most tilapia species to tolerate a wide range of 
water salinity. DO fluctuation is affected by photosynthesis, respiration and 
diet fluctuation. Nile tilapia exposed to ammonia has a lower number of red 
bloods cells and hemolytic anemia, leading to a reduction in blood oxygen 
control. High levels of nitrates may weaken its immune system and increase 
the possibility of mortality. Conversely, photoperiod promotes fish growth, 
metabolic rates, body pigmentation, sexual maturation and reproduction (El-







Figure 3.3 Average monthly rainfall in last 30 years (1971-2000) in Northern Thailand  
(Millimeter) (Source: Statistical Forecasting Bureau, National Statistical 
Office, 2014, by Santita, 2014a) 
This section traces back to the 1990s when pond-based aquaculture was 
initiated. Figure 3.3 showed the rainy season pattern in Northern Thailand 
over the last 30 years (1971 -2000). The average rainfall was different in the 
three provinces. Chiang Rai had the highest rainfall, followed by Chiang 
Mai and Phayao respectively. According to TMD (2013), the rainy season 
was from May to October. The rainfall generally started by the end of April 
and dropped a little in June under the weak influence of the Southwest 
monsoon. The rainfall pattern increased again in July and gradually again 
due to tropical storms in August and September. Then, it declined by the 
end of October at the beginning of winter.  
3.1.2 Drought    
Rearing practices during the dry season is the most severe and are highly 
risky to fish aged over 4 - 6 months. A water shortage worsens water quality 
and quantity. It is a threat to fish-pond culture because it reduces the 
possibility of water exchange. Due to low water quantity in the canals, fish 
farmers hardly change water in the ponds. Low water exchange directly 
results in the instability of water temperature, salinity, dissolved oxygen, 





For that reason, poor water quality and quantity during low flow periods 
result in increasing the plankton boom, the weakening of fish disease 
resistance and increase in its mortality rates (El-Sayed, 2006). Based on the 
Thai Meteorological Department (2014), figure 3.4, in fact, indicates the 
rainfall pattern fluctuation and uncertainty from 2005 to 2012 including the 
period of the study from the end of 2012 to the beginning of 2014. It can be 
seen that the rainfall pattern had changed and became uncertain. In fact, the 
rainfall in 2005 and 2012 did not meet the normal dry season period 
(February-May). It rose during summer in February and dropped slightly 























      
Figure 3.4 Rainfall pattern in from 2005 to 2014 in Northern Thailand (Millimeter) 
               (Source: Statistical Forecasting Bureau, National Statistical Office, 2014 















Figure 3.5 Monthly rainfall patterns in Northern Thailand during 2011- 2013 (%)  
          (Source: Thai Meteorological Department, 2014 by Santita, 2014a) 
The decreasing rainfall in 2012 and 2013 resulted in drought over the last 
decade. To clarify the point, figure 3.5 demonstrates the comparison among 
the rainfall pattern during 2011 - 2013 to explain the rainfall level change. It 
is found that drought was most severe in 2012, followed by 2013 and 2011. 
The total of 7 percent rainfall in the 2012 was lower than in 2013 by 4 
percent, and more than 3 times lower than in 2011. In terms of quantity, the 
rainfall in 2012 was steadily low (figure 3.5), but increased slightly before 
the rainy season. On April 18, 2013, Northern Thailand encountered long 
low flows of the water level at Mae Ngad Somboon Chol Dam; Chiang Mai 
was reduced to 36 percent from the full water storage capacity of the dam. 
Chiang Rai and Phayao were also affected by severe drought (Office of the 






Figure 3.6 Rainfall units in Mae Lao Weir during 2003-2014 (Millimeter) (Some  
                incomplete data in 2014 in collecting.) (Source: Mae Lao Transmittal  
and Maintenance Project, 2014 by Santita, 2014a) 
 
Figure 3.7 Rainfall units in Mae Ngad Somboon Chol Dam (Millimeter) 
            (Source: Mae Faek Mae Ngad Operation and Management 






Figure 3.8 Monthly water storage in Mae Ngad Somboon Chol Dam during 2011 - 2013 
(Million cubic meter) (Source: Mae Faek Mae Ngad Operation  
and Management Project, 2014 Santita 2014a) 
At the local level, Sanpakhee Village has fewer impacts from long low flow 
since it gains water from Mae Lao Weir. From figure 3.6, rainfall units in 
the Mae Lao Weir in 2012 sharply dropped, but it grew steeply in 2013. The 
total high amount of water could be allocated for widespread use in farming 
and fish farming. The water supply was different in Chiang Mai. Figure 3.7 
emphasizes the fluctuation of water and rainfall in the Mae Faek Mae Ngad 
Operation and Management Project (2014). The trend of rainfall after 2005 
was steadily reducing. Figure 3.8 shows the level of water corresponded 
with the water storage capacity in Mae Ngad Dam in 2012 and 2013. It was 
lower than the level in 2011 that caused the local Maekaedluang fish 
farmers’ difficulty in accessing the water.   
The water shortage issue became drastic in some areas especially 
Tamphralae in 2014. Since the site was regulated by local communal 
irrigation system; there was no data record of monthly and yearly water 
storage and its flow. In turn, the Kae Muang, as a representative of each 
weir, made a plan for common water allocation during the wet season rice 
and off-season rice while the sub-district municipality kept records and 





fact, the Muang Fai system managed water allocation unevenly and not 
extensively. In other words, the majority of mostly midstream and 
downstream farmers no longer received water in last 2 to 3 years. They 
could not do off-season rice, so a low water use-crop such as garlic, onion, 
pumpkin and marigold was more preferable. Furthermore, the villagers 
encountered water conflicts and polluted water.   
“The water level has been reducing the last ten years until now. I am 
so worried about the situation in the next five years. The water will 
probably dry out if the forest is replaced with rubber and cash crop 
plantations as well as fish ponds. The state makes the villagers 
misunderstand that growing rubber means replenishing the forest. 
Actually, that kind of tree needs a large amount of water. People 
selfishly connect water pipes and pump only into their plantations. 
There are more than 16 hectares (100 rai) of rubber plantation and 
less than 16 hectares of maize plantation up there. As a result the 
water pollution and shortage affect villagers downstream. I never 
thought that we would have to compete with each other for water 
access,” explained one affected villager in Tamphralae (07-05-
2013). 
We could say that water scarcity was expected to become a big issue due to 
increased demand and lack of the good management. Tamphralae in 
particular was most affected by the stresses because the Kae Muang was 
absent from managing the water during the low flow period and the 
regulation was temporarily implemented but was not active enough. The 
water users broke the law that stipulates that farmers were allowed to access 
water in the daytime and fish farmers at night. In fact, fish farmers got as 
much water as possible all the time. They were careless about the Muang 
Fai punishment and sought out ways to access water as much as they could. 
As a result, they competed for access with one another; some stocked a lot 
of water whereas others lacked the resource. Sanpakhee and Maekaedluang 





RID agencies and Kae Muang in water allocation throughout the year is 
important. 
3.1.3 Flood  
Floods caused by cyclones and extreme rainfall events are risks to tilapia 
ponds constructed close to rivers. According to figures 3.6 and 3.9, it was 
obvious that the total monthly rainfall in 2011 was higher than in 2012 by 
17 % and in 2013 by 13% (TMD, 2014).  The excessive rainfall led to 
floods in 2005 and 2011. The rainfall in the first year dramatically rose from 
August to September and inundated 25 districts such as Muang Chiang Mai, 
Sankhampaeng, Doi Saket, Prao, Maetaneng and Sansai. In particular fish 
farmers in Maekaedluang Village, Sansai District, were vulnerable to such a 
great and unpredictable flood. Moreover, although the rainfall pattern in 
2011 was lower than 2005, flooding still occurred and caused a lot of 
damage to fish farms and agriculture lands. In late June, Thailand was 
dominated by the remnants of the tropical depression, "Haima." By the end 
of last July to last August, the country was affected once again by the 
tropical storm, “Nok Ten.” It induced very heavy rainfalls and resulted in 
widespread flooding in the north and northeast (TMD, 2014). Thus, the 
water collecting in the Mae Ngad Somboon Chol Dam had been increasing 
since May and when discharged, it raised the water level of the canals 
higher than normal.  
The flood was worsened by ineffective water management and urbanization 
influence in relation to human intervention. It is agreed by Cutter et al. 
(2003) that the density of the commercial establishments and housing units 
probably caused the exposure of this hazard situation. Areas packed with 
households and residential estates increase the possibility of flooding or 
higher levels of water. Land use has rapidly changed and local land 
ownership has declined whilst the rate of land speculation for housing and 
residential estates is increasing. The villagers agree that once there were 
vast paddy fields and agricultural lands, but now outsiders have converted 





others left theirs idle for sale. Consequently, some waterways have become 
narrower and blocked full with waste from households and agricultural 
activities. Many suffered losses, some stayed safe while others gained. At 
that time, several fish ponds, especially catfish farms upstream were flooded 
at the natural canals and the water also flooded other neighboring fish 
ponds. 
Tamphralae faced floods in 2005 and flash floods in 2013. In October, 2013, 
flash floods rose rapidly during 1 - 3 days of heavy rain. The flood was also 
stimulated by a reducing number of trees that could have helped absorb 
water and reduce the massive magnitude of flood. Fortunately, most fish 
farmers were safe because a large amount of water was released 
downstream before it caused any damage. Only a few fish farmers and 
households suffered from the flood. Walker (2002) mentions the role of 
farmers in forest conservation, but in fact there is less public attention on 
their role in maintaining forest functions. Tamphralae villagers do not seem 
to maintain the forest, but only take its advantages instead. This 
phenomenon is one of the factors that increase the possibility of natural 
hazards.  
“Look! There is a crack in the mountain. Over there is maize and 
rubber plantation owned by a big company. Indeed, those areas 
belong to the forest conservation and SPK4-01 agricultural lands, 
but no one protects the forest. I’m so afraid of landslides in the 
future," said a medium-scale fish farmer in Tamphralae (18-08-
2013). 
All in all, table 3.1 shows the summary of the impacts from climate-related 
and socio-economic risks in the three sites. It is clear that the damages to 
fish farms result from not only hydrological and meteorological cycles 
towards changes in climate but also the process of human intervention. High 
market demand and irrigation systems influence water quantity and quality, 
resource exhaustion and resource conflict as well as land title changes.  





Table 3.1 Summary of the impacts from climate-related and socio-economic risks 
3.1.4 Water pollution from used water upstream, toxic and fish diseases 
Pollution from poor water quality and quantity reduces fish survival and 
weakens its resistance to diseases. According to figure 3.9, water pollution 
results from both climate-related risks and socio-economic risks. Low and 
late rainfall plus hot temperatures cause drought, which increases the level 
of water pollution issues. High levels of water in the canal from raining also 
lead to the release of polluted water to downstream users. 
On the other hand, commercial plantations and urbanization not only require 
high amounts of water but also increase water pollution issues. In this sense, 
farmers and fish farmers who use intensive systems nowadays tend to use 
chemicals to increase their production. Farmers also use pesticides to kill 
pests while fish famers use chemical medications to treat fish diseases. All 
the chemicals are mixed with water and released to common irrigation 
canals for water users. Therefore, the fish production process risks facing 
the polluted water from maize and rubber plantations, chilli farming and rice 
paddy fields.  
Water pollution mostly occurs during the low flow period. Low water 
exchange directly results in the instability of water temperature, salinity in 
addition to dissolved oxygen, ammonia, nitrites, pH and water turbidity. 
With these factors, high ammonia and nitrite levels signal that there are high 
fish density and many wastes in the ponds (Patcharawalai et al., 2013). 
Village  Sanpakhee Maekaedluang Tamphralae 
Flood No 
2005, 2011 resulted from 
monsoon + weak irrigation 
system + land-use change 
from urbanization  
2005, 2013( flash flood) 
resulted from excessive 




2008 stopped waterway 
for weir construction 
for three months, 
2013 faced water 
conflict 
2012,2013 experienced low 
flow, overused water and 
lands from in and off 
season rice; and water 
conflict 
2012, 2013, 2014 
experienced low flow 





Moreover, during the rainy season or in places with highly intensive 
agricultural plantations, fertilizers or pesticides and waste are likely to get 
into the pond water, unqualifying and worsening its water quality. Since the 
location of a large number of rice paddy fields and fish ponds are close to 
one another, the use of poor water relatively increases the level of pollution 
upstream, midstream and downstream. Consequently, the poor water 
conditions result in the weakening of fish disease resistance and the increase 
in its mortality rates. Fish diseases spreading among several ponds are 
hardly solved and eradicated. Chemical use and other technologies are 







Figure 3.9 Effects of multiple climate and socio-economic risks on fish farmers 
Water pollution causes different impacts in the three villages. Low levels of 
water intensify water pollution. In other words, low flows of water in the 
pond reduce dissolved oxygen and worsen its quality; this poor water is then 
released downstream. In Sanpakhee, a place with highly intensive rice and 
fish-pig production, too much poor water has serious impact on the farmers’ 
production. The rice growth is unnaturally faster and taller than normal but 
is too weak to resist the heavy winds in summer. Many fish farmers with 
medium- and small-scale operations and the one who left the fish group in 
Maekaedluang also face poor water quality. They are agreed that the 
intensive catfish farming in the last two years has made water too low in 
quality for use. Thus, fish farmers downstream have found it difficult to 
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change the water in the pond, which affects the fish growth and production 
system. Then, the polluted water flows into three smaller canals. It is found 
that one canal stocking water in a high wooden weir increases the level of 
poor water quality and causes the most trouble to downstream water users.  
“From what I notice, water quality in Maekaedluang is poor; the 
water surface is dim and oiled unlike that in my Sanpakhee Village. 
The water quality might be in trouble and contaminated with waste 
and chemical substances. I understand that it is so in places located 
in peri-urban areas. Even if the water is purified, I am not sure if it 
will be clean and safe for rearing practice. The water in my 
hometown is from the highland, which is also polluted with chemical 
substances,” one fish farmer from Sanpakhee said after visiting one 
of the fish groups in Maekaedluang (11-01-2014). 
Tamphralae fish farmers with medium and small farm sizes as well as the 
one who left also encountered the highest rate of fish deaths because of the 
high level of poor and polluted water. During the rainy season, the public 
stream is at high risks from the fertilizers and chemical substances from 
intensive farming activities. Even if the chemical substances are supposed to 
maintain soil quality and pesticides kill pests, they destroy natural aquatic 
animals and contaminate water, soil and plants. Moreover, in the rainy 
season, the three sites probably experience sediment from heavy rain flow. 
Water passing through agricultural fields is contaminated and mixed with 
polluted soil and mud. Such water possibly fills up the fish gill and causes 
difficulty in breathing. It is more problematic if there is no filter in the pond 
or if fish farmers cannot identify whether the water is polluted with 
pesticide or safe. This is why most fish farmers try to avoid the water by 
closing their pipes. These stresses mostly affect the fish ponds in 
Tamphralae. It is because most fish farm systems are automatically 
changing water all the time in order to increase the oxygen rate in the pond. 
But unfortunately, the system is prone to polluted water without proper 





toxic water from the medium fish operators upstream got into the pond of a 
large operator downstream.  This water linkage led to the death of about 
4,000 kilograms of fish. 
3.1.5 Non-climate risks 
 1)  Resource demand as a result of market forces and urbanization 
The consumption of agriculture and aquaculture production is highly 
boosted by the market demand of fish resulting from increasing 
populations and urbanization expansion (Belton, 2008). The pressures 
forced an increase in the number of people moving from rural to urban 
areas. Those local people shifted from farming to off-farm 
employment in urban areas. Thus, the local agriculture-based 
economy changed to a more intensive system to respond to the market 
expansion. The phenomenon coincides with what Phrek (2002) wrote 
about numerous agricultural land tenures becoming insecure and 
speculated on by external landlords and capitalists. Many agricultural 
lands are undoubtedly now converted for housing development.  
The demand is a crucial pressure on the fish farmers’ resource access, 
which is related to their productivity. Water competition among 
agricultural intensification and fish-pond farming is increasing. 
According to the rice mortgage policy (2012 - 2013), the price of 
ordinary rice has risen to 15,000 baht a ton. Many farmers tend to 
grow wet and off-season rice around two to three times a year to 
benefit from the policy. Farmers in Sanpakhee Village settled down 
near the Japanese rice company, preferring to grow its rice variety 
because of its attractive price at 15.30 baht/ kilogram for normal 
moderators and 17 baht for seed producers. They shift between 






In Maekaedluang, a few farmers who left their paddy fields idle also 
returned to grow rice to benefit from the rice mortgage policy. 
Farmers (92 percent of village households) in Tamphralae moreover 
responded to not only the policy but also commercial plantations 
drives by mainly the state and agro-industrial companies. 
Consequently, an increasing amount of water is being used for 
agricultural farming expansion such as chilli, maize, longan and 
rubber trees. In this regard, the water demand has been rising the last 2 
- 3 years after the DOF launched fish-based production in the area. 
Since then, both villagers (28 percent of households) and outsiders 
have converted their farms into fish farming. We can see that about 64 
hectares (400 rai) of land upstream have been expanded for those 
activities.  It is skeptical in what way the soaring water demands plus 
climate-related risks affect fish pond farms. 
 2)  High cost of investment 
Fish farmers are dominated by higher and higher costs of investment. 
Most input factors including seed, feed and the harvest fish process 
are produced and provided by the fish- related enterprises (Table 3.2). 
The price of the production factors collected in 2013 was slightly 
lower than the price in 2014, except feed prices which increased by 5 
baht/ bag in the three sites. According to the farming standard system 
agreed upon from meetings between feed companies and fish groups, 
480 fish in intensive farm should fit into one 0.16 hectare of the pond 
and requires a maximum 150 bags of feed. The data is mixed up from 
both 14 integrated (9 in Sanpakhee, 2 in Maekaedluang and 3 in 
Tamphralae) and 17 non-integrated fish farmers (1 in Sanpakhee, 10 
in Maekaedluang and 6 in Tamphralae). Land used for pond-based 
aquaculture is also a very important cost in which its price naturally 
rises through time whether the land ownership is either bought, leased 
or inherited. Showing its rental cost is counted as a cost of land use. 





briefly made to prove the differences of the production cost per crop 
in each site. 
Table 3.2 Average unit cost of key inputs in the three villages 
Factors Sanpakhee Maekaedluang Tamphralae 
Seed price 0.4-0.5 bht/ fry  or 1.80 bht/ fingerling 
Average feed price*  540 bht/bag** 470 530 
Average number of 
feed bags 100 150 270 
Water fee Free 200 bht/ pond 100 bht/ pipe 
Rental land  price 5,000 bht/ rai/ year 20,000 bht/ rai/ year 10,000 bht/ rai 
* Average feed price is calculated by collecting different prices from many brands and divided by a 
number of the feed brand (Collected on 16-09-2013). 
** 20 kilograms/ feed bag 
In reality, fish farmers in the three villages use varying portions of 
feed with different prices and farm systems. Feed agencies play an 
important role in fish groups. Each feed agency in Sanpakhee chooses 
a few feed brands whose price is controlled by the particular feed 
companies. Buying feed with cash is cheaper than with credit as a 
surplus of interest. In fact, some large- and smaller-scale operations, 
decide to borrow feed that makes the price higher (540 baht/ a feed 
bag) than reality. The system is like that of the Tamphralae fish farmer 
cooperatives. They prefer using only one type of feed while the fish 
committee negotiates with the feed companies to keep the price low. 
Thus, the feed price (530 baht/a feed bag) is slightly lower than the 
feed price in Sanpakhee by 10 baht.  
On the other hand, Maekaedluang fish groups allow various brands of 
feeds with different prices and quality. The feed companies are 
required to compete with each other which automatically force the 
price (470 baht/ a feed bag) to reduce to entice the farmers to buy. 
Moreover, the fish farmer members are encouraged to buy feed with 
its actual price and allowed to pay with credit just for one month 





of money circulation. Sanpakhee uses the smallest number of feed 
because the majority of them rely on not only fish feed but also 
plankton from pig manure.  But they pay the most expensive feed 
price while Maekaedluang and Tamphralae buy cheaper but the latter 
fish farmers have to pay for the water fee. Fish farmers in Tamphralae 
use a larger number of feed than Maekaedluang and Sanpakhee 
respectively.  Yet, the ones who are out of the groups in the three 
villages were previously required to buy the feed with the given price 
from the feed companies and middlemen. Their cost of investment 
therefore was hardly negotiable and higher than the ones in the fish 
farmer group.  That is an important reason why they decided to leave 
fish farming. 
 Table 3.3 Calculation of cost of investment in the three villages 
Price Sanpakhee Maekaedluang Tamphralae 
Seed price (fry) 0.5* x 3,000 = 1,500  
Average feed**  540 x100 = 54,000  470 x 150 = 70,500 530 x 270 = 143,100 
Water fee Free 200 100  
Rental land  /crop 5,000 / 2 crops = 2,500  20,000 / 3 crops = 6,600  10,000 / 2 crops = 5,000  
Total expense 
(bht) *** 
58,000  78,800  149,700 
*   Use 0.5 baht/ fry  
** Maximum - minimum. price of various brands of fish feed / 2 is an average feed price. 
*** Labor is out of the calculation because most fish farmers rely on their own labor, just a harvest fish 
cost. 
It is significantly seen in the table 3.3 that Tamphralae has the highest 
cost of investment (149,700 baht), 3 times of Sanpakhee (58,000 baht) 
and 2 times of Maekaedluang (78,800 baht). Fish farmers use the 
highest number of expensive feed with an average of 2 crops a year 
like Sanpakhee. At the same time, even if the land title in 
Maekaedluang is the most expensive, the fish farmers can increase 
frequencies of crops as much as they increase their incomes. However, 
this cost is a brief number which is different upon scale operation in 





daily labor wage increases all employment wages including harvesting 
costs and other employments. As a result, fish farmers here have much 
more financial burden from production to harvest process. Harvest 
labor wage in Sanpakhee and Tamphralae rises to 250 baht/ person/ 
day. The owners of the fish farms are required to provide breakfast 
around 1,000 baht/ day. The more they harvest, the more they pay. 
Sometimes fish harvests takes longer than usual because of excess fish 
supply. So fish traders skip the queues for the new farms and return to 
the previous one. Consequently, all fish farmers have higher 
investment costs and hardly negotiate with the invisible market 
uncertainty. 
Fish sale is dependent upon the market price and related actors. The 
fish farmers’ incomes are determined by the price regulated by fish 
networks and traders based on demand and supply. Fish networks are 
able set the price based on other groups in other provinces. The price 
of the biggest fish size is hence not that much different at around 55 - 
59 baht/ kg during 2012 - 2014.  However, the price fluctuation 
caused by excess demand or supply in the market impacts production 
process. For example, the excess supply from other fish sources and 
low demand of consumers in 2011 delayed harvest queues. This 
lowered prices and pressured the farmers to continue to rear fish while 
waiting for lower supply. Those fish farmers had no choice but to pay 
for extra feed, materials, electricity and other additional costs. 
Unfortunately, oversized fishes with longer rearing duration did not 
meet market demand which possibly forced the price lower. Above 
all, those fish farmers without groups are more vulnerable because 
they are out of the harvest queue and controlled price regulation.  
Most fish farms (90% of the case studies) in Sanpakhee and some (3 
out of 9) in Tamphralae have another problem with pig prices. The 
price of pig feed and vaccines increase, but the pig price is not 





of over 100 kilograms at 52 baht was reduced from 65 last month. The 
fish farmers lost about 1,300 baht/ pig. 
“This year, the price of pigs rose up to 75 baht/ kg, then 
dropped by 13 baht. Even at 65 baht/ kg, it is difficult to get a 
profit and is not worth investing in. When the price of pigs is 
low, pork retailers do not reduce the price; but when it is 
higher, they increase their prices naturally. Whether the price 
is high or low, we have to sell pigs for the middleman; 
otherwise they will be overweight, which does not meet the 
market demand. Again, if the price is soaring too high, some 
agro-industrial companies will lower it. Farmers like us are 
barely surviving,” one fish farmer in Sanpakhee said (01-06-
2013). 
 3)  Low quality fingerlings and pest  
Some fingerling varieties are not strong enough to withstand the 
different weathers. Hence they die after being reared for a week. In 
addition, the low quality fingerlings results from the process of 
converting female fingerlings to males in the northern part of 
Thailand, the coldest in the country. Transforming the gender might 
not be successful because fish eat fewer hormones under the cold 
weather. Thus, the fish is still female and breeding, so such so that it is 
too thin to meet the market demand. Additionally, intensive 
agriculture has an impact on the loss of aquatic animal. After 
implementing agricultural intensification, natural fish are disappearing 
because lots of chemical substances and fertilizers destroy a number 
of aquatic animals. Therefore, natural fish such as the climbing perch 
and eel naturally surviving in paddy fields adapt themselves to live in 
fish ponds. But unfortunately, they eat fingerlings between 4 - 5 mm. 





Members of the fish farmer groups in the three sites are allowed to 
buy the selected fingerlings suggested by the feed agencies and other 
fish networks. The source of supplies is different upon the 
consideration of fish farmer groups and locations close to them. 
Maekaedluang mostly use the fingerlings from the supplier in Chiang 
Mai while Sanpakhee and Tamphralae buy from sources in the central 
and eastern provinces of Thailand. However, choosing the wrong 
supplier probably causes worse fish productivity and reduces income. 
The members might unfortunately get the breeding fingerlings which 
have slow growth and weight. Slightly similar to some fish farmers 
who do not belong to the groups, they have to get the fingerlings from 
the available sources themselves. Some medium and small fish 
farmers buy the seed from known persons who might lack enough 
related information and knowledge.  
 4)  Fish snatching and weighing process  
Some fish pond compounds are not fenced and located far away from 
home, presenting opportunities for fish snatchers or thieves who enter 
the pond at night or when there are no owners. For instance, the 
situation often appears in Tamphralae since most fish-pond farming is 
settled outside of the village community. Some fish farmers have to 
carefully watch out for the fish for a few months before harvesting 
time. Conversely, the situation is rarely found in Sanpakhee and 
Maekaedluang because the ponds are close to the houses of the fish 
owners. The weighing process is another problem mostly found in 
Sanpakhee. Harvesting fish periods are run systematically by the 
groups. Some fish farmer brokers cooperate with traders to cheat on 
the fish’s weight and size. For example, the checker writes down the 
weight of a fish as 200 kilograms when it is in fact 240 - 250 
kilograms. That is how the fish farmers lose their profits or earn less 





“The pond owners have to check the harvest staff and checker 
because they skillfully and quickly run a process that is likely 
to cause mistakes. For example, a harvest man weighs fish 
quickly but does not communicate properly with the checkers. 
So they don’t actually record the real weight or some just 
pretend to do so. Some might write the fake weight. However, 
if the fish owners have such experiences they will deal with 
the situation. But I decided to keep silent,” one fish farmer in 
Sanpakhee explains (03-07-2013). 
3.2  Vulnerability of Pond-Based Aquaculture  
Which site is most vulnerable to physical and socio-economic risks? The study explores 
where and what kind of fish farmers are most sensitive to the multiples risks, and the 
conditions that affect their response to hazards.  
 3.2.1 Site vulnerability 
The sites that are vulnerable are measured by different levels of access to water 
resources and degree of urbanization. These conditions increase the stresses and create 
greater impacts on fish farmers. Types and density of infrastructure and water 
management at community levels determine household capacity in response to the 
stresses. Furthermore, building effective canals running far and wide for agriculture and 
aquaculture farms to assess can resolve resource conflicts among water users.  The 
concrete water canals, which reduce the frequency of clearing canals, are mostly built in 
Sanpakhee, except for some downstream canals that are still earthen and covered by 
weed. In Maekaedluang, most canals are concrete; some are earthen but not well taken 
care of by the Kae Muang and water users. In the first two villages, whether they are up-
, mid- or downstream, the water users have high chances of gaining a lot of water. By 
contrast, most canals in Tamphralae are earthen with slow-flowing water; some of it is 
absorbed by streams running alongside the canals, thus lowering the water level. As a 





Water access is related to the relationship between irrigation institutions and water user 
groups including farmers and fish farmers. It also affects the collaboration of the Muang 
Fai system and the rate of water competition. Loose water user networks reduce the 
efficiency of water allocation and management. In this way, after the RID has played its 
role in the existing Muang Fai system, the main responsibility of the Kae Muang in 
managing water has been changed and replaced. The collective action of all water users 
in maintaining the Muang Fai has also likely disappeared. Local people rarely take care 
of common water and public activities. It can be said that the three villages lack 
solidarity and participation among water users, but the situation is different in various 
contexts.  
In the past, the users helped clear the earthen canal together. After the state development 
of the irrigation system, the earthen canal was replaced with concrete ones. The 
collective action has disappeared whereas the role of machines like backhoes has 
become more significant. The Muang Fai system in Sanpakhee Village is completely 
controlled by RID, while the Kae Muang continues playing a few roles in water 
maintenance. But some canal has no collective activities. The Maekaedluang irrigation 
has also declined. Few Kae Muang take on the responsibilities of water management 
under the top-down RID policy. Water users are asked to pay for the water fee and to 
help clear the waterway. The level of the villagers’ collaboration in irrigation activities 
is declining. Some claim that they will not pay the fee anymore, but they continue to use 
the water for agriculture and aquaculture activities.  
“I work hard alone and there is no young generation taking part in my 
work. Now, my assistant does not help me, not even to attend the 
meetings and maintain the canals. But he collects the water fee without 
letting me know.  You know, I am given a monthly salary of 1,200 baht 
together with the small partial amount of water fee. I also have to report 
the updated situation and activities monthly to the RID meeting,” one 






Figure 3.10 The canal construction by filling the gap between the actual canals  
and the constructed dyke. 
Anyway, many canals in Maekaedluang are designed and developed by RID without 
any public hearing. The RID does not ask for public agreement or participation from the 
local water users in developing the waterway. For instance, to prevent soil erosion, they 
recently built a concrete dyke that was narrower than the actual canal width (figure 
3.10). On April 2014, the RID filled the water gap area between the canal with its actual 
width and the constructed dyke. Besides the irrigation construction increasing the flood 
probability, filling lands and converting them for housing also impede the waterways 
and slow down the water flow. Therefore, the locals’ concerns about the higher water 
level during the rainy seasons are not always unfounded, like the flooding that happened 
in 2005 and 2011.   
“We can’t even tell whether the RID aims to solve or increase the 
problems. Without good communication, we don’t know what they use 
to fill some parts of the canals. We cannot stop the project because it is 
run by the RID. The canals cannot revert to the normal state. It is now 






Land titles are highly likely to be transferred to the one with more purchasing power. 
Many farmers lease or sell their lands to outsiders while they move to work off-farm. 
For example, a large fish operator sold his fish pond land to a rich lady from the city 
(figure 3.11). After she raised fish for a year, she sold the land nearby to foreigners and 
converted the rest of the land to soil mining. A lot of big trucks started driving back and 
forth many times a day, carrying a ton of soil dug from more than 10 meters deep. The 
villagers were annoyed by the activities and afraid of landslides, so they asked the lady 
to stop.  
 
Figure 3.11 Soil mining done by outsider in Maekaedluang 
Due to higher water demand from agriculture and aquaculture production expansion in 
the upland area, resource conflicts in Tamphralae are something beyond the control of 
the farmers. Some agriculture farmers and fish farmers upstream undoubtedly gain a 
good quantity and quality of water. The downstream water users consequently suffer 
from the inert and poor overused water. Without collective action, some people break 
the rules by using big pumps and stock water without sharing with others. The local 
irrigation leader position is no longer valued nowadays. Few people voluntarily take the 
role of Kae Muang with low salary and many responsibilities.  In addition, the system of 
water allocation is not well managed and planned for a vast land of waterways. Hence, 





 “The Kae Muang’s role is reducing. I am too old to walk back and forth 
to check how far the water is distributed and to deal with conflicts. 
Because of low flow, water conflicts are more severe. It is because the 
authorities upstream stock water in a big pipe intake, how can it flow? I 
ask for the water to be shared. I’m Kae Muang, I actually have rights to 
take the big pipe out, but I can’t. I’m too weak to have a say like other 
villagers who are scared of the influential people. They are rich and 
authoritative,” one old Kae Muang in Tamphralae said (08-05-2013). 
 “Kae Muang is no longer prestigious. No one is scared or cares about 
their punishment. The existing Muang Fai law is not active. As long as 
anyone has opportunity, they will access more and more, using a big 
water pipe. Thus, the Kae Muang should be younger. They can 
understand easily, make a project and report to the municipality,” 
explained a medium fish farmer in Tamphralae (07-05-2013). 
In terms of market demand over land titles in Tamphralae, the lands there are either left 
idle or forest areas that are villagers and outsiders use for economic benefits. Around 64 
hectares (400 rai) of forestlands under the national park are illegally occupied by local 
people who are relatives of national park officials. Some farmers converted their farms 
to grow rubber trees, pineapple, pumpkin, corn and soybean in the highland while some 
illegally stake the partial upper watershed areas in the national park compound. Most 
upland areas are SPK4-01 and the lowland village is titled. The upland areas have been 
transformed to SPK4-01, which does not allow them to be sold. In fact, large pieces of 
lands are illegally leased, speculated upon, and sold to other farmers and wealthy 
outsiders. Unquestionably, the forestlands have been replaced with housing and 
agricultural lands. 
All in all, with a high potential of water allocation, Sanpakhee has fewer problems of 
such land ownership change. Maekaedluang is mostly affected by urbanization that 
makes water management and allocation more difficult. The fish farmers there are 
mainly plagued by floods, droughts and water pollution. Tamphralae, a medium-sized 





drought and water pollution whist reducing the capacity of fish farmer households’ 
response.  
  3.2.2 Household vulnerability 
The weather changes, flooding and droughts can affect annual incomes and resource 
base. How much impact the climate and weather leaves on the pond culture depends not 
only on where the area is geographically situated but also on how the people respond to 
the adverse situations. Here I classify the capitals embedded in families of fish farmers 
with different scale operations and see how they are affected by the stresses. The 
information is analyzed from the case studies representative from each community, as 
follows: 
1)  Aging farmers over rearing practice 
The aim of classifying the different ages here is to see how those fish 
farmers can apply new knowledge and technology in rearing practices. 
Does age matter in response to the multiple risks? If so, which of the 
age groups are more vulnerable to the risks? The average age of the 
fish farmers of all scale operations in the 3 sites is 54 - 57 years old 
who are naturally getting older and weaker for such hard farm work. 
In fact, there are also a number of people older than the average age, 
whilst a few young people around 25 - 40 years old work in fish 
farming.  
It is necessary to rely on new technology, scientific knowledge and 
economic understanding when practicing earthen pond-based 
aquaculture. Fish farmers basically learn or experience first-hand how 
to choose the factors of production and to calculate the feed ratios and 
productivity. But, it has been found that age is an obstacle to the old 
people’s learning and practice. As a result, the younger and older 
generations have different fish productivity outcomes. The young 
know how to seek for knowledge wider and more modern than the 





their children or other younger family members have slowed down 
their learning or learned as much as they could on their own.  
Based on table 3.4, compared to the other sizes, most large-scale fish 
farmers are younger and have higher education from high school to 
graduate degrees. Thus, they have more capacities to develop the fish 
business and to maximize productivity. Exchanging information in 
fish groups encourages the 22 fish farmers who are group members in 
the three sites to use a high feed conversion ratio (a measurement of 
the animal’s efficiency in converting feed portion into fish meat or 
FCR); and 13 fish farmers to use fingerlings. All of them, mostly in 
Maekaedluang, are able to reduce the risks during rearing and produce 
good fish weight within a short period. Fish farmers who implement 
the ideas are 77% large-scale and 30% medium-scale operators in all 
sites who are approximately below 60 years old. Significantly, all 
three large fish operators in Maekaedluang are the youngest (average 
age of 45 years old) and would rather choose feed with high FCR and 
fingerlings. As a consequence, they have less likelihood of fish death 
than smaller fish farmers in other villages. On the other hand, not only 
some small-scale elderly fish farmers (average age of 63 years old) 
but also the one who exited from fish farming and the fish group (62 
years old) in Maekaedluang always encounter slow fish growth and 
low weight (less than 400 grams per fish) and a high rate of fish death. 
They can barely cope with the stresses when dealing with urgent 
matters. The impacts are also found among some medium-scale, many 
small-scale fish farmers and the ex-fish farmers who are non-group 
members in all sites.  It is likely that they prefer using production 
inputs different from the larger scale operators.    
The enthusiastic younger generation with high education can reduce 
their vulnerability by putting in more long-term management 
strategies and investments. In Maekaedluang, for instance, two large 





economics into their farm practice. Some large-scale fish farmers use 
their own geographical knowledge and zoning to foresee what will 
happen in the area and whether it is fit for agriculture and aquaculture. 
They also formulate their farming systems with maximization and 
utilization. Furthermore, in Tamphralae, one large operator applies 
knowledge from agriculture of which he is a university graduate, into 
farming management. He runs the business in terms of hybrid farming 













Figure 3.13 Local FCR calculation in Maekaedluang 
Conversely, the aging and smaller fish farmers with lower education 
and rare knowledge exchange with their counterparts have less ability 
to understand and develop rearing techniques and processes. FCR is 
one example of knowledge management. I explore the comparison of 
Local Feed Conversion Ratio (FCR) Calculation Example 
Conditions: 
(1) Present fish price = 56 bht/kilogram 
(2) Feed price = 490 bht/ bag 
(3) A number of feed= 730 bags 
(4) Total production = 11,330 kg. 
Calculation: 
(1) Total production/a number of total feed: 11,330/730 = 15.52 (FCR) 
(2) FCR x fish price: 15.52x 56 = 869.12 baht 
(3) Total fish price with FCR – feed price (profit/bag): 869.12-490 = 379.12 baht 
Result: a bag of feed can return 379.12 bht/bag. Thus, the higher protein feed is (more expensive),  
the higher FCR is.      (Collected on 01-07-2014) 
Standard Feed Conversion Ratio (FCR) Calculation  
Formula: FCR= Total feed (kg)/total fish production (kg) 
(1) A number of feed = 730 bags 
(2) Weight per feed bag = 20 kg. 
(3) Total production = 11,330 kg. 






different FCR calculations in figures 3.12 and 3.13, one is academic 
and the other is the local pattern. The collected number in 
Maekaedluang is used as an example that can be applied to different 
feed ratios and sites. Beginning with figure 3.13, FCR is made by total 
feed (kg) divided by total fish production (kg). One shows the best 
conversion from feed to fish protein, so the closer the number is to 1, 
the better the FCR. Still, the calculation system has changed a little 
after local fish famers adopted it in their farming. 
FCR and profit per feed bag are measures of good rearing practice. 
FCR in the local version is supposed to be 20. It means the closer the 
number is to 20, the higher the FCR. The higher the FCR, the more 
fish farmers gain high fish weight that returns high profit per feed bag. 
Based on figure 3.14, the number 15.52 FCR means high protein 
conversion. Using high FCR increases the fish weight, makes it grow 
faster and reduces the rearing period.  The profit per feed bag 
represents a return of investment. In figure 3.14, the farmers will gain 
379.12 baht as profit/ feed bag in return. In other words, the way to 
get more profit is using a feed with high FCR. The higher the number, 
the higher the profit per feed bag. 
With less understanding of the technical and economic terms, most 
fish farmers of mostly aging medium-, small- and some large-scale 
operations experience slower fish growth and more deaths. Since the 
feed brand with high premium protein is expensive, those farmers try 
to minimize the cost as much as possible. No matter how much the 
FCR is worth in the long term, they prefer using cheaper feed as a way 
to save money in the short term. The fish, in turn, have lower weights 
and smaller sizes than those fed with high FCR. Therefore, the 
farmers need extended rearing periods and require more investment in 
order to respond to the market demand with big and heavier fish. 
Above all they cannot notice and clarify fish diseases, which makes it 
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high FCR Fingerling 
Sanpakhee                
( rural area) 
Large (n=3) 3 - - 55 3 3 1 High fish weight in a 
short rearing duration and 
low rate of fish death Medium (n=3) 2 1 - 59 3 3 - 
Small (n=3) 3 - - 57 3 3 - Low fish weight in  long 
rearing duration and high 





Large (n=3) 1 1 1 45 3 3 3 High fish weight in a 
short rearing duration and 
low rate of fish death Medium (n=4) 4 - - 53 4 3 3 
Small (n=4) 3 1 - 63 4 3 3 Low fish weight in  long 
rearing duration and high 
rate of  fish death Exit (n=1) 1 - - 62 - - - 
Tamphralae             
( rural area) 
Large (n=3) 1 1 1 56 3 3 3 
High fish weight in a 
short rearing duration and 
low rate of fish death 
Medium (n=3) 3 - - 51 2 1 - 
Low fish weight in  long 
rearing duration and high 
rate of  fish death 
Small (n=3) 3 - - 60 3 - - 
Exit (n=1) 1 - - 50 - - - 






Table 3.5 Summary of fish farmers’ capitals on fish material selection and the results (continued) 
Village Scale operation 
Labor availability  
Family 
members 
Land title Land price 
(bht/hectare) Results Hired Family Exchange Rental Inherited Bought 
Sanpakhee                
( rural area) 






Medium (n=3) - 3(A) 3 > elderly / 
children and 
grand children 
- 2 1 
Limited investment 
cost Small (n=3) - 3(A) 3 - 3 - 




Large (n=3) 2 (M) 3 - 
< elderly 






maintenance  Medium (n=4) - 4 - - 4 1 
Small (n=4) 1(A) 4(A) - > elderly - 4 - Limited investment 
cost Exit (n=1) - 1 - > children and grand children - 1 - 
Tamphralae            
( rural area) 






Medium (n=3) - 3 - - - 3 - 
Limited investment 
cost 
Small (n=3) - 3(A) - > children - 3 - 
Exit (n=1) - 1 - > elderly and many children - 1 - 
Total n=32 7 32 9  1 32 8   
      







2)  Personal wealth, weak family members and labor availability 
Wealth enables people to quickly prevent and recover from losses. Other 
income sources and accumulated wealth can be fast diverted to mitigate 
or recover from stresses. Using other safer income is a good indicator of 
its ability to offset the loss in time. However, family member’s burden is 
necessarily taken into account as a key factor of income allocation in the 
households. In this way, farming stock, tenancy and family members can 
produce the social vulnerability.  
Labor is an important factor of fish farming as a measure of the farmers’ 
capacity in rearing practice. Non-farm jobs are seen as new income 
opportunities for the young generation while the reciprocal and young 
laborers working in farming diminish. However, found in some parts of 
Tamphralae Village, even under the commercial pressure on agriculture, 
labor exchange (ao mu ao wan) remains operating in particular during the 
rainy rice season, except in fish farming. Also seen in Sanpakhee, fish 
farmers help one another harvest fish in the morning.   
From the table 3.5, in the other two villages, they have to hire labor, 
which increases the cost of investment. Hired labor roles become 
important for both large and aging fish operators.  Seven out of nine 
large-scale operators hire labor since they have various businesses such as 
land speculation, fish trade and expanding agricultural farming. Those 
large fish farmers in Maekaedluang, Chiang Mai hire migrant workers, 
who mostly work in the big city, and neighboring laborers to support a 
large amount of farming work. One aging fish farmer with less help from 
his family but has enough money, also hires labor for temporary work.  
The rest of the medium and small fish farmers in Maekaedluang and 
Tamphralae, and operations of all scales in Sanpakhee, rely on their own 






scale operator in Sanpakhee takes care of the pig and fish farming alone 
while his wife takes care of their grandson. Her daughter and son-in- law 
are working off-farm in other provinces. Without hiring any labor, he has 
to work from sunrise to sunset every day and seldom participates in social 
activities in the villages. Similar to other two medium and two small fish 
operators, their children sometimes send remittance as a cost of looking 
after a grandson and a granddaughter. Therefore, their fund is too limited 
to pay for hired labor costs.  
Two demographic groups most affected by disasters are children and the 
elderly (Cutter et al., 2003). The more children and elderly people they 
have, the more their capitals are reducing. In the three sites, it is clearly 
seen that the large fish operators have fewer children than the smaller 
operators. They have to share affordable income among family members 
especially the elderly and children who have less ability to earn, help with 
the farming and take care of themselves. In other words, all available 
income is exhausted for the necessities of daily life and life cycles that 
cause the limitation of the smaller fish farmers to invest in fish farming.   
Table 3.6 Land holdings comparison of each scale operator in each site 
Villages Sanpakhee Maekaedluang Tamphralae 
Scale of fish pond 
(Hectares) 
S = 1.6-3.2 
M = 4.8-8 
L = > 9.6 
S = 1.6-6.4 
M = 8-12.8 
L = > 14.4 
S = 1.6-6.4  
M = 8-16  
L = > 17.6 
Land ownership is dependent upon farm sizes. Do large-scale operators 
have more capacity to own more lands than the smaller ones? It is found 
that larger-scale operators have more land holdings than smaller fish 
farmers in all sites. From the table 3.6, all fish farmers are given inherited 
lands. The land ownerships across scale operations are not vastly different 
like in Tamphralae and Maekaedluang. Large fish farmers in Tamphralae 






followed by the large-scale farmers in Maekaedluang and in Sanpakhee. 
The small- and medium-scales are slightly different among the three sites. 
Tamphralae land types in Phayao, a medium town, comprises of land 
titles and SPK4-01, based on the table 3.5. The land price is 80,000 -
112,000 baht/ hectare (6.25 rai) which is more expensive than the upland 
SPK4-01 by 16,000 - 48,000 baht/ hectare (6.25 rai). Most large fish 
farmers, except for the small and medium, are able to buy and lease the 
lands. The lands owned by the smaller-scale farmers are mostly inherited 
from their ancestors. Besides their inheritance, those with more wealth are 
also better able to choose the right location and buy or lease the lands 
than most small operators who are inherited the lands. Meanwhile, the 
large-scale operators have more opportunities to intensify fish farming 
and other farming over the land utilization. 
The land price in Maekaedluang, Chiang Mai (a large city) is most 
expensive at about 240,000 - 400,000 baht/ hectare (6.25 rai). That is the 
reason why the small fish farmers cannot buy the lands while those who 
exited from fish farming decide to rent out their lands. Six out of nine 
large and 2 out of 9 medium fish farmers in all sites both buy and lease 
the lands. One large operator in Maekaedluang buys land outside the 
village with better quality of water and away from urbanization. 
Meanwhile, he has more opportunities to intensify fish farming and other 
farming and expand income availabilities. He is hence safe from the 
hazards unlike others in the village. Sanpakhee lands in Chiang Rai, a 









3.2.3 The most vulnerable households prone to the multiple risks 
Site vulnerability coincides with the level of household vulnerability. The peri-urban 
Maekaedluang, followed by Tamphralae and Sanpakhee respectively, is most prone to the 
multiple risks between climate-related and socio-economic stresses. The vulnerability level 
is mediated by aging, which affects the understanding ability, non-working household 
members, lack of social networks and lack of massive investment as well as the likelihood 
of fish death. Thus, high household vulnerability is assessed by frequency of fish death in 
every season and the slow fish growth and low weight (the largest amount is less than 500- 
600 grams).  Such households also have a very small amount of money for the existing and 
future investment. Moderate level is assessed by some amount of fish death in some 
seasons, the fish weight around 500 - 600 grams and enough investment funds. The fish 
farmers with low vulnerability levels have some fish death in some seasons, produce fish 
weighing mostly 700 grams up and have the ability to intensively invest in the fish ponds. 
Most small-scale operators are likely exposed and sensitive to risks. It is found that the 
small aging fish operators and the one who has left fish farming in Maekaedluang are most 
vulnerable (table 3.7). They not only face disasters and natural stresses but also massive 
urbanization influences on landlessness, land conversion and labor shortage. This group of 
people also undergoes ineffective farm management from the lack of help from family 
members and their low level of understanding the new information and technology. As a 
result, they can hardly avoid the fish diseases and fish death from the fluctuating water 
quality and quantity released by the water users and the residents. Taking the long rearing 
duration is undoubtedly not suitable for them. They have to harvest the fish earlier during 










Table 3.7 Level of household vulnerability (Source: Santita, 2014a) 
Villages Level of vulnerability Scale operation Level of vulnerability  
Sanpakhee Low Large Low 
Medium Low 
Small  Moderate  
Exit High 
Maekaedluang  High Large Low  
Medium Moderate 
Small  High  
Exit High 
Tamphralae Moderate Large Low 
Medium High 
Small  High 
Exit High 
Two cases are elaborated to see who is most vulnerable and how affected they are. Both of 
them are members of fish groups. Firstly, Mrs. A (pseudonym) in figure 3.14 is a small 
aging fish farmer in Maekaedluang. She encountered fish loss from floods in 2008 and 
2011 as well as fish diseases and death from rapid changes between hot and cold 
temperatures in the following year. In addition, the water level was not stable during the 
dry season in 2013 due to its demand upstream for residential estates, households, 
agriculture and aquaculture farming. Furthermore, her productivity was uncertain due to the 
pressure from unqualified fingerlings and climbing feed prices. Moreover, she raised the 
fish alone such as feeding, circulating the pond and cleaning its compound. With little help 
from her family members, getting older was her obstacle and deepened her growing desire 
to exit from fish farming. But no one seemed interested in continuing with the farm at the 
moment. Thus, she reluctantly remains on the farm as long as she is not too weak to work. 
Furthermore, a small divorced fish farmer woman Mrs. B (pseudonym) in the same village 






change. Located downstream, she allowed water upstream into the pond without realizing 
how poor and polluted the water was during the raining period. Her fish were affected by 
severe diseases through relatively used water and suffered from rapid water turnover. 
Barely able to cope with the situation, what she could do was to just let the fish group 
harvest earlier and freeze dying fish for sale with hopes of getting as much returns as 
possible. To make matters worse, her brother sold the fish pond she was allowed to use, 
which belonged to her dead parents. The land was filled and a house was built in its place. 
She then used the idle pond near her brother’s house, but still lacked investment money. It 
was because she had to save the small amount of accumulated money for her two school-
going sons. Thus, she had to stop rearing fish for almost a year as a way to reduce risks 
during the rainy season. She also worked hard off-farm to accumulate money to offset the 
previous fish loss and kept it for the next investment. 
 
Figure 3.14 Mrs. A (pseudonym) rafting to feed fish alone  
Second is the medium-scale operation with non-group, the small and the exited one who 
often faced water competition, drought and high levels of water pollution. They try hard to 
maintain the productivity at the existing fish farm landscape by using the available water, 






a lot of non-working generations. The most affected case is also found in Tamphralae. The 
medium-scale operator Mr. C (pseudonym) is a newcomer who is neither a part of a fish 
farmer cooperative nor the Muang Fai system. His pond is located in the lowland 
downstream, which is prone to low flow and stocked water upstream. During the dry 
season in 2013, lower levels of underground water and hot weather led to tons of fish death. 
There was no help from any social partners and even the state’s compensation since he did 
not register in the fish farmer list of RID. A year later, he set up an aerator and reduced fish 
density to reduce risks but vulnerably still faced lower flow period. To keep water quantity, 
he sometimes had to reluctantly utilize overused poor water from other ponds upstream.  
Sanpakhee Village is less prone to the multiple risks but there is still the vulnerable person 
who left fish farming because he was independent of any fish farmers’ organization. That 
was why he had minimal opportunity to exchange information and knowledge with other 
fish farmer friends. Therefore, he had a low coping strategy and no network to help him 
during the harsh stresses. The four cases ensured the vulnerability of fish farmers as a result 
of weak human capital, problematic financial capital, inefficient natural capital and lack of 
social capital in households and social networks. The problems are made more critical by 
the high degree of urbanization due to increasing resource demands. Indeed, the capacity of 
water allocation at the community level is neither well managed to respond to the 
uncontrollable influences nor able to support the fish farmer business. Consequently, those 
vulnerable fish farmers have to individually struggle for survival to make their capitals 












Findings indicate that not only climate-related risks but also socio-economic risks have 
impacts on pond-based aquaculture. Location, social and financial status capital, knowledge 
and social networks have constituted the vulnerability of different sized operators. 
The most vulnerable places are (1) Maekaedluang and (2) Tamphralae based on the criteria 
of the degree of urbanization and water access. Due to the high urbanization influences, 
poor infrastructure of water management and allocation lead to the low capacity of water 
users to access water. Earthen canals result in ineffective distribution of water that causes 
different capacity of access.  Moreover, the lack of collaboration in Muang Fai activities 
reduces the solidarity of water allocation and increase resource conflicts between those 
upstream and downstream. In addition, the degree of urbanization increases pressure on 
land ownership/ titles and the cost of investment in the fish farming. Some smaller-scale 
operators cannot own the land rights and better location with easy access to efficient water. 
It is noted that all these factors multiply the severity of climate-related risks. Maekaedluang 
was dominated by floods in 2008, 2011 and 2013 while Tamphralae flooded in 2013 and 
suffered droughts in 2013 and 2014. The least vulnerable is Sanpakhee because it has 
sufficient water sources with low levels of urbanization. 
In terms of household vulnerability, the most vulnerable households are mostly small-scale 
and some medium-scale operators in Tamphralae because of the loose collaboration among 
fish farmers and villagers. Furthermore, the lack of family labor, support and social 
networks makes it difficult for the fish farmers to cope with the problems and increases the 
possibility of reducing or exiting from fish farming.  In addition, aging is an obstacle to 
learning new scientific and economic knowledge on how to rear fish effectively. Limited 
wealth resulting from weak family members also reduces the capacity of intensive 
investment. However, the differences among smaller and larger operators can be resolved 
through social connections across the scale operations, collective action, and the exchange 
of information and knowledge with external organizations. In this regard, different scale 






multiple risks. It is skeptical how they use their capitals to respond to, cope with, recover 




Farm Sizes and Adaptive Capacities  
Households and community vary their abilities to respond to, cope with, recover from, and 
adapt to hazards.  Adaptive capacity is determined by ability to access: information and 
technology; natural resources; labor; money; lands; and, social networks. The chapter 
outlines (1) the rationale to examine the different abilities of small, medium and large scale 
operators over the capital convertibility in order to maintain fish productivity and to 
generate income; (2) the impacts of climate-related variability towards fish farm 
households and communities and their coping capacities; and (3) their adaptation to 
different scale operations.  To elaborate the different adaptive capacity, the fish farm 
households with small, medium and large scale operations are divided into the ones 
participating in fish farmer groups and those not. 
4.1  Converting Capitals to Access as Adaptive Capacity 
Successful pond-based aquaculture depends on site selection, good quality and quantity of 
production factors and good rearing management. Any fish farmer who has more assets 
tends to have a greater range of options and an ability to switch between multiple strategies 
to secure their livelihood (DFID, 2000). In other words, water, information, labor, money, 
land and social networks can be utilized, mobilized and converted among themselves in 
order to access to resources.   It is necessary to study how that small, medium and large fish 
farmers who are both in and out of the groups have different adaptive capacities. 
4.1.1 Water access  
Water is an important factor for rearing practice. But each scale of operation in 




 (90%) in all sites are members of fish groups that work in isolation with the 
Muang Fai group. Eighty four percent of all case studies take part in the Muang 
Fai system. One medium fish operators in Tamphralae and those who exited 
from fish farming in all sites decided not to undertake the irrigation system, but 
prefer using the nearby available water sources instead. Water use in Sanpakhee 
is more efficient than the other two villages. Regulated by the RID, the water 
allocation plan is made based on rice seasons and will be closed during rice 
harvesting period. However, in reality, the water allocation plan together with 
natural water sources provide sufficient water that allow farmers and fish 
farmers to do agriculture and aquaculture activities widespread throughout the 
year round. That is the reason why they hardly make a direct contact or 
negotiation with the irrigation agencies because of the low level of water 
conflicts, shortages and access difficulties. They can use enough water during 
rainy season and just slightly have difficulties in accessing to water during low 
flow periods.  
All scale operations in Sanpakhee can use and change water in the pond 
whenever the water is released, but they are different in terms of their pond 
location and their different capacities. It is also found that no matter they have 
different scale operations, their pond location is scattered along upstream to 
downstream canals. Fish farmers in general are hence able to not only change 
water in the ponds at least once a month but also to use water even during the 
dry season. Downstream fish farms of any size can change water later than 2 - 3 
days compared to up- and midstream fish farmers. Since there is low level of 
water downstream, some fish farmers (30% of them) are willing to share water 
with other water users who both do agriculture and aquaculture.  In terms of 
farm sizes, large fish operators with a larger number of lands than smaller scale 
ones can allocate at least one fish pond in order to stock water and to purify 
polluted water before using in their fish farm. One out of two medium-scale 




farmers with limited lands primarily rely on the irrigated canals. But this is not 
a big problem since the water is mostly widespread, allowing them to change 
water during the summertime. If there is totally no water, some large-, medium- 
and small-scale fish farmers basically put the probiotics to maintain the quality 
of water as long as possible.  In contrast, the farmer who exited completely 
from fish farming due to the poor water downstream and replaced his lands 
with rice paddy fields also access to water like other fish farmers. Since he 
lacks participating with fish groups and fish farmers friends, he mainly relies on 
the poor used water from upstream fish ponds. If getting excessive water 
enriched with too much nutrient, rice growth will be negatively fastened with 
low weight of grain. 
In terms of widespread water allocation, the water users in Sanpakhee face less 
water problems than those in Maekaedluang. Regulated by the cooperation 
between RID and the Muang Fai system, water users experience the uncertain 
water level and its poor quality especially during the dry season. They have 
difficulty maintaining the existing pond water and their productivity. Except for 
the one who stops fish farming, every fish farmers belong to the fish farmer 
groups and the Muang Fai system. The two organizations sometimes cooperate 
with each other particularly during the time of water crisis. Depending on scale 
operations, fish farmers can differently access to water. In other words, whether 
the fish farmers include in the fish group or Muang Fai group, they actively try 
to access to water by their ways. All farm sizes are located around the areas 
from upstream to downstream.  
Starting from large size, fish farmers upstream can easily access to water.  
Since pumping water to the ponds requires extra cost of investment, the larger- 
scale operators take the condition into consideration and decide to reduce the 
expense permanently. The first large fish farmer with high financial capital 
moves his fish-based production to the better location with efficient water 




the pond autonomously that can reduce long-term water pumping costs. 
Another large operator downstream also rents a big idle pond at 10,000 baht a 
year for stocking water to prevent water shortage. Then, he sets up the water 
circulation in the ponds in order to keep the existing water qualified and long 
utilized rather than using the poor water in the canal. It is obviously seen that 
the most wealthy fish farmers face a lower level of water constraint than the 
smaller-scale operations.  
On the other hand, the smaller fish farmers with fewer choices have to adjust 
their ways of water access in the existing areas. They can get enough water in 
general but usually face problems during the low flow period. Six out of eight 
fish farmers can rely on the irrigation water while one small operator has to 
access to water in other different ways. To solve the water shortage crisis, one 
medium fish farmers can temporarily rent a small idle pond for 5,000 baht a 
year but unfortunately the owner of the pond decides to build houses on the 
property. Then the fish farmers have no choice but to look for alternative water 
sources. The small fish farmers located downstream struggle from long low 
flow owing to the water use for farming upstream.  One out of three small fish 
farmers use accumulated wealth to invest in ground water. They mix the ground 
water from 30 % of pond water with 60 % of the irrigation water.  Lastly, the 
fish farmer who exited from commercial fish farming did not participate in any 
kinds of group investments in the ground water and seldom used irrigation 
water. He did not pay for the water fee, which limited his negotiation rights in 
accessing to water unlike others in the Muang Fai group. 
The role of water irrigation systems in Tamphralae under the Muang Fai 
system is declining nowadays. However, water allocation is mainly taken care 
by the communal irrigation leader who does not enforce the irrigation 
regulation towards water users. There are many natural streams and some 
canals from Mai Yang Weir around the farming and fish farming areas. Some 




farmers (80% of all case studies) are members of fish farmer cooperatives and 
Muang Fai groups in which their works do not coincide with one another. Thus, 
fish farmers try to access to water by their own ways. Two out of these who 
does not belong to both fish group and the Muang Fai group are excluded from 
any given benefits. On the other hand, some, mostly outsiders who practice 
farming and fish farming, get benefits from water, but do not live up to the 
irrigation rule, which causes problems for the other water users. Most of them 
use and stock good quality water and large quantities upstream before releasing 
the poor water, which impacts on most water users mid- and downstream.  
In terms of scale operation, all farm sizes rely on water from the streams and 
some canals without spared ponds for stocking the water. The farms upstream 
mostly use automatic water circulation systems in the pond that require a larger 
amount of water than the normal pond water system. Fish farmers with more 
money are able to buy or lease the additional lands with good access to water.  
On the contrary, the medium and small scales have fewer abilities to buy land 
in suitable locations. They possibly face water problems depending on their 
farm location. The ones in the local irrigation groups generally use the 
irrigation canals and face fewer problems than the one out of the Muang Fai 
group. For instance, one medium fish farmer who is excluded from the Muang 
Fai group has no rights to negotiate with the communal irrigation leader for 
access to water. He independently relies on the uncontrolled rain, natural 
underground water and used water from aquaculture and agriculture activities 
upstream. Sometimes, he has to clear the canal by himself with his own funds. 
Thus, he can feed fish in particular rainy season but his production is 
inconsistent. Furthermore the ground water is sometimes too low to use for the 
pig farm, which leaves him with no choice but to transport large amounts of 
water from his home.  
In addition, all three small fish farmers downstream in the Muang Fai area use 




upstream. They prefer using the underground water from which their ponds 
located in low land generates water through year round. The water is always 
available even in dry season but it is difficult for them to change poor water in 
the pond and allow the pond to dry out for cleaning after harvesting. The waste 
and toxic-residue left in the pond create risks of fish diseases in the next crop.  
In addition, one large fish farmer neighbor built canals to release his used water 
from his farm for the smaller fish farmers who also need water. They thus 
utilize the used water that is poor and polluted especially during low flow 
periods. Because of poor water, one out of three small fish farmers decided to 
invest in ground water for pig farming. Additionally, the ex-fish farmer who is 
out of the fish group but still in the Muang Fai group had most difficulty in 
accessing to water and help. She left because she had no help from the fish 
cooperative during the time of fish stresses. To make things worse, her pond 
located downstream gained poor and polluted water from upstream. She 
sometimes had to use piped and underground water instead. 
4.1.1 Access to money and earned income-generating activities 
Different places with different rearing fish systems depend upon various 
systems of water availability. In particular, the integrated pig-fish farming 
system is widely implemented by every fish scale operator in Sanpakhee and 
two large fish operators in Tamphralae. Additionally, chicken-fish farming is 
implemented by one medium and small fish operators in Maekaedluang. 
However, fish farmers in the places with less efficient water such as 
Maekaedluang and Tamphralae tend to do intensive farming without pigs or 
chickens since they do not have enough water to change and maintain the fish 
production. 
 1)  Sources of investment  
The sources of income are generated from loans and accumulated income. 




village), cooperatives as well as social networks (kin, neighbors and 
friends). Smaller scale fish farmers in the three sites borrow money from 
the Bank of Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) with a small amount of 
interest. The village loan generally allows farmers to borrow money 
around 10,000-20,000 baht per year. It is required to refund and re-
borrowed yearly. Furthermore, most of fish farmers who belong to the 
fish group are allowed to borrow feed with interest at the beginning of the 
rearing practice. Some groups allow farmers to borrow feed just a few 
months before harvesting. More or less available income can be used to 
invest in fish farming and households depending on the farming system 
and their scale of operations.  It is chiefly found that all farm sizes have 
access to all investment sources but in differing amounts. Most large 
operators get money from inherited family wealth and from wealth 
accumulation from farming and other businesses. Some also manage to 
get large loans from the BAAC and other private banks plus their 
accumulated money.  They use the loan to pay for the high investment of 
commercial feed and expand their businesses. Many of them divide part 
of the profit to refund and keep the rest of money for the next investment. 
However, without a loan, some smaller-scale operators decide to use their 
own small amount of money from off-farm income to invest in their small 
fish farming. More details are elaborated below in different villages. 
In Sanpakhee Village, large fish farmers borrow money from the BAAC 
and other private banks for investment plus their accumulated incomes. 
Paying back the banks’ loan is cheaper than the higher extra expenses of 
the related materials. For instance, they use the borrowed money to pay 
cash for the expensive feed and seed in order to reduce its interest.  They 
think that borrowing 100,000 baht from the bank with 6-700 baht for its 
interest a year is better than paying for the additional and higher feed 




from the BAAC as an initial cost of investment and paid it off before 
using their accumulated wealth for present and further investment. 
However, they decide to borrow the feed from the fish group instead of 
paying cash. The other large fish farmers who belong to a feed agency 
borrow a large amount of money (around millions) from the BAAC and 
other banks to pay cash for a large amount of feed. Income from the profit 
of retail feed and fish sale is used to pay their monthly debts.  
For medium and small fish farmers, they borrow money from the bank 
and village fund. With limited accumulated wealth, some of them use 
about one hundred thousand baht in cash to pay for feed while a few 
people would rather keep the money for the rearing payments and daily 
consumption. That is why they cannot pay cash for feed, which forces 
some of them to borrow feed with high interest from the fish group. To 
save the interest cost of about 5-15 baht per feed, some decide to pay in 
the first 4 - 5 months and borrow the feed a few months before harvesting 
time. Some of them use are given financial support for initial investments 
from their kin who are large fish farmers. Then, the loan is required to be 
repaid in kind through assistance as well as money.  
In Maekaedluang, since, all of the fish groups do not allow every single 
fish member to borrow feed to prevent the debt constraints. But the 
systems of some fish farmer are compromised by allowing the members 
to borrow feed for 1 - 2 months with a high interest of about 5 - 30 
baht/feed bag before harvesting. Thus, each fish farmers have to try their 
best to access to money sources. Most large fish farmers borrow money 
from the BAAC and private banks and use accumulated wealth. Most 
then repay the borrowed money and use their main incomes from fish 
farm and other sources of income.  They usually pay cash for the rearing 
materials. Without the bank loan, for instance, one large operator firstly 




he keeps two-thirds of the profit for the next investment in buying 
fingerlings and feed. If the investment cost is not enough when fish-
harvesting time comes around, he uses the additional profit from other 
fish crops to invest in the present crop. Thus, his investment cost is 
systemized by allocating and circulating money. Some furthermore get 
the private bank loan for further wealth speculation as shown in the 
speech below. 
“I just borrow money from the bank as a supplement fund for 
urgent matters, but I have the existing investment money. Imagine 
I use that amount of money with 3% interest to buy other stocks or 
deposit the money. I get divided 7% that mean I thus get 4% 
profit. See there are many ways to get profit from a bank loan,” 
explain the large fish farmer in Maekaedluang (8-07-2013). 
With limited money, medium- and small fish farmer rely on the loan from 
the BAAC bank and kinship’s assistance. The bank loan is usually used 
for fish farming investment and house construction. Some of them are 
still in the process of refund while some continue borrowing. Some use 
the village loan mostly for daily expenses. Few medium and small fish 
farmers use their own income, which is for household consumption. Some 
medium-scale farmers borrow money from relatives; one farmer 
borrowed from his son who works off-farm in the big city. They also ask 
the large fish farmers who are their clans to pay in advance for the feed 
and the money will be returned. Some use the winning lottery reward to 
invest in materials such as aerators. In terms of paying for feed, they tend 
to use their rights borrowing feed a few months before harvesting by 
paying extra interest for 30 baht/ feed bag. It has been found that a few 
small fish farmers whose family contains working people and a low 
number of aging adults and children add their own off-farm income with 




fish crops. For the person who was out of the fish group and exited from 
fish farming later on previously paid for expensive feed costs regulated 
by the contract farming.  He had to work in more off-farm employments 
for the investment cost used in the fish farm, but in reality he hardly 
keeps the profit for the next investment. This was because there is high 
financial demand from his family members who are still studying and 
over-spending. 
In Tamphralae, fish farmers generally get a bank loan, village funds and 
other sources depending on their abilities. Two out of three large fish 
farmers do not borrow money from the bank, but rely on the feed loan 
from the feed shops or the fish cooperatives and circulated profit from 
livestock such as pig and chicken. One of them get a large amount of 
BAAC bank loan of more than 1,000,000 baht and the Agriculture 
Cooperative to pay cash for feed and other materials and equipment. 
Meanwhile, two out of three medium- and three small-scale fish farmers 
borrow a small amount of money from the BAAC. They also get the feed 
loan from the fish farmer group with less credit than the large fish 
farmers. One small fish farmer is given money mainly from the 
Agriculture Cooperative of about hundred thousand baht with 5 baht 
interest per year. Another two small fish operator are supported by their 
children to invest in the farm. They prefer to borrow feed with some 
surplus interest because they do not have enough remaining money.  
Similarly, one medium-scale fish farmer out of fish group does not 
receive any feed credit. He decides not to borrow a loan from the bank, 
but to use his circulating income from livestock and fish farming profit to 
borrow feed. Thus, his income is allocated for investment, which limits 
his business expansion. The one who stopped fish farming use the bank 
loan and his small amount of income. This limited his capacity to invest 




noticeable the small fish farmers in all sites rarely use accumulated 
wealth.  
Two types of rearing practices which are intensive and integrated farming 
require different investment management. Intensive farming relies very 
much on commercial feeding; even though pellet feeds are more costly 
than pig/ chicken manure. The systems are mostly found in all farm sizes 
in Maekaedluang and Tamphralae. Fish farmers with all scale operations 
invest in the business with loans and available incomes.  But, circulating 
money between aquaculture and livestock can help reduce the cost of 
investment. Fish and pig income can be circulated for all farm sizes in 
Sanpakhee and large sizes in Tamphralae. According to the table 4.2, 
raising pigs for 3 - 4 months is faster than fish for 5 - 7 months. The 
income from pig with 10,000 baht per pig is used to invest in fish, and 
fish income is used for pig investment in return. Thus, their income 
affordability can reinforce production and household security throughout 
the year.  
“Income from fish and pig is circulated. That is why we raise pigs. 
After getting money from this pig crop, we will keep it for fish 
investment. So we never lack money because it is saved from both 
fish and pig,” one medium-scale Sanpakhee fish farmer explained 
(18-01-2014). 
Table 4.1 Non fish products 
Sanpakhee Maekaedluang Tamphralae 
Pig: 10,000 bht / pig        
(on sale every month)  
Chicken: 6 - 10,000 bht/ crop 
(6 - 8 crops a year)  
Pig: 10,000 bht/ pig        
(on sale every month) 
Raising chickens on top of fish in Maekaedluang minimizes the cost of 




small piece of land by raising chicken and reducing the feed use. Her 
tactics are feeding fish with plankton from chicken manure, but it 
decelerates fish growth and causes low weight. Therefore, after raising 4 
crops of chicken (20 - 28 days for one crop), which is matched to 5 
months old of fish, commercial feeding will be started for another month 
before harvesting. Then, the fish will get higher protein and good weight. 
Fish and chicken crop will start at the same time again then. From the 
table 4.1, raising chickens in summertime returns little income, but the 
winter can produce 3 crops a year with high income of about at least 
6,000 – 10,000 baht/ crop. The income is circulated to invest in 
interrelated fish and chickens. Moreover, income from her husband as a 
van driver is used for household consumptions.  
 2)  Farming investment 
To invest in fish-pond farming, many costs, which are available in the 
fish farmer groups, are taken into account such as that of fingerlings, 
feed, chemical substance and water system as well as other equipment. 
The fish farmers who participate in the fish farmer groups have 
opportunities to get reduced prices and loans. On the contrary, non-group 
fish farmers are naturally required to pay as much as the real costs of 
inputs. Although the groups can take the extra financial burden, most 
small- and medium- scale operators basically with limited money attempt 
to find ways to reduce the costs.  
“The more density of fish we have, the less profit we gain. For 
instance, raising 10,000 fish, we gain just 1,000 - 2,000 kilograms. 
We don’t know why the fish dies. On the other hand, using some 
1,000 fingerlings, we get more profit with less fish death,” one 




Using high quality feed and fingerlings are worthwhile for reducing the 
rearing duration while increasing frequencies of crops and fish survival 
rate. This is because using fingerlings is believed to reduce risks of fish 
death and increase fish crops, but it is costly. The big fingerlings can 
survive in different temperatures against fish diseases. However, a small 
fry is at risk of fish prey such as snakes, birds, and the snake - head fish. 
It is found that all small and medium fish farmers particularly in 
Sanpakhee and Tamphralae prefer using fry fish (a very small baby fish 
about the size of a matched head) and cheap feeding which might not be 
qualified. By contrast, every large fish farmer in the three sites decided to 
invest in fingerlings (baby fish with the length of one finger).  
Meanwhile, like the farmer quoted above, all scale operators in 
Maekaedluang, in which the fish groups have high information exchange, 
prefer using fingerlings to minimize the risks of fish death. Some people 
have 80 fingerlings/ kg, 53 fingerlings/ kg and 6 fish/ kg.  
Aerators have become necessary for oxygen circulation nowadays, but 
different scale operators used them differently. Three small and three 
medium fish farmers in Sanpakhee who run the integrated farm; and three 
small and two medium in Tamphralae from conventional commercial 
farm find it difficult to pay for the expensive equipment. Thus, all of them 
use aerators particularly only during the time of stresses to save on 
electricity costs. The integrated system in Sanpakhee is more prone to 
water-stratification resulting from the differences in density between 
warm and cool water from absorbing solar radiation passing through the 
water surface (Patcharawalai et al., 2013). The fish farmers as a result 
experience the stress that fish are exposed to low dissolved oxygen levels 
during rainy seasons if they decide not to implement the machine to mix 
the water. That makes them more prone to fish death than the larger- scale 




and small fish farmers in intensive farming in Maekaedluang to which the 
feed companies give financial support and information, are aware of the 
risks and agreed to set up aerators to prevent fish loss. Similar to the large 
fish farmers in the three sites, they decided to pay for many expensive 
aerators widely spread in the ponds and the increasing electricity costs for 
their operations. In addition, they invested more money to develop their 
water and pond systems as a way to simply prevent risks in the ponds and 
reduce the investment cost in the long term.  
Table 4.2 Farming system and income generation per crop in three villages  
(Source: Santita, 2014b) 












3,000 - 5,000 
fish/rai 
3,000 - 5,000 
fish/rai 
2,000 - 3,000 
fish/rai 
3,000 - 5,000 
fish/rai 





2 crops/ year 
3 crops/ 2 years 
2 crops/ year 
 
2-4 crops/ year 2 crops/ year 
 
2-3 crops/ year  
2 crops/ year  













65 - 100 feed 
bags*/ 3,000 
fish 
75 - 90 feed/ 
5,000 fish 
120  - 150 
feed bags/ 
3,000 fish 
70 - 100 feed/ 
5,000 fish 







1,300 - 1,700 
kg/ rai 
1,000 - 1,400 
kg/ rai 
1,000 - 1,600 
kg/rai 
1,000 - 1,700 
kg/ rai 
600 - 1,200 
kg/ rai 
* 20 kilograms per feed bag  
Stocking density has impacts on yields depending on water quality and 
quantity as well as and oxygen levels. Having high density of fish stock 
reduces the level of oxygen in the pond that weakens the fish immune 
system. Fish farmers nowadays in the three sites tend to reduce fish stock 
density for more oxygen distribution in the pond. Thus, lowering its 
density to 3,000 fish/ rai (0.16 hectares) is an average ratio to increase 




understood across scale operations in all sites. Large- scale operators have 
low density of fingerlings such as 2,500 - 3,000 fish/ rai. Six out of nine 
who are smaller fish farmers from integrated farms in Sanpakhee and 
from intensive farms in Tamphralae raise 3,000 - 5,000 fish/ rai (table 
4.2), but lately they have been suffering more from fish death and loss. 
Every fish farmer in Maekaedluang significantly reduced the density of 
fingerlings. They shortened raising fingerlings into 1 - 2 months and 
further feed intensively for more 3 - 4 months. Some nurse fry in hatchery 
prior to raising fingerlings in the pond. 
“One of the feed brands here cost 450 baht in Chiang Mai, but it is 
sold at 530 baht in Phan, Chiang Rai. Why do those people there 
have higher investment still get profit?” said one large fish 
farmers in Maekaedluang (24-01-2014).  
The farming system and management in each village might answer the 
curious question above. From the table 4.2, it is seen that integrated pig - 
fish farming in Sanpakhee and Tamphralae and chicken-pig farming in 
Maekaedluang can save on payment of feed. Water with pig or chicken 
manure producing planktons and algae as a kind of fish feed can reduce 
commercial feed use. In addition, putting too much artificial feed in the 
integrated faming possibly makes the water quality poor. All fish farmers 
in integrated farming in Sanpakhee, two in Maekaedluang and three in 
Tamphralae, thus use a smaller number than those fish farmers in 
conventional commercial systems because they rely more on the plankton 
from pig or chicken manure.  
Nonetheless, the rearing duration of integrated farms is longer than the 
intensive system. Nine out of eleven fish farmers in Maekaedluang 
mainly use artificial feed but still less than those in intensive farming in 




much feed portion is fit for the appropriated amount of fingerlings. That 
is why they use extra.  Additionally, the more frequencies of fish crops 
increase, the more fish farmers are likely gain more income. However, it 
is depending upon a density of fish and fish survival rate that require the 
amount of intensive feeding and investment costs. Ninety percent of large 
fish farmers in all sites have more frequencies of fish crop than the 
smaller scale. Seventy-seven percent from medium and small fish farmers 
in Sanpakhee and Tamphralae takes 2 crops a year and 3 crops per 2 year. 
But 63% from all scale operations in Maekaedluang takes 3 - 4 crops a 
year. The rest of them take 2 crops a year. Consequently, it is found that 
the fish production yield in integrated farms in Sanpakhee is highest due 
to high stocking density and a low number of feed. The production from 
integrated and intensive systems in Maekaedluang and the integrated 
farms in Tamphralae are compatible. The production in intensive farms in 
Tamphralae is lowest because of high fish density, which is at risk of fish 
death; and the high number of feed which costs high investment. It is 
interesting to study other factors influential on fish farmer information 
and management. 
 4.1.3 Labor availability  
Table 4.3 Labor availability in the three villages 
Village scale Family labor Hired labor Exchange labor 
SPH Large (n=3) 6 16 A number of labor 
depends on a number of 
water users in each canals 
Medium (n=3) 5 n/a 
Small (n=3) 6 n/a 
Exit (n=1) 2 n/a n/a 
MKL Large (n=3) 4  6( migrant) n/a 
Medium (n=4) 10 n/a n/a 
Small (n=4) 6 1(aging) n/a 
Exit (n=1) 1 n/a n/a 
TPL Large (n=3) 5 3 n/a 
Medium (n=3) 6 n/a n/a 
Small (n=3) 5 n/a n/a 




The labor factor is significantly important in running the farming. Different 
scale operations rely on different labors such as family labor and hired labor 
whereas exchange labor is available based on location. The more the larger 
scale fish farmers have labors, the more effective their farming management is. 
For the small-scale operation, labor is important for earning a living, because 
even if households have no lands they could seek both farm and off-farm 
employment. Based on the table 4.3, all farm sizes in all villages use their 
family labors, but some large fish farmers (19% of all case studies) in all sites 
hire total 26 labors. At the same time, exchange labor is particularly available in 
all farm sizes in Sanpakhee. However, labor availability is different upon the 
spatial contexts of fish farm types and the association with the fish groups.   
In terms of integrated fish farms in Sanpakhee, no matter how much farm size 
they own, all of them tend to rely on their family labors (husband and wife), 
while 88% of their children would rather seek off-farm employment. The site 
has the largest number of aging fish farmers who do farming while supporting 
their children to do off-farm work and study outside the village. Due to 
weakening health, 8 out of 9, as a result spend almost a whole day to feed fish 
and pigs as well as to manage farming that does not offer fish farmers’ many 
opportunities to do off-farm work. Three of all case studies do farming alone all 
day, which reduces the chance for them to rest and participate in social 
activities. Furthermore, some fish farmers with large- and small-scale 
operations decide to use feeding machines instead since they lack labor for a lot 
of work in the pig and fish farming. Their home-based production is, as a result, 
hardly expanding unless the small aging fish farmers have more money and 
labor. Only one large farm size hires 16 local people to help farming. He has 
the largest number of hired laborers comprising of 6 fish distributors, 6 fish 





The intensive pond-based aquaculture in Maekaedluang and Tamphralae does 
not highly require laborers. Most small- and medium-scale operators with small 
pieces of lands can thus rely on family labors in order to save cost of 
investment. For example, in case of a small fish farmer in Tamphralae, she and 
her husband help take care of the fish together. Near her fish farm, there is 
another divorced woman also raising livestock, poultry and pond-based 
aquaculture alone. With some help from her children and limited money, she 
decided not to hire anyone. On the contrary, large-scale fish farmers use both 
family and hired laborers to help take care of the expanded business. Some of 
them assign their children to take care of the fish ponds while they themselves 
work in off-farm jobs. Some of them allocate their children some partial ponds 
for further investment. However, if there is no help from the family, they decide 
to hire labors.  
Hired labors are important for both large and aging fish operators. Two large 
fish operators in Maekaedluang hire labors to support a large number of 
farming works and determine the capacity of rearing practice. The labor more 
they have, the more effective and widespread the feeding and pond 
management are. The first one hires 4 laborers and the second, 2. Meanwhile, 
most migrant labors are mostly found in the big city like Chiang Mai. In 
Maekaedluang, migrant workers replace Thai labor shortage. Those laborers are 
at first suggested by fish farmer neighbors who know some of migrant workers. 
Then the workers introduce their friends to work on other farms until the 
migrant workers connections are wider and more spread out the district. They 
are not only working on the farms, but are also seeking for other incomes like 
that of fish harvester and fish retailer. One offspring gains money from off-farm 
employment to invest in fish farming by hiring migrant workers. Aging fish 
farmers with less help from their families also hire migrant workers to clear out 




The intensive fish farm systems in Maekaedluang also provide farmers with 
opportunities to seek other income sources out of fish farming and time to 
participate in other social activities. They agree that fish production can be 
supplementary income - just spending a particular short time in taking care and 
feeding for 20 - 30 minutes. That is the reason why two offspring working off 
farm returned to invest in fish pond farm. The first, a large sized fish farm 
operator, inherited the business from his parents or relatives and works fulltime 
on the farm. Another offspring working off-farm or seeking for employment let 
his parents takes care of the farm; the profits are shared among the family 
members and partially kept for the next investment. Eighty percent of fish 
farmers can also work for social activities and charity works such as weddings, 
new house warming and funeral ceremonies.  
In terms of fish group assistance, exchange labor in fish harvest activity 
remains in Sanpakhee. Besides to the hired harvest labor from the fish group, 
fish farmer kin or neighbors, who use the same canals but belong to various fish 
groups, voluntarily help each other in the morning. Different from the other two 
villages, Maekaedluang primarily uses hired migrant workers provided by the 
fish group to harvest fish while Tamphralae hires local people. The fish owners 
are required to pay the hiring cost. Fish farmers in all villages who are not in 
the local fish group do not get exchange labor. They rely on the external trader 
and have to pay for the hired laborers.  
 4.1.3 Land utilization  
Land size and ownership determine the different capacities of rearing practice. 
Land utilization is a way to maximize farming income for all scale operations. 
Fish farmers in Sanpakhee and Tamphralae have more capacities to develop or 
expand their lands because the land price is cheaper than in the peri-urban 
Maekaedluang. It is unsurprising that the well-off fish farmers have more 




the more they can benefit from land use allocation. Most large operators are 
also able to allocate their lands for nursing fingerlings and rearing fish, aiming 
at reducing the rearing duration and increasing survival rates.  
One of the large fish farmers in Tamphralae, for example, has been rewarded 
for an efficient fish pond system to raise fish all year round. He can raise fish 
for 3 - 4 crops a year within 4 ponds by allocating lands into 2 rearing ponds of 
0.32 hectare (2 rai) and 2 rearing ponds of 0.64 hectare (4 rai)  as well as 2 
nursery ponds of 0.04 hectare (0.25 rai). He can raise fingerlings for 3 months 
before transferring to the rearing ponds for another 3 months. Many of the 
smaller scale fish farmers in Sanpakhee and Tamphralae cannot follow the 
systems because they have limited pieces of land as well as lack of techniques 
and information. Still, due to the knowledge exchange in the fish groups, many 
farm sizes in Maekaedluang adopt the ideas, use the fingerlings and maximize 
their small pieces of lands by increasing the fish crops. Some of them, 
especially large fish farmers, furthermore gain more income by selling nursed 
fingerlings to the smaller fish operators who have a smaller piece of lands.  
All scale operations can diversify and ultimately utilize their lands upon their 
land holdings. For instance, four smaller- scale out of nine fish farmers in 
Sanpakhee grow vegetables around the levee and sometimes share the product 
with their neighbors and kin. One large-scale fish farmer in Maekaedluang 
allocates a big plot of land for 23 fish ponds while raising ducks for eggs as 
supplementary income for his migrant workers. However, the smaller fish 
farmers in Maekaedluang only do fish farming and look for off-farm incomes. 
Additionally, two small farms out of nine in Tamphralae are allocated into fish 
ponds, a small piece of rice paddy field and orchards while the rest of the land 





4.1.4 Social network as a consequence of information distribution and    
   implementation  
Social networks can facilitate innovation and knowledge development. There is 
a sharing of information among kin groups, neighborhood and fish farmer 
cooperatives; so called an interrelationship between social and human capital. 
Being a member of the fish group provides opportunities to learn and exchange 
information to increase the adaptive capacity. Adaptive capacity as a 
consequence is enhanced by new information, technologies and resources from 
social learning and self-organization among fish farmer cooperatives. 
Accessing information, fish farmers basically learn how to rear fish, what kind 
of size is good, age, feed, fish disease, water, climate and weather. 
Notwithstanding, non-group fish farmers lack such opportunities to experience 
like their other friends, to exchange and learn from others. Their adaptive 
capacities as a consequence are probably lower than other friends who are in 
the group. Being a member of the fish groups does not benefit all farm sizes. It 
is found that 67% of all large fish farmers learn a lot through experiences and 
other organizations. Five out of nine share with other friends, the rest keep the 
information to themselves. In other words, such information distribution 
depends on the kind of social connections in the three sites. 
Maekaedluang fish groups have the highest level of close relationships among 
kin, neighbors and other external feed agencies, compared to fish groups in 
Sanpakhee and loose fish farmer operatives in Tamphralae. Fish farmers in 
Sanpakhee usually learn from their experiences and local exchanges among kin 
and neighbor groups but Tamphralae fish farmers are highly supported by the 
state and university. However, the information distribution is not as widespread 
because there is less local exchange among the members across all scales of 





Fish farmers in Maekaedluang have the highest learning process via monthly 
meeting among the fish groups. A large-scale fish farmer leader is a key person 
who mainly encourages the smaller-scale fish farmers to learn from each other 
while asking the feed agencies to distribute information for the group members. 
For instance, they learn how to adjust the geographical landscapes of the pond 
to fit better with the fish nature. Deep water can reduce temperatures during 
summer time while shallow water is good for the fish under the cold weather. 
Moreover, deep ponds with not too much water and high bunds can prevent 
flooding. In Maekaedluang, the height of pond walls depends upon the location. 
According to the farm system, the height should be at least 1.80 meters at the 
water entrance and 1.20 meters at another water exit. The height in high 
landscapes can be least one meter. Fish can survive in 25 - 30 0C within these 
heights.  The idea is similar to the location in Tamphralae, one bottom of the 
pond is 1.50 meter depth and another is 1 meter. Even though the Department of 
Fisheries and universities supports the knowledge, just all large- and one 
medium-scale operators indeed adopted this idea. Two medium- and three 
small-scale operators built up their ponds without academic knowledge and 
understanding. 
In terms of feeding, in the past fish farmers just fed fish as much as they could 
without cost-benefit calculation like two large-, two medium- and three small-
scale operators in Tamphralae in these days. Although the state and university 
tried to share the academic information, the farmers seemed not to follow their 
advice but selected feed more from the propaganda of fish groups or neighbors 
than from their consideration. Nevertheless, two large fish farmers use high 
FCR feed, but do not share the successful profit information to other fish 
friends. Conversely, fish farmers with all scale operations in Maekaedluang and 
some in Sanpakhee have now learned from each other and from the fish groups 
about how to feed fish more systematically. They learn not only how to select 




compare the protein and price among different feed brands. For example, from 
local calculations, comparing two feed brands with similar price, the higher 
FCR the more protein is in the feed. FCR of the first brand is 17 for/ feed bag 
(20 kg), but the second is 13/feed bag. Thus, fish farmers prefer using the first 
brand because, with the same number of fish, feeding fish 20 kilograms can be 
converted to a fish weight 17 kilograms.  
“We have done local research on experiments and experiences. Using 
the premium feed with high protein increases the fish weight. 
Implementing a ring blower (a kind of aerator) into the pond is effective 
and working well. So everyone is curious about the solutions and 
voluntarily wants to change the fish system,” a fish farmer leader in one 
Maekaedluang fish group claimed (26-01-2014).  
Nowadays aerators have becomes important for oxygen circulation with the 
hope of reducing the risks in the pond. Ten out of eleven of fish farmers in 
Maekaedluang are obviously aware of the risks. They also often learn how to 
appropriately run an aerator at the time of low oxygen, especially in early 
morning and for the fish aged over 4 months old. If there is less density of fish, 
it is not necessary to run the aerator all the time.  Accordingly, aerators are 
mostly implemented by all farm sizes. Supported by the feed agencies, they are 
given 10 baht reduction per a feed bag in exchange for a ring blower (a kind of 
aerator shown in the figure 4.1). It costs around 6,000 - 9,000 baht depending 
on its size. However, the topic of aerator types is controversial. To find the 
most investment- worthy aerator, one large fish farmer said in a monthly 
meeting, that ring blowers just reduce the hazards, but do not totally play a 
much more important role in reducing oxygen shortage indeed. It is better to 
use more the expensive paddle-wheel aerators (figure 4.2) that in fact can be 
afforded by a few well-off people in the three sites. Thus, the 4 smaller fish 
farmers still prefer to use the cheaper water pumping system (figure 4.3); at 





Figure 4.1 A ring blower aerator mainly implemented in Maekaedluang 
 






Figure 4.3 Water pumping implemented by medium and small fish farmers 
Due to low knowledge sharing and exchange among fish farmers and other 
external organizations in Sanpakhee and Tamphralae, different scale operations 
have various understanding and awareness, particularly 6 smaller scale 
operators out of 9 case studies who rarely exchange information with state and 
feed agencies have low level of risk awareness. One small fish farmer in 
Sanpakhee and three in Tamphralae thought climate-related risks were not vital 
enough to take prevention action. Thus, oxygen circulation was perceived as 
unnecessary with extra electricity cost. They decided to set up cheap water 
pumping which was operated just before harvesting time, which increased the 
risk of fish stresses. The one small fish farmer in Sanpakhee urgently borrowed 
an aerator from his kin or neighbors during the time of crisis, which might be 
too late to solve the problems.  Hence there is a huge contrast between the 
different perceptions and understanding from the small-scale farmers and the 
three large-scale fish farmers in Sanpakhee and Tamphralae, who have more 




suggestion, they tended to use expensive turbines such as paddle-wheels and 
ring blowers. 
 4.1.5 Productivity  
Figure 4.4 Overall production (kg)/ crop divided by scale operations in 2013-2014 
It could be said that water, knowledge, labor, money, land and social networks 
are a component of farming management to function the capacity of production 
of each site. The figure 4.4 demonstrated overall fish production (kg)/ crop 
divided by scale operations in 2013-2014. The data was collected from all farm 
sizes in integrated system in Sanpakhee, except one large operator; all intensive 
farms in Maekaedluang comprising of 3 large, 2 medium and 3 small; and all 
intensive farms in Tamphralae comprising of 3 large, 2 medium and 2 small 
operators. Some missing data from the rest of the 7 fish farmers in 
Maekaedluang and Tamphralae was not counted due to their incomplete 
records. Calculating the production per crop per sale operation by multiplying 
total production of each scale with the number of land holding and then 
dividing that by the number of land holdings.  It was found that Sanpakhee had 
highest average fish production at 26,210 kilograms/ crop/ rai, mainly 
comprising of 12,903 kilograms from the large-scale operators. Producing a 
large ton of fish per crop in a big piece of land at least once a year was 




Maekaedluang and 3 times of Tamphralae. It was because they had less cost of 
investment (integrated farming). Efficient water quality and quantity allowed 
fish farmers to raise a high density of fish.  
Nevertheless, Maekaedluang had higher knowledge exchange and 
implementation than the other two villages. Still the medium- and small- scale 
operators had low production because they experienced water stresses and land 
ownership changes resulting from urbanization. All scale operators hence 
decided to increase the frequencies of crop and reduced the density rather than 
to reduce the production per crop. So they had more production than 
Tamphralae which had less knowledge distribution. Though the latter had 
fertile water, the fish productivity was lowest at 13,614 kilograms/ crop/ rai. 
Just the large- and some medium-scale operators gained benefits from such 
water and knowledge. They reduced the density of fish but increased a number 
of crops per year. Meanwhile the smaller fish operators had less capacity to 
produce because they used unqualified fingerlings and feeding with low 
technology. 
4.2  Coping Capacities of Fish Farmers with Different Scale Operations  
This part focuses on coping capacity, which means short-term and immediate orientation 
towards survival. Fish farmers are motivated by stresses, but urgently react or respond to 
reduce the risks. In this way, better adaptive capacities functions better coping capacities 
based on different scale operations and social learning processes. Better coping capacities 
rely on not only technology but also the individual fish farmer’s management. Fish death 
results from the conditions that fish cannot naturally get through the climate variability and 
uncertainty. Thus, better prevention by implementing aeration or assisting water circulation 
is taken into consideration.  
 




Table 4.4 Summary of physical coping strategies of fish farmers with small-, medium-  
  and large-scale operations to climate-related risks 
Stresses Flood Drought Water pollution Rainfall Cold 
Impacts - fish loss 




- no water exchange 
- fish death 
- fish diseases 
- water conflict 
- fish death 
- fish diseases  
- fish death 
- fish diseases 
- eat less 
- grow slowly 
- fish diseases 
SPH Large - - run aerator (expensive) 
- drain out water  
- reduce feed portion   
- close/open pipe 
- reduce feed portion 
- run aerator  
- choose the right 
and safe water 
- harvest fish earlier  
- reduce feeding 
- reduce feed 
portion 
- postpone 
feed time Medium  - - run aerator (cheap) 
- fill more water Small - 
Exit - - -  - 
MKL Large - stretch mesh 
around the pond 
 - build higher pond 
dike after flooding 
- negotiate for flood 
compensation 
 
- run aerator  
- put salt, chemical and 
herbs (EM) 
- reduce feed portion  
- fill more water 
- close pipe 
- negotiate with the casual 
fish farmers  
- reduce feed portion 
- run aerator  
- put chemical, herb 
( Vitamin C), salt,  
- harvest fish earlier  
- choose the right 
and safe water  
- reduce feeding 







Exit - - run aerator 
- use ground water 
- - run aerator  
 
- 
TPL Large - close entrance pipe - run aerator (expensive) 
- fill more water 
- close pipe 
- reduce feed portion 
 
- run aerator  
- put chemical 
- reduce feeding 




Medium  - not prepare - run aerator (cheap) 
- fill more water Small - 






From the table 4.4, the physical coping strategies with many stresses such as floods, 
droughts, water pollution that is stimulated by long low flow, rainfall and cold. It is 
found that the strategies are similar among small, medium and large farms in the three 
sites. But large fish farmers apparently have more abilities to cope with the stresses than 
the ones with smaller scales. The smaller hence are more likely to face fish death and 
loss than the larger- scale. However, the fish farmers with all sizes in Maekaedluang 
who often share and exchange information have various coping strategies towards the 
stresses than fish farmers in Sanpakhee and Tamphralae.  
Flood causes fish loss. Higher water levels also make the fish trade transportation 
difficult and reduce the total fish harvest. In 2005 and 2011, Maekaedluang faced severe 
floods and slight ones in 2013.The more severe flood in 2011 caused damages to fish 
farm. At that time, all scale farm operations were affected. The fish farmers at mid and 
downstream could prevent the flood in time. They asked their relatives for help to 
stretch mesh around the pond to prevent the fish from escaping.  In contrast to the 
affected fish farmers in Tamphralae, without preparation and social help, one medium-
scale fish farmer’s pond was damaged by flash flood suddenly within less than an hour.  
Many fish farmers at all sites have experienced low flow. They have no water exchange 
in the ponds that cause fish death and fish stresses. Water conflict is most severe in 
Tamphralae, followed by Maekaedluang and Sanpakhee. Most fish farmers with 
different scale operations in all sites basically run aerators and fill more water. 
Moreover, it is outstandingly clearly that some large fish farmers in Sanpakhee and 
most fish farmers with all scales of operations tend to reduce feed portion. After 
frequent exchange, most fish farmers in Maekaedluang learned how to use chemical and 
herbs to maintain the water quality. In addition, water pollution results from the mixed 
toxic and poor used water upstream causes fish death. Most fish farmers thus close the 
pipes and reduce feed portion. Through neighborhood ties, fish farmers mid- and 
downstream in Maekaedluang decide to negotiate with the casual fish farmers upstream 
for social benefits.   
Rainfall or changing weather causes water stratification in the pond that results in fish 
death and fish diseases (Patcharawalai et al., 2013). Most fish farmers in all sites 





checking the water to make sure it is qualified for use. All farm sizes particularly in 
Maekaedluang put chemicals, herbs and salt in the ponds hoping to purify and maintain 
the water quality. In winter, the weather is cold, especially in the beginning of 2014. 
Fish eat less, grow slowly and are at risk of fish diseases. All fish farmers with any scale 
and all sites tend to reduce feed portions and postpone feed time. From the table, during 
low flow periods, water pollution and rainfall, one medium and the ex- fish farmers who 
are out of the group in Tamphralae have to rely on their available water and their own 
ways. They mainly use underground water and run aerators to sustain the water quality. 
The farmers who used to do fish farming and exited from the fish group turn to do 
intensive and integrated agriculture to avoid drought and water pollution. They still face 
the new risks of pests and poor water from the fish ponds.  
To explore the coping strategies towards climate-related risks, fish farmers’ tactics and 
social connection are elaborated more in terms of feeding time adjustment, plan of water 
exchange, stocking and calendar adjustment, risk prevention and the use of social 
networks during the time of stresses as well as how different farm sizes play their role 
to solve the problems.  
   4.2.1 Chemical use towards fish diseases 
In this regard, through fish farmer kin, neighbors and feed company 
agencies, the farmers start learning how to cure fish diseases. All fish 
farmers attempt to learn how to use chemicals properly. Wrong use of 
chemicals or medication cannot deal with some bacteria or parasite, but in 
turn cause the water and soil to pollute in the pond. Some chemical 
substances should be mixed with water before splashing around the surface 
of the ponds. But, it was noticeable that not all large fish operator who have 
much experience and knowledge could precisely examine the characteristics 
of fish diseases and better choose the right chemicals to cope with the 
diseases. The large fish operators in Sanpakhee tended to use the chemicals 
from the well-known companies rather than general chemical stores. In 
contrast, all small and medium fish farmers tended to use the chemical 
promoted by the fish farmer cooperatives or groups and neighbors. When 





sometimes did not know the fish diseases. They just explained the 
symptoms to neighbors who might know and could suggest the right 
chemicals. They also often told others the wrong and shortened names of 
fish diseases and chemical substances. These evidences caused the 
possibility of chemical misuse in treating the fish diseases.  
Due to high social learning in Maekaedluang, all scale operators had shared 
knowledge with one another on how to choose and use the right chemical to 
fit with the fish conditions. Because of knowledge exchange, for example, 
after fish diseases spread in many ponds, all large, medium and small fish 
farmers ordered the expensive imported Amoxycillin from other fish 
networks. The streptococcus diseases could be cured after taking the 
chemical for 3 days. It cost 2,000 baht/ kg. However, fish diseases are hard 
to control and beyond expectation. Three small fish farmers still used 
mismatched chemicals, which hardly solved the problems. 
“I paid almost 10,000 baht for the chemical, but it doesn’t work just 
like wasting money. I bought it 600 to 700 baht each time for 4 to 5 
kinds of chemicals. I just run my operator water pumping with hope 
to stop the fish death,” a small fish farmer in Maekaedluang (20-07-
2013). 
Two out of three fish farmers, particularly large ones, in Tamphralae knew 
about used chemicals effectively, but rarely exchanged knowledge with one 
another. No matter which scale operations they have, they might use the 
wrong chemical substances. They are likely to waste money paying for the 
wrong chemical. For instance, during an urgent matter, one large fish 
farmers decided to use the existing chemicals such as formalin that was not 
fit for the existing disease treatment. The problems could be coped with and 
the solution worthwhile in the short term, but they are not totally solved in 
the long term because the farmers were still prone to the climate-related 
risks. Moreover, one small fish farmer bought many wrong chemicals for a 





kilograms for a week. As a result, without a choice, she asked the fish 
farmer cooperatives to harvest her fish earlier. 
4.2.2 Feeding time adjustment  
All fish farmers in the three villages adjust the feeding times depending 
upon the weather and fish conditions. During the rainy season, the abrupt 
change between hot and cold temperatures reduces fish respiration rates. If 
the fish eat too much, the rate of oxygen needed will be high for respiration 
and for digesting food. What the fish farmers should do is to reduce feeding 
from 3 meals a day to 2 or 1 or none in order to save the fish. If the famers 
lack awareness, fish loss is highly likely to occur. For example, 1,000 fish 
belonging to a large fish farmer die per day since his laborers dutifully feed 
the fish without being conscious of the weather change. Furthermore, during 
winter, there is little possibility of fish death, but they grow slowly and eat 
less. Farmers therefore tend to reduce feed by half of a normal portion but 
feed the fish more often, like 3-4 meals a day. Moreover, they postpone 
feeding time later than other seasons. In the summer, they feed the fish as 
much as usual, together with running aerators to increase the fish’s eating 
capacity. 
4.2.3 Plan of water maintenance and stocking calendar adjustment  
Based on their past experiences of fish diseases and fish death, fish farmers 
have to plan when water should be exchanged and maintained as long as it 
could. If the waterway is closed, it is their task to maintain water quality in 
the pond. Sanpakhee fish farmers exchange water once a week to coincide 
with the existing water quality mixed with the pig manure. During low flow 
periods, they reduce the feeding portions and allow fish to eat plankton and 
algae stimulated by the pig manure. Furthermore, adjusting the stocking 
calendar can prevent risks. Raising fish during the time between summer 
and the rainy season has increased exposure to polluted and fluctuating 
water as well as changeable weather. So all fish farmers in Maekaedluang 





raising them from April to June and some from August to November. They 
decide to wait for the safer winter-time by starting during late rainy season 
because it is not necessary to pump water into the pond but getting it from 
the rain and avoiding the abrupt temperature change. During the temporary 
stop from fish farming, the farmers of mostly medium- and small-scale 
operations offset the missing income by relying on off-farm income. For 
instance, one small fish farmer elder in Maekaedluang is given a monthly 
salary of 6,000 baht by her daughters one of whom is an accountant and the 
other, a teacher. Thus she makes a fast decision to not to take risks during 
the hazardous seasons. However, this strategy is rarely seen in Sanpakhee 
because they have access to a good amount of water.  
The fingerling shortage occurs in winter and is hardly cultured. Fish farmers 
in Sanpakhee and Tamphralae face this shortage. Meanwhile, fish farmer 
groups in Maekaedluang stock 300,000 - 400,000 fingerlings per year in 
advance. The fingerlings are then nursed and stocked by the fish farmers 
who have to a large number of ponds before selling to other fish farmer 
members during the shortage time. It is a strategy that solves the fish 
production shortage and generates income for the related fish farmers and 
makes the production period faster. Fish farmers can raise fish for few 
months before harvesting.  
4.2.4 Risk reduction  
Rather than coping with the stresses by using the chemical substances, 
prevention strategies are taken into account. Most fish farmers with all 
levels of scale operations (59% of all case studies) increase in use of pro- 
biotics, medication and vitamin application mixed with feed to prevent fish 
diseases. However, three medium- and three small-scale operators 
especially in Sanpakhee and Tamphralae have less awareness of fish 
diseases. They do not take action to prevent the risks, but rather cope 
urgently with the stresses. For example, they mix chemicals with feed just in 
time so that the fish unusually eat less. Conversely, fish farmers in 





diseases and fish death. Getting knowledge from television, magazines, 
books and their neighbors, some of them use effective micro-organisms 
(EM) to purify water.  
Vitamin application is used for increasing fish immune systems. Here, fish 
farmers have a chance to exchange their knowledge with each other about 
whether the vitamin is suitable for use and if it works in reality. As a result, 
after knowledge exchange and encouragement, most of them eagerly 
implement vitamin C and some use EM. They mix fermented fruits with 
pellet feed after raising fingerlings for a week. Thus, the fish is stronger 
with a better weight against the climate variability. Two large fish farmers 
in Maekaedluang use natural products from their farm such as lime, 
tamarind and malacca tree, but they are not available all year. Sixty percent 
of all fish farmers in this village decide to pay for extra artificial vitamin 
instead with the hope of preventing any risks in the long run. At the same, 
time, the knowledge is not extensively adopted in the other two villages, just 
found in one medium fish farmer in Tamphralae who applied it upon the 
suggestion of her son who is working in the related aquaculture field. 
The aerator is another technology used to help reduce the climate-related 
risks. Eighty percent of fish farmers with all sizes in Maekaedluang and two 
large fish farmers in Sanpakhee and Tamphralae adopt the machine. They 
tend to run aerators for adult fish of over 4 months old and during rains, 
changing weather between hot and cold; and in the early mornings from 3 - 
7.00 am, which is the low oxygen time. However, 2 small and 3 medium 
fish farmers respectively in Sanpakhee and Tamphralae run their aerators 
just in the time of stresses to save electricity cost. They do not run the 








4.3  Fish Farmers Adaptation to Climate-related and Socio-Economic Risks 
This part investigates whether scale operations and social networks are able to allow the 
adaptations. Adaptation in this regard is practices towards long-term livelihood security. 
Interrelated physical and social adaptation is taken into account in fish-pond 









4.3.1 Farming intensification and diversification 
Aquaculture intensification increases average inputs of labor or capitals to increase the 
value of output per rai. Most fish farmers who intensify the fish business are mostly 
large- and medium-scale operation. Their investments are supported by family members 
in generating the high cost of investment and enough costs for household living. Being a 
part of a fish grouping also provides them opportunities to access social networks and 
knowledge as well as fruitful information. Above all, it is useful for them to access good 
quality and quantity of water in order to effectively sustain their fish businesses and to 
increase their productivities. 
No matter how much the cost of water management, based on financial capital, all scale 
operations are willing to invest in the pond systems for more stable productivity and 
income security. Allocating a piece of land and adding value, its utility can increase the 
Figure 4.5 Adaptation of fish farmers  
-Aging generation 
-Lack of money 
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productivity and return of investment. Fifty percent of large-scale operators in all sites; 
3 out of 4 medium- and small-scale in Maekaedluang; and one medium in Tamphralae, 
try to raise fish with low density but increase its frequencies in order to gain consistent 
income. In this number, most of the farms use the intensive system; just three large fish 
farms in Sanpakhee are integrated systems. In addition, six out of nine large fish 
farmers in the three villages try to develop the long-term water system to prevent the 
polluted water. They decide to allocate one of the ponds for stocking water to prevent 
the uncertainty of water quality and quantity. They also widely connect the pipes to 
each pond. The smaller fish farmers also attempt to solve the water problems. For 
instance, one medium- scale operator in Maekaedluang lacks water and rents an idle 
natural fish- pond as an alternative water source.  
Aging fish farmers downstream in Maekaedluang are furthermore affected by the 
stocking water and poor quality for households and farming upstream. They thus, invest 
in groundwater with 72 meters’ depth. Furthermore, to invest in technology, after a 
great fish loss in the previous crop, the medium fish farmer in Tamphralae raise fish 
with low density and set up aerators. Thus, he gains profit of around 200,000 baht. After 
that he adjusts the amount of fingerlings depending upon the seasons. He raises fish 
with lower density in the dry season and more from the rainy season to winter. 
Moreover, he will expand his pig farm to benefit from the market. 
It is found that one large- scale operator in Sanpakhee who does intensive fish farming 
tries to be at the forefront of the fish suppliers and the leader of the fish farmer group. 
Besides raising pigs, he is deciding to convert the tilapia fingerling farming into catfish 
farm, which rarely takes place in Phan. Thus, he offers opportunities for his son to learn 
freshwater aquaculture. To deal with excess fish supply and increased fish market value, 
his wife opened a transforming fish franchise under his farm’s name. The stall provides 
grilled fish, Northern Thai spicy sausage and steamed fish with curry paste and so on. 
He also aims to expand the business in the future. One medium fish farmers in 
Sanpakhee raise tilapia and red tilapia (more expensive than the Nile tilapia) in the same 
pond to serve the high market demands during the market time. Similar to the small fish 
farmer in Tamphralae, she plans to rear snake-head fish with tilapia to increase income 





4.3.2 Reduction of production due to market fluctuation and aging  
Most medium- and small- scale operators tend to reduce the production scale because 
they are affected by markets and are getting older. They also gain less support from 
family members with low levels of asset capital, and low interaction among social 
networks. It is found that all scale fish farmers in Sanpakhee tend to reduce a number of 
pigs while some stop the farming completely because of the pig price fluctuation. Some 
fish farmers yet attempt to minimize costs of investment by replacing the commercial 
pig feed with natural grains such as paddy husk and rice bran. Thus, they still continue 
the business under the crucial market forces. 
“I stopped raising pigs because the pig feed price is too expensive to 
get profits in return. It is not worth the investment. The price should 
be 60 - 65 baht. But now it is cheaper. I stopped pig farming since 
the mother pig died. It is so risky,” one small fish farmers in 
Sanpakhee said (6-04-2014).  
In terms of aging, most types of families skipped-generation or have grandparents living 
with grandchildren. Their children have gone to seek off-farm employment, leaving the 
farming with the elders. Technology has thus become more influential in pig farming. 
For instance, they rely on feeding machines, setting particular times and the portion of 
feed. Thus they have enough time to feed pigs and fish in other ponds. As a result, many 
old fish farmers aim to reduce the business or might exit totally. One large- scale 
operator who runs intensive farming in Tamphralae, for instance, thinks he is too old to 
do fish farming. He might retire soon and hand the business to his son and his relatives. 
Furthermore, the old fish farmer from conventional commercial farming in 
Maekaedluang expects to stop the fish farming, soon but no one seems to want to take 
over. Above all, due to help and social connectedness with fish farmers and 
cooperatives/ groups, they decided not to completely exit from fish farming. They still 







4.3.3 Complete exit  
The fish farmers who decide to leave fish farming have something in common. Most of 
them are small fish operators who have low investment costs and low levels of social 
interaction. There is no help from fish farmer friends or external organizations who have 
academic and practical information. During the time of stresses, they cannot cope with 
the problems in the right way and on time. Little assistance and less knowledge sharing 
from family members, in addition, reduce the capacities to manage the farm more 
effectively. To make things worse, household burden is an obstacle to further 
investment or to expansion of the business. One small fish farmer in Tamphralae for 
instance decided to leave because she cannot bear fish death and loss of investment. She 
also has to take care of one elder and five children at home.   
Some of them are getting older and it is difficult for them to learn new and more 
modern technology, fish pond management and numerous new fish diseases. Some of 
them stop fish farming because of profit losses from fish deaths and diseases. It might 
be because the pond location is prone to floods, low flow and polluted water. This is the 
reason why they prefer seeking for lower risk jobs like other types of farming that 
require lower investment costs. The small fish farmer in Sanpakhee converted his pond 
into rice paddy fields while the fish farmer in Tamphralae adjusted her lands for natural 
fish and farming. To minimize risks, she diversifies her farm for various kinds of 
vegetables, flowers, trees and poultry. She also trades in farming products and works 
off-farm. The small fish farmer in Maekaedluang replaced his commercial ponds for 
natural fish in which rearing time is not required much. He then turned to work in more 
stable off-farm jobs that face less climate uncertainty such as painter, building 









4.4  Summary 
Findings indicate that exposed location, social and financial status, knowledge and 
social capital have impacts on the ability of different-sized operators and social ties to 
cope with climate-related risks. In terms of coping capacity, all scale operations of fish 
farmers in Sanpakhee with low levels of social learning but low exposure have fewer 
impacts from climate variability.  All fish operators in Maekaedluang with high social 
learning seem to implement higher and more modern technology than other villages, but 
struggle with rapid urbanization. Because of loose social network and high resource 
conflict, uneven knowledge distribution is found. Large fish operators in Tamphralae 
have much more knowledge than the smaller sizes, which are more prone to risks. 
Conversely, the fish farmers with non-groups have little information and social 
interaction. They have less help from fish farmer friends and other external 
organizations, which reduces their ability to cope with the climate-related risks.  
In terms of farm sizes, large- scale operators have high financial assets, and more 
opportunities to gain information from other external sources; as a consequence they 
have less hazard impacts and stresses than smaller operators. Medium and small 
operators suffer more from fish death and diseases. These latter operators have fewer 
financial assets and fewer contacts with external partners. Thus, the small fish farmers 
have less capacity of fish production and suffer from fish loss.  In this way, cooperatives 
can help small-scale fish farmers expand their networks, which, in turn, is helpful in 
supporting innovation, improving access to financial services, and overall, in building 
adaptive capacity. All in all, the social capital plays an important role on adaptive 
capacity but it is not yet clear about the interaction among fish farmers with different 
farm sizes. Chapter 5 further elaborates the formation of social connection and its roles 





Social Capital Roles in Climate Adaptation 
The study examines how fish farmers household and kin are united to increase their 
adaptive capacity to cope with and adapt to the climate related and socio economic 
risks. In this way, ties within a social group show bonding social capital based on 
homogeneous family, kinship and locality and local Muang Fai membership. The water 
users have socially and culturally committed to help maintain the common water 
systems. Bridging of networking social capital is made up of economic and other 
external ties. Most fish farmers set up the system of the organization; reduce transaction 
costs, provides fish-related jobs; and access fund, new knowledge and technology. Both 
relations represent the sharing of knowledge, financial risks and the labor force. The 
study first focuses on the construction of kinship and friendship of fish farmers made by 
bridging networks with horizontal and vertical links. Secondly, it shows how building 
up social capital components determines the level of adaptive capacity. Bridging, 
bonding and the notion of reciprocity, trust and collective action provide a framework 
for examining relational power. Lastly, it demonstrates that the social networks are 
utilized during times of water-related stresses. It comprises the different interactions 
among different scales of agencies on collective access to resources.   
5.1 Construction of Bonding through Bridging Cooperatives 
According to the nature of rural livelihood, Scott (1976) states that people living as a 
cluster of social and cultural units are bounded with a set of social norms, structures and 
processes. If peasants face the hazards affecting harvest failure and starvation, the close-
knit kin can ask for support and reciprocity from community networks or the so-called 
‘moral economy’. This rural life shows the egalitarian, corporate, communal, safe and 





“Relationship with kin is harder to break off, but also because kin have 
more mutual aid and material assistance to offer one another,” stated by Bott 
Elizabeth (1971) 
In these days the relationship has been changed through the urbanization development 
that increases the spatial mobility of local people from rural to urban area and from 
farming to non-farming. With loose-knit networks the members of the group or so 
called household families no longer closely see, give and take and support one another. 
In accordance with Rigg’s statement (2012), a higher number of local villagers in the 
Asian countryside seek for non-farm income sources opportunities. The mobility of 
people doing off farm jobs in the city is high as the number of their heirs, who have less 
cultural attachment to the land and tended to pursue higher education. The process is 
called delocalization, which leads to a growing geriatricfication of farming (Rigg, 
2011). Increasing spatial fragmentation of the young for salaries from off-farm work 
and studying away from home also remains a component part of the household. Most 
elderly people are, as a consequence, left to do the farming in the rural areas. Few 
offspring return to farming and pond-based aquaculture. Households and communities 
are also inevitably disembedded and less socialized as households become extended 
units and skip-generation households. In this way, a new kind of fish farmer networks 
across generations is built up for financial interests. Bonding of family members and 
relatives are also found to be no longer about traditionally staying put and helping 
together, but living with more material and financial linkages.   
5.1.1 Kinship and neighborhood of fish pond farmer cooperatives  
Fish farmer cooperatives or groups are founded economically to reduce transaction 
costs; enhance access to knowledge, technology, labor and funds; and increase adaptive 
capacities to respond to the stresses. Moreover, there is a gap of separation of kin 
groups and neighbors who are fish farmers; either they are young or old. In this regard, 
fish farmer relationships are expanded through marriage, kinship and friendship. In the 
past most farmers decided to convert their agricultural lands into fish-ponds because of 
high economic returns as well as peer and kin pressure. The following process kicks off 
one by one, time-by-time, step-by-step until there are kin, neighbors and friends in the 




Most fish farmers have relatives, neighbors and friends in the three villages. Most are 
participants in fish farmer groups. The groups are of two types: (1) a private one 
commercially driven by individuals or traders; and (2) a cooperative led by the elected 
fish farmers as the committee managing the system. Even though those fish farmers 
belong to different fish groups, they are friends in helping each other do both fish-
related and other social service activities. The relationship is different from Tamphralae 
fish farmer organizations that include both a major fish farmer cooperative and small 
trade groups from Phan, Chiang Rai.  Eighty percent of fish farmers are a part of the 
major local fish farmer cooperative; while fifty percent of them are both the cooperative 
and the Phan fish groups. One participates just in the fish trade group, which provides 
not only feed and marketing, but also academic advice. Most of them who have 
different memberships in fish groups are relatives and neighbors; but they started 
experiencing resource conflicts after the commercial farming and fish farming 
expansions. Since then, the clan relationship has weakened, which affects the social 
service activities, collective action and resource negotiations.  
The fish farmer group structure in Maekaedluang is used in detail in an attempt to 
demonstrate how connectedness of networks is constructed and expanded. According to 
the figure 5.1, in Maekaedluang, there are three fish farmer groups that comprise of 
their kin and neighbors. The first group is the biggest, followed by the second and the 
third groups. The second and third groups just separated from the first old group due to 
disagreement of regulations. The regulations such as increasing feed price and inputs, 
previously made by the fish committee without public participation, made the rest of the 
group members dissatisfied. A large number of fish farmers in the village mainly 
participate in the first two groups, which have a competitive relationship. Even though 
fish farmers are relatives across the groups, they have difficulties in working with each 
other within the groups as well as sharing about fish-related issues, except for joining in 
the social activities. Meanwhile, fish farmers outside the village from the third group 
have a compromise relationship with other two groups. They offer joint assistance by 
allowing fish traders to buy fish when the first two groups cannot make it in time to 













Figure 5.1 Example of relationships among kin groups, neighbors  
and other fish cooperatives in Maekaedluang 
From figure 5.1, fish farmer kin and neighbors of both genders are urged to take part in 
fish memberships; some play roles as group committee members and others as regular 
members. For example, Mr. A (pseudonym: A/L), a large-scale leader of the first group 
in Maekaedluang, has a great deal of contacts with his kin and his wife’s relatives who 
are also involved in pond-based aquaculture. His wife’s father has younger brothers 
whose children are also in fish farming. One of them is Mr. B (B/L) who inherited the 
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fish farm from his father and became a large operator and a member of the fish 
cooperative committee. His uncle, Mr. C (C/M) is a medium fish farmer and also in the 
committee. Three of them belong to the same group and work closely in running the 
first fish group.  Furthermore, fish farmers across the three groups are relatives. For 
instance, Mrs. D (D/S) is a small fish operator in the third group. Her siblings are fish 
farmers in the first group while her son in law is a member of the second. They often 
indirectly share information and help one another.  
It is seen that most large- and medium-scale operators who are mainly in charge of a 
group’s committee have good contacts with external feed agencies and other fish 
cooperatives. Some of them get to know other fish cooperatives via fish-related 
conferences or joint activities held by the Department of Fisheries and other private feed 
companies. On the contrary, the fish farmer household out of the fish group lacks 
opportunities to interact with other fish farmers. Thus, there is less knowledge sharing 
and skill development. 
Family and extra-familial kin previously did not play much part in the economic and 
occupational unit including access to means of earning a living. However, ties among 
kin are likely to be stronger if the kin are able to provide or offer one another jobs (Bott, 
1971). It is evident that the fish cooperatives provide skill development in addition to 
full-time and part-time job opportunities for kin and neighbors including the young.  
New sorts of jobs including fish producers, fish retailers/ wholesalers, harvest men, 
accountants, checkers and committee membership are made and assigned to fish farmers 
and other neighbors. They are also given new roles such as fish group leaders, 
secretaries and committee members responsible for the group management and system. 
These kinds of jobs encourage the fish farmers to seek for more income and develop 
their skills to fully derive benefit from fish-related employment. For instance, when one 
particular large-scale operator was young, he was an intern in the fingerling farm in 
Phan, Chiang Rai. Here, he gained much experience and developed himself to become 
the fish commercial fish farmers in the village.  At that time, he and his wife also helped 
one another to trade in other provinces nearby for more than five years now. Since he 
has gained a large number of fish retailers in different provinces, he initiated his own 
private fish group. He hires his neighbors to work on fish and livestock farms, fish trade 
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and processing. He also hires the offspring of his fish farmer neighbors. One of them 
works as a hired fish wholesaler while helping his parents with the fish farming. Now 
this neighbor and his brother has put together some money to invest in an agricultural 
pesticide shop whist letting their parents run the business.  
 5.1.2 Neighborhood ties with Muang Fai institutions 
While the fish farmer groups have been formed, the Muang Fai group is still declining. 
Fish farmers are a part of the Muang Fai (local irrigation system) with common 
responsibilities in managing water resources. The relationship between the Muang Fai 
groups and fish farmer cooperatives determines the collaboration of water management 
and access. Fish farmers are a member of water users, which is a kind of bonding 
relationship rooted from the past. When times passed, the relationship has bridged 
between the old water users and newcomers taking benefits from fish ponds and 
agriculture activities in the areas. The expanded relationship has a great impact on the 
participation in collective Muang Fai activities.  Water is also rarely used effectively. It 
can easily be overused by those who have access first, resulting in water shortages and 
conflicts over water scarcity and water pollution. This exacerbates competition for water 
among agriculture, aquaculture and villagers.  
In Sanpakhee, the RID manages efficient water all year round to all stakeholders 
without any water fee, whilst the Muang Fai activities still remain with local 
participation to clear the waterways in some canals. No obvious resource conflicts are 
undoubtedly found. In Maekaedluang, the responsibilities of water management mainly 
belong to the Kae Muang under the RID with the collaboration of fish farmers and other 
farmers. However, the Kae Muang working alone cannot manage the water to meet 
every single water user’s demand. They are asked to pay for the water fee and to help 
clear the waterways. In any case, many canals are sometimes designed and developed 
by the RID without any public hearing. This causes disagreement among local water 
users because some constructions block the water flow. 
Conversely, in non-bonding interaction Tamphralae, few water users from both local 
and outside communities respect the Muang Fai laws and the activities in particular.  
Moreover, most canals are still earthen, making it necessary to regularly clear the 
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waterway. Every water user has to pay for the water fee according to the number of 
their pipes. But under the same fee rate, some use bigger pipes for overusing large 
amounts of water. Thus water conflict is highly likely between fish farmers and farmers; 
and between insiders and outsiders. Even though the Kae Muang has rights to meet out 
punishment to whomever break the laws, he avoids arguing with the big-pipe men and 
leave the conflict unsolved. 
 5.1.3 Bridging fish farmer network management and direction of social ties 
Bonding and bridging of social capital enhance networks and connectedness. Vertical 
and horizontal ties functioning in the network are also ways of increasing trust and 
abilities in working together and expanding access ability. Social capital can reveal the 
power dynamics between social actors in the social inequality and risks; and resource 
access inequalities (Pelling, 2005). The relationship between bonding and bridging; and 
vertical and horizontal are linked to form social networks and their operation.  
In figure 5.2 below, social capital is divided into three kinds of networks: (a) high 
bonding with minimal bridging interaction (Sanpakhee). Fish farmers have strong 
kinship and neighborhood but have fewer contacts with DOF agencies, university and 
feed companies; (b) high bonding with bridging interaction (Maekaedluang) means high 
interaction between kin and neighbors in fish farmer group; and external organizations, 
except DOF; and (c) minimal bonding with high bridging interaction in Tamphralae is 
low at the level of kinship and neighborhood, but high level of interaction with DOF 
and university, except feed companies. Based on the actual phenomena in the fields, the 
three figures are made to understand the complex relationship among fish farmers with 
different scale operations and other stakeholders. I wonder how those people with 
different kinds of bonding and bridging relationships interact with one another and what 
the results are. Here I categorize the actors into external groups (the state, feed firms 
and universities) and local fish farmers with small-, medium- and large-scale operations. 
They have both vertical and horizontal relationships upon the kind of relationship. 
Sanpakhee Village symbolizes closed bonding with low bridging interaction. They pay 
less attention to the state’s help since their projects extend unevenly to some particular 
fish farmers. The state’s image thus seems negative from the fish farmer’s point of view 
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for they rarely take care of those fish farmers. In the past, the agencies took some fish 
and water as well as some portion of the feed, but there are no informed results for the 
fish farmers in return. In addition, the views between the DOF and local people are 
different. DOF attempts to take responsibilities for the health of customers but local fish 
farmers aim to increase fish productivity and income by any means whether or not it is 
harmful for the environment and to health. 
According to the Good Aquaculture Practice (GAP), they also compel the fish farmers 
to reduce chemical substances and give up their pig farm. The agencies of the DOF 
claim that the fish fed by pig manure is contaminated with chemical substances and 
waste. For food safety for consumption, they moreover sometimes show up and ask fish 
farmers to use qualified chemical substances that are registered to the GAP standard. 
Indeed, the fish farmers unavoidably have to use the available chemical substances 
suggested by their neighbors and fish groups, which might not serve the state’s demand. 
Consequently, fish farmers decide to independently run their farming without 
cooperation with the state. However, some do contact the state agencies to get the 






















Most fish farmers in Sanpakhee are members of fish farmers groups and some are in the 
cooperative. Each organization is led by either the powerful and well-off fish farmers or 
fish traders who have exited from the formal biggest group. They develop their skills 
and network and build up the private fish group. Such leaders monopolize both kinds of 
groups. But the cooperative is again regulated by the elected fish farmer committee 
(from all scales of operations) who are in charge of rechecking the transparency of the 
accounting. The leader of the group accumulates wealth from the fish trade and 
becomes a feed agency while seeking for fish productions and managing marketing. In 
this way, they are supported commercially by feed agencies as seen in the big circle of 
the diagram 5.2a. The rest is small, medium and large fish farmers in the smaller circle.  
They are the members of the group.  
The leaders and the cooperative committees set up regulations and takes control over 
the smaller-scale members. The group committee or the leader without participation of 
the majority of group members regulates the decision-making process and regulation of 
price, harvest systems and yearly meetings. Different from the group leader, either 
a) High bonding with minimal 
bridging interaction (Sanpakhee) 
b) High bonding with bridging 
interaction (Maekaedluang) 
c)Minimal bonding with high 
bridging interaction (Tamphralae) 
Figure 5.2 Kinds of bonding and bridging interaction of three sites 
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reducing or increasing feed and fish prices and dividing profits should be approved by 
the committee first in order to save the cost of investment and increase income for the 
members. Still the fish groups individually control the price and divide mostly for their 
individual interest. This provides opportunities for the larger operators and traders 
opportunities to take advantage of the smaller fish farmers.  
Each group, cooperative or group uses a few feed brands suggested by the familiar feed 
agencies. They often approach the leader of the fish group by not only giving credit but 
also providing knowledge and technology. By contrast, they hardly care about or give 
advice about fish diseases and rearing techniques to smaller fish farmers. One related 
university also has a good contact with one large operator. This project is about climate-
related sensitivities of aquaculture production. It studies the effects of climate variability 
on chemical and physical water properties and tilapia production in fish-ponds in 
Northern Thailand. From the interviews conducted, information and knowledge are not 
well distributed to other fish farmers. It is obvious that the knowledge exchange among 
fish farmers is built up more through horizontal bonding of kinship and neighborhood 
than the vertical help from the state, companies and university. Thus, fish farmer 
members do not have a sense of belonging to the group and willingness to share 
knowledge and experience. They rely very much on their experiences and sometimes 
exchange among each other across scale. They are also more bound to each other 
though informal lending money and materials; and reciprocal labor exchange among 
themselves. 
“The students from the university tested water from Mr. A’s 
(pseudonym) pond. I just saw that from my pond and Mr. A told me 
when we drove past that the cloud cover starts between 2 - 4 o’clock. We 
have to open our aerator. I do believe him, but better believe my own 
experience” said by a large fish farmer in Sanpakhee (16-08-2013). 
The second one shows the interaction between bonding and bridging with both vertical 
and horizontal ties. There are three big fish groups in Maekaedluang, but they work like 
a cooperative because they are run by the elected leader along with the committee and 
hired staff. The bonding of fish farmers who are relatives, neighbors and friends is 
reconstructed into the financial relationship of fish farmer groups. From the diagram 
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5.2b, the smaller circle includes fish farmers with all scales of operations. The account 
represents the bonding embedded in the bigger bridging relationship with external 
stakeholders. The constructed group aims to reduce transaction costs; to provide 
employment and income opportunities (fish harvest, accounting, and fish trade); and to 
manage farming and marketing.   
Due to the absent state condition in Maekaedluang, the state agencies rarely support the 
fish farmers; they just apply the GAP standard for large-scale operators. On the 
contrary, the feed agencies often access the fish farmer members via the leader and 
committee of the group. Here, each group generously opens the space for feed agencies 
to promote their products. The more they present their cheap and high quality products 
with advanced technology, the more fish farmers are interested. Unquestionably, ties 
with feed companies is more commercially and challenging. They not only promote 
feed but also provide training, knowledge, survey and exchange travel. They also offer 
help on fish disease treatment, fish dead protection and increasing fish productivity. 
Nonetheless, ties between the group and the related university are indirectly enhanced 
by the feed agencies that are alumni of the institute. Many researchers and specialists 
are invited to give talks about biological change in the ponds, fish disease, and chemical 
use.  
Even though the large scale operators have wider social capital and more abilities to 
access resources and to increase the common benefits for all fish farmer members, they 
tend to horizontally share knowledge and technology with other smaller scales. 
Additionally, the group leader (large operator) and committee (all operators) critically 
negotiate the price of the feed and fingerlings as well as equipment used in the fish 
farming. Furthermore, fish farmer members are a part of the decision-making process 
like, setting up fish prices and agreements to use technology and changing the fish 
system to reduce risks and maximize land use. The first two relationships substitute 
local management for state control but are different from the last one. 
Minimal bonding with high bridging interaction takes place in Tamphralae Village. The 
state control substitutes for local networks. The fish production project is vertically 
supported by the state and university aiming to increase bio-friendly fish production. 
They fully provide fund for fish farmer cooperative initiation as well as knowledge and 
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technology for increasing fish productivity. In turn, the project interests both local 
people and outside authorities bridging together into the fish farmer cooperatives. The 
state agencies mainly apply the GAP standard to fish farmers as much as possible. The 
diagram 5.2c shows the local state control substitution over local networks and the 
complex position of the fish farmers with different scale operations. There are three 
circles: the biggest circle (bridging relationship) and the small circle linked with the big 
circle and the isolated small one.  
Most large and some medium fish farmers are major actors in the fish cooperative in the 
big circle. They are mostly given advice and opportunities by the university and the 
state. Meanwhile, the feed agency with one brand often supports especially the fish 
group leader with a large farm size and the committee as a way to promote their 
products and increase the sale from other fish farmer members. The agency provides the 
group with seed and feed supply on top of market distribution that increases the 
production base and the cooperative’s income. Still the feed agencies seldom visit and 
take care of the smaller-scale fish farmer member. They are slightly supported by some 
larger scale fish farmers. It is seen that all farm sizes get advantages more or less in 
being a part of the fish cooperatives except for the isolated fish farmer. Lack of 
participation in any fish group activities limits the opportunities to take such advantages 
like the others, which forces him to find new ways. 
The medium fish farmer in Tamphralae (15-08-2014) states the reason 
why he does not want to be a member of the cooperative: “I am not a 
member of the fish cooperative. I buy feed from Mr. N (pseudonym). He 
lends me feed because I do not have enough money to pay cash. Though 
it is more expensive than the feed from the cooperative, I am willing to 
pay because its interest is fixed. But the interest of the cooperative is 
increasing through the number of months I borrow feed before 
harvesting. I therefore do not want to be part of the group.”  
The expert ideas and knowledge of how to cure fish disease and purify water are just 
stuck in particular well-off fish farmers and less applicable by poorer farmers. Why is 
that so? Why can ready-made knowledge not be used in the real society? The distributed 
knowledge from the university and the input supply from the feed companies are set 
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into the regulation of the cooperative and distributed to most medium and small fish 
farmers. They are members of the cooperative and allowed to get funds, but not full 
support like the previous group. The committees are normally the first to get 
information and knowledge, which some might not distribute to others. Consequently, 
the second group does not totally understand the offer and instead follows the new 
knowledge and practices from those with larger-scale operations and works closely in 
the cooperative and with external sectors. Last is a medium fish farmer who does not 
belong to the cooperative. By his own choice, he prefers not following the regulation of 
the cooperative, but decides to take part in the fish group from Phan- providing feed and 
fish harvest. So, he admits to lack the opportunities, knowledge and funds like others in 
the cooperative. Above all, most members of the fish cooperative do not link to the fish 
farmers out of the group.  
 “The university encourages us to purify water from water hyacinths, but 
I do not do it. Let others do it first, if it works, I will follow. But now I 
do not think about it yet,” said the small fish farmers in Tamphralae (20-
01-2014). 
Due to their different financial status and loose-neighborhood, the locals cannot get very 
familiar with local wealthy people and powerful outsiders. Most local people feel 
otherness but just participate for economic interests. They individually turn to learn by 
their own experimenting and from other related neighboring fish farmers instead. At the 
same time, most large and successful operators become group leaders and other large 
and medium farmers, the committee members. But the smaller-scale operators are not 
allowed to participate in the decision-making process. They are excluded from 
regulating the price of feed, fish, harvest and loan condition. The fish farmer members 
are as a result given the payment burden for high priced feed (plus interest) and hired 
labors. Some do not socialize with the group, but seek feed and marketing from Phan 
District. It is seen that productivity and quality are so far different among the different 
scaled operations, some get profits while others lose. Each operator rear fish as best as 
they could, depending on knowledge access and financial status. All in all, vertical 
bonds might be less helpful for information distribution than horizontal ties which 
might undermine the capacity for collective action and the ability to access resources.  
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5.2 Social Capital Components towards Level of Adaptive Capacity 
As I allude to physical and social risks and vulnerability in the earlier chapters, pond- 
based aquaculture is exposed to floods, drought, rainfall and cold weather.  The 
different types of social networks in each site hence have an impact on different 
adaptive capacities in response to the stresses. These sets of held networks shape 
different institutional forms that influence social patterns of access to water, knowledge 
and money. Does adaptive capacity constitute capacities of self-protection and 







Figure 5.3 Social capital impacts on adaptive capacity 
I outline the social capital components (figure 5.3) embedded in the actors’ 
relationships. Starting from the smallest level of the community, the relationship of kin 
groups, neighbors and friends is enhanced through trust and exchange under social 
obligation and norms. If they trust one another, they are willing to share, exchange, 
follow and practice like what they are supposed to do. Based on the strong foundation 
of local bonds, the constructed fish farmers cooperatives or groups are placed in the 
larger frame and strengthened by collective action and regulation. The group cohesion 
with trust can encourage the members’ ability to work voluntarily together. The more 
they jointly share their voices on the regulations, the more their feelings are full of the 
sense of belonging. They will also accept and eagerly follow the regulations. Right then, 
nesting people with those interrelated trust, exchange, collective action and regulation 
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components are various upon the types of networks that determines different benefits 
and adaptive capacities. 
 5.2.1 Building trust and trust results  
Prior to elaborating the adaptive capacity, the social components of trust, exchange and 
collective action are assessed in order to explain different levels of bonding and 
bridging interaction in Sanpakhee, Maekaedluang and Tamphralae villages. There are 
social capital components based on bonding and bridging interaction in the three sites. 
Assessing trust is the intangible quantity members have and the measurement is the trust 
payoff, which is the amount of benefits the individual can draw on trust building. In this 
sense, trust can be assessed by the frequency of interaction; the voluntary willingness to 
contribute in social group; and to cooperate, to transact and to invest as well as to create 
innovation.  
Trust results from the social interaction and social structure and it in turn enhances 
trusting relations (Fu, 2004). According to Paldam (2000), trust and cooperation have 
some simultaneity; trust brings about ease of voluntary cooperation which is tied 
together. Trust is generated from exchange and sharing over time; voluntarily reciprocal 
relationships; collective actions; willingness to conform to the regulations; 
transparency, accountability and participation in the group. They can voluntarily share 
what they have with others that convert into practices resulting in innovation creation 
and risk reduction. They also get more trust in return, if they often share their 
knowledge and information with other fish farmers. The information from education 
institution, feed companies and the state are also useful for fish production and 
management. For example, in case the oxygen level in the water is low, it is necessary 
to run the aerator and change water as well as put the chemical and vitamin. However, 
each fish farmer implements different kinds of aerators based on network structure and 
trust sources.  
It is noted that different relationships between people involved in trust building have 
different reasons. Links with kin and neighbors can be both negative and positive, 
depending upon the kinds of relationship. Some might be aware, while some might 
really care for each other that determine the direction of building trust. Links with fish 
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farmer groups is made for common economic interest in fish farmer cooperatives and 
for individual interests in a private group. Links with feed companies working for profit 
and private interests can be both trustful and untrustworthy for local fish farmers. 
Whether or not they trust the state and university, they aim to provide common benefits. 
More elaboration is demonstrated below by using 3 out of 9 in the same fish group in 
each village.  They represent large (L), medium (M) and small (S) fish farmers who 
have various circles of networks from the DOF (S), university (U), feed companies (F) 
and other fish farmers who are kin and neighbors (F). All of them have important roles 
on trust and trust payoff.  
 
    
 
 
Figure 5.4 Intensity of contacts in Sanpakhee 
It is found that only the large fish farmer who is the fish group leader has close contact 
with one feed companies. He has a lot of experience and knowledge from trainings, 
seminars and meetings provided by the feed companies. That makes the medium and 
small fish farmers, member of his groups, trust him. But he in turn prefers trusting the 
feed companies to other fish farmers who have fewer opportunities than him. However, 
he has less contact of fish farmer ties than the other two scales that have more very 
close relationships with other fish farmers. Often interacting with a lot of fish farmers 
exposes the last two scales to exchange different information from one another. They 
trust not only the large fish group leader but also other fish farmer neighbors who often 
work together. Above all, the DOF does not play a significant role here. Although the 
officials contact some fish farmers like the medium operator, for example, he does not 
trust DOF at the first place. It is because the officers rarely show up in the areas to help 








   
185 
 
In addition, they have low interaction levels in fish groups that limit their willingness to 
share their information among the group and to develop the better system. In other 
words, trust in fish groups does not arise because of high flexible opportunities of fish 
farmers to follow regulations. The fish farmers are not fully controlled and compelled in 
a way as to unite the members to build up trust in the group. One fish farmer is able to 
apply to more than one fish group for individual benefits. For instance, groups A and B 
allow the members to borrow feed with credit, but group A prefers a big fish size with 
higher price than the group B which prefers a medium fish size. Thus, the fish farmers 
apply to those two different groups. They borrow feed from both but sell fish to group 
A, if the fish size is big enough at that time. But if it is too weak to survive before 
harvesting time, the fish farmer decides to sell the fish to group B to reduce risks. In this 
way, applying to many fish groups help them reduce individual risks and get financial 
benefits, but not for social solidarity. Fish farmer cooperatives or groups just offer 
materials and marketing, except advices and information. Furthermore, the fish farmer 
members seldom take part in collective activities in the fish farmer groups unlike those 
in Maekaedluang. They are also not allowed to be a part of decision-making process and 
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Table 5.1 Activities indicating trust and results of trust in three villages 
Trust activities Sanpakhee Maekaedluang Tamphralae 
Social structure  The community with high 
bonding and minimal 
bridging has higher trust 
among local people than 
external organizations. 
The community with high 
bonding and bridging 
builds high trust between 
local people and external 
organizations. 
The community with 
minimal bonding and high 
bridging has different 




Kin and neighbors more 
often exchange information 
than external agencies. 
Fish farmers (80%) often 
attend the monthly 
meeting and always 
exchange information with 
feed companies.  
Most large and medium fish 
farmers, who are part of the 
group committee, have more 
opportunities to regularly 
exchange information with 
external organizations than 
the smaller-scale ones who 
seldom participate in the 




Reciprocal fish harvest 




Organizing as group to 
compel the fish traders to 
increase the fish price 
Collectively negotiating to 
get water with the Kae 
Muang   
- 
Willingness to 




Since each fish farmer can 
engage in many fish groups 
for resource access, he/she 
does not strictly follow the 
regulations of any certain 
group. Thus, there is low 
trust in fish group. 
Each fish farmer has to 
follow the regulations of a 
particular group; 
otherwise he/she will not 
get any benefits and has to 
quit the group. Thus, there 
is high trust in the fish 
groups. 
Since each fish farmer 
engages in either local fish 
group or fish group from 
Phan District for resource 
access. Thus, he/she does 
not strictly follow the 
regulations of any group that 







Due to low trust in fish 
group, only the elected fish 
group committees are 
allowed to check the 
accounting and group 
system without member 
participation. 
To widely build trust, not 
only elected fish 
committee who manage 
the fish group system, but 
also group members can 
voice out their opinions.  
Due to low trust in fish 
group, only the elected fish 
group committees are 
allowed to check the 
accounting and group 
system without member 
participation. 
Results of trust: 
technology 
implementation 
Most fish farmers use low 
technology such as cheap 
water pumps instead of 
advanced technologies 
introduced from outside 
village. 
Most fish farmers use 
advanced technology such 
as ring blowers (a kind of 
aerator) supported by the 
feed companies. Sixty 
percent of them use herbs 
mixed with feed to prevent 
fish diseases.  
Different scale operations 
use different levels of 
technology. Two out of three 
large fish farmers use 
advanced aerator, one out of 
three medium and two out of 
three small use cheap water 
pumps. 
 
It can be seen here ( table 5.1) that Sanpakhee has more horizontal bonding trust among 
clans and neighbors due to the low level of repeated exchange, sharing and participation 
in the fish groups. With the close relationship among clans and neighbors, working 
together quite often encourages them to have a closer relationship, which is a foundation 
of trust. 
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“Due to kinship, we trust each other. My niece also gives me advice and 
financial support to buy initial land and feed. I distrust other external 
people. You know, kin is the one we trust, rely on and we have to be 
faithful to,” claimed a fish farmer lady in Sanpakhee (11-01-2014). 
The quote above represents the voice of those fish farmers in Sanpakhee who rely more 
on horizontal relationships within the groups than external stakeholders. The local fish 
farmers who are clan and neighbors often informally exchange their experiences. For 
example, sharing the idea of fish prices, fish farmers who get the low fish price from the 
same group help one another to negotiate an increase in the price from the fish group 
owner. Such a collective action helps them to keep their benefits and maintain fairness.  
There is voluntarily reciprocal relationship of fish harvest activities every early morning 
like the figure 5.5. Fish farmers using the same stream naturally help their neighbors 
whose product is ready for harvest. Since there are a few number of hired harvest teams 
(the men in yellow), male fish farmers help harvest voluntarily while women cook 
breakfast for all the people related to the fish harvesting. Moreover, the kinds of 
bountiful relationship benefits for the water users at the same canals to collectively help 









Figure 5.5 Reciprocal fish farmers assisting the hired harvest team  
They also think that knowledge and techniques suggested by those feed or external 
related organizations are just keen on academics, but they are not practical and 
applicable in reality. For instance, the organizations sometimes do not allow the use of 
chemicals to the fish diseases because they are harmful. Such an idea is in contrast to 
fish farmers’ experiences that the chemicals often stop the fish diseases. Still, less 
contact with external vertical organizations limit their knowledge to what they have 
done. Comparing to Maekaedluang, for example, the majority of fish farmers in 
Sanpakhee prefer not to invest more in technology like aerators and to prevent the risks 
by using vitamins. Just two large fish farmers out of ten adopt the technology while the 















Figure 5.6 Intensity of networks in Maekaedluang 
Maekaedluang with both strong bonding and bridging ties obviously have the highest 
trust of fish group members, fish farmer neighbors, fish farmer committees and feed 
companies. Based on the above trust, as a result, with strong internal and external 
relationships, fish farmers in Maekaedluang have the highest level of knowledge and 
technology exchange. Trust in leaders and practices in working toward common goals 
in Maekaedluang (figure 5.6) enable knowledge formation and distribution. Feed 
companies, universities and the state mainly approach the large fish farmer who is the 
leader of the group. The large fish farmer tends to share his knowledge with other group 
members. He has a large number of lands, increased fish production and initially 
adopted advanced technology in his farming that always encourage other group 
members to do so. From his practical and concrete outcome, that is why the followers 
trust him and see how successfully he is. He also trusts feed companies and always 
consults with feed company agencies about feed efficiency, fish diseases and other 
related issues.  
Feed companies are allowed by the fish leader to participate in the monthly meetings as 
a time for them to convince the fish farmers to buy their feed brands. Then they use 
different tactics to build trust such as taking care of the fish production process, giving 
advice about fish disease treatments and so on. High frequency of contacts makes those 
fish farmers buy their feed and ask for help during urgent matters. The way the feed 
agencies use technical equipment to test water helps the fish farmers deal with the fish 
death and poor water accurately; and urges them to prevent the risks. They often take 













   
190 
 
daytime or night-time or even on the weekends. One of the feed agencies also invited 
the professors from the university to test fish conditions in order to promote good care 
and customer service.  
Increasing the accumulated trust between the bonding ties of fish groups and the 
bridging ties is made by increasing public participation and providing opportunities to 
do activities together in the fish group. Since the fish groups are not supported by any 
organization, each member is urged to found the group and distribute individual money 
used for common investment (table 5.1). The sharing and willingness to pay get them 
psychologically into the sense of belonging. With shared benefits, they are basically 
encouraging them to accept the regulations aiming to develop the organizational system 
and fish production. To reduce transaction costs, the money is used to buy cheap feed 
and chemicals including public equipment. Additionally, the way the large fish farmer 
keeps retelling the good points of fingerling use and technology implementation 
persuades all the fish farmers in the group to consider changing their farm system. 
Based on trust enhancement, they tend to share and exchange their knowledge among 
the group members.  
Trust is developed from transparency of the organization in the monthly meetings and 
information updates. Frequent working together keenly urges more than 80% of the 
members to easily follow the social norm, accept and exchange new knowledge and 
improve the farm system. Fish farmers who participate in the meetings, seminars and 
field trips have more opportunities to have more experiences. Monthly fish farmer 
meetings are always held as an opportunity and space for identifying accounting, news 
updates, information exchange, solution finding and peer encouragement in order to 
develop fish productivity. Successful fish farmers who produce the highest fish product 
are selected every month as a good example for others. The feed companies also support 
the field trips to visit the feed and fingerlings factories. Getting real experiences about 
how advanced technology and techniques are implemented can build up trust. Most of 
them are agreed that the aerator becomes necessary as a risk minimization strategy. 
Choosing qualified feed and chemicals is moreover important to the fish’s immune 
system. Using vitamins and EM application are taken into account to ensure fish 
survival rates with good weights. That is why most members committed to changing 
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their farming system. Consequently, fish farms here are more systematic and more 






Figure 5.7 Intensity of networks in Tamphralae 
In Tamphralae, many stakeholders involve in the fish farmer cooperatives (figure 5.7). 
The cooperatives use only one big feed brand (F1) of which the feed agencies often 
approach the large fish farmer who is the group leader, but not the small fish farmer 
who also uses the feed. The uneven distribution of customer service makes them 
fragmented in that the small and medium fish farmers decide to look for other feed 
sources. The medium fish farmers thus use not only the first brand sold in the fish 
farmer cooperatives but also a second feed brand from Phan District. The state and 
university also play a big role in fish farming extension for farmers with all farm sizes. 
It is seen that the state has great contact with all farm sizes. They often visit them on site 
to test the water and to test for fish diseases, making the farmers trust what the DOF 
officers advise on matters such as the water change system, chemical use and fish 
disease symptoms. On the contrary, even though the university cooperates with the 
DOF to launch the water purification project, those farmers including the large fish ones 
uninterested in the idea. It is also noticed that the university only directs the large and 
related fish farmers in the fish cooperatives. Based on minimal bonding community, 
those people in fish group rarely share or participate in activities together. Only the 
large fish farmers get more information from external organizations than others. But, 
less contacts (dotted lines) with each other limits the opportunities to share and 
exchange with each other. As a result, the medium and small fish farmers do not trust 
each other and the large fish farmer even when he gets lots of external assistances. They 
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villagers. If some fish farmers in strong bonding relationships like those in Sanpakhee 
and Maekaedluang retell the rumor or suggestion about successful fish production a 
second and third timev, other villagers tend to share and start to consider trusting.   
According to table 5.1, the loose regulation of the local fish group leads to high 
fragmentation in Tamphralae where local people have more opportunities to be exposed 
to DOF advice and other smaller fish traders from Phan.  They take part in the group for 
economic interest without the sense of belonging and the willingness to develop the 
group for common achievement. Only elected fish group committees are allowed to 
check the accounting and manage the group; while the rest of the members do not have 
opportunities to engage in the transparency process and public participation like in 
Maekaedluang. They thus tend to trust either DOF or kin/-neighbors or both who often 
interact with each other. Nonetheless, they do not trust the ones who rarely visit like the 
feed companies and the related university that promote the water purification project. 
No one grows water hyacinth like what the university suggests; they still wait for others 
to start first. If it is working, they will follow.  
“A fish farmer’s knowledge recognition is different. The fish farmers 
who have practiced fish farming for a long time and pay interest in 
improving the farm might be skillful in curing fish diseases. Some 
people don’t even consult with me, but rather buy the harmful chemicals 
that stimulates poor water in the pond and leads to fish death. I notice 
that some large fish farmers better ask me how to choose the chemicals 
and maintain the water quality but there are still a lot of fish farmers who 
ask one another who might not have the correct information. I am really 
concerned,” Explained the state agency in Tamphralae (9-08-2014). 
The professor from the university (7-08-2014) also claimed “from my 
experiences, the ones who have better skills are the ones like the group 
leader and the fish farmer committees who often participate in the fish 
cooperative. However, the knowledge gap is made by the differentiation 
between the first group and other fish farmers who seldom participate in 
the group. When having a meeting, the second group might not attend 
because they believe more in their own experiences than the outsiders. In 
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fact, they hurriedly find the chemicals to deal with the fish death instead, 
but in fact it might not work.”  
At the same time, some small scale operators viewed that “the external 
organizations do not really help us as much as we help ourselves. Their 
seminars or meetings are so academic. They suggest to us to use certain 
safe chemicals, but do not provide us with any. We also do not know the 
kind of medication and where we should buy it.” 
Trust is generated by voluntary exchange and sharing among group. In fact, fish farmers 
comprise of both local fish farmers who are kin and neighbors and the outsiders. They 
have long distance relationships and live in different villages. Having fish farm 
compounds close to others does not seem like their pond neighbors play their role to 
take care of the fish-ponds. Each pond located out of the village is hence fenced to 
prevent thieves and outsiders from walking through the area (figure 5.8). Eight out of 
nine fish farmers come to feed fish just in the morning and evening and then return 
home or work on other farming that reduces the frequency of meetings. As a result they 
are not close and hardly ever share together. At its core, the level of networking social 
capital has an impact on social innovation to prevent from and cope with fish diseases. 
Low bonding levels and interactions in fish groups result from low trust levels from rare 
learning and exchanges with each other. As are result, innovation creation derives from 
individual ability to build trust with the one he/she is willing to share with. Two out of 
three large fish farmers use advanced aerators while one out of three medium and two 
out of three small use cheap water pumps.  




Figure 5.8 The fenced pond areas  
 5.2.2 Regulation and advantage of membership  
From the building trust process above, regulation and preferential treatment for 
membership (table 5.2) are further elaborated. The cooperatives in Sanpakhee and 
Tamphralae mostly set up the regulations in terms of commitment and encouragement. 
The fish farmers are urged to pay the common fund that is used to buy feed and other 
public properties for all the members’ benefits. Moreover, there are bonuses and saving 
money like a bank in order to indirectly commit the member to produce fish for the 
group. Then they will get money in return. In this way, some fish farmer members are 
selected or voted to be committee members to check the accounting and to manage the 
system as well as to deal with the group problems.  
Like the fish farmer members of the independent group in Sanpakhee, the owner of the 
groups here mainly operates it more privately and commercially. Thus, the price of the 
production factors is higher, but the system is faster than the cooperatives. However, 
even though Maekaedluang is the fish farmer groups, they are run by a kind of 
cooperative system. Through public participation, the fish farmers vote for the 
committees democratically while all members can voice out their problems. It can be 
clearly seen that inputs of fingerlings and feed prices are cheaper than other two villages 
because the committee and fish members regulate them. Some groups have bonuses 
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from fish production and feed profit. Meanwhile, other groups removed the bonus 
system, preferring to use the bonuses to offset the profit from feed. 
Table 5.2 Regulation and preferential treatment for membership  
Villages Conditions 
Sanpakhee 
Regulations Groups: (1) buy only a big size of fish; (2) buy feed, but fingerling is optional; (3) buy feed 
on credit of  30 baht/ a bag; (4) the profit given to staff salary 
Cooperatives: (1) pay 100 baht as an application fee; (2) pay at least 2,500 baht for share ( 
if less than 100,000 baht, the members have to guarantee their properties which will be 
reconsidered by the committee); (3) buy feed on credit of 20 baht/ a bag of feed and will be 
refunded 5 baht/ a bag of feed after refunding the whole credit; (4) provide a bonus by 
returning 0.1 baht per a bag of feed, depending upon the fish weight and share; (5) keep 




If any fish farmers get familiar with or often participates with the fish group, they might be 
not charged from credit of the feed.  
Maekaedluang 
Regulations Group 1: (1) pay 10 baht/share ( total 500-2,000 shares) as a common fund for investment 
and field visit; (2) no credit of feed, chemical, and fingerlings; (3) remove 3 kg of fish 
weight per time: one for harvest cost, second for a common fish truck and third for common 
fund (eg. Weighting fish 58 kg minus 3 kg equals to 55kg.) 
Group 2 and 3: (1) pay 600 baht as an application fee; (2) pay 10 baht/share as a common 
fund (at least 500 stocks); (3) buy feed on credit, 30 baht/ a bag of feed a month before 
harvest time;(4) provide the bonus 2-4 times a year to encourage for fish farmers to increase 
fish production;(5) sell extra 25 baht per a bag of feed to nonmember; (6) pay 0.3 baht/ 
fingerlings if anyone does not buy fingerlings from the group; (7) set a price of feed, 
fingerlings and chemical based on agreement of committee and members; (8) remove 2 kg: 
one for harvest cost, another for common fund; (9) allocate profit from fish, feed, 
fingerlings and chemicals to staff salary and office construction. (10) fish group staff 
receives money from fish traders instead of the farm owner to clear the debt first. 




The one who often participates in the group activities is allowed to buy feed on credit more 
than the one who is absent. The group also first prioritizes him/her the fish harvest queue 
during over fish supply. 
Tamphralae 
Regulations Cooperative: (1) pay application fee for 100 baht; (2) pay 10 baht/ share, 100 shares; (3) 
save 50 baht a month; (4) provide the yearly bonus according a total number of profit from 
fish and feed; (5) withdraw a saving money and bonus after quitting or death; (6) buy feed 
on credit depending upon a number of stock, if want more, more stock will be paid;(7) 
provide a loan for the members to buy feed; (8) buy  feed on credit for 15 baht/ a bag of 
feed, four months before harvesting; (9) pay for checker according fish weight, 300 baht for 




The group also first prioritizes him/her who often buys feed and inputs from the fish groups 
the fish harvest queue during over fish supply.  
The fish farmers decide to take part in any kind of fish group because firstly they trust 
in the suggestions of neighbors, kin and fish members; and secondly, of the acceptance 
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level of the group regulation. To be a fish farmer members are required to adhere to the 
regulations of the groups for further assistance from the groups. For example, if the fish 
farmers always follow regulation, they are allowed to buy feed on credit out of the 
restricted time. Moreover, if there is any urgent fish death, the fish group will help 
harvest their fish earlier than others who hardly follow the regulations. The fish groups 
overtake the advantages for the farmers. If not, they are required to quit and seek for a 
new group and build new relationships. 
Bringing social ties into economic framework is both strength as well as weakness. 
Social capital can also be beneficial for included groups but not always good for 
everyone. The relationship between fish farmer cooperatives and groups in three sites is 
connected in terms of competition, a win-win advantage and taking advantage of one 
another. In the case of competition, due to economic returns, each fish cooperative aims 
to grab market shares from one another. However, Chiang Rai is the highest supplier 
distributing the fish product to Phayao and Chiang Mai and other provinces in upper 
Northern Thailand. Phayao with its natural water source also aims to control their 
provincial market and hit the Chiang Mai market. Phayao and Chiang Mai regrettably 
face lesser and more unstable productivity. Accordingly, the regulations of each fish 
farmer cooperative to develop market strategies are designed to encourage their group 
members to increase production. 
Table 5.3 Different fish prices in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and Phayao 
Provinces Chiang Mai Chiang Rai and Phayao 
Fish size  Weight (g) Price (bht/ kg) Weight (g) Price (bht/ kg) 
1 > 500  58  > 7 58 
2 > 400 48 > 5 47 
3 > 300 43  > 4 37 
4 < 300 20  < 4 27 
 (Data collected on September 15, 2013) 
Although the relationship among the networks is competitive, the local levels of fish 
trade can seek for benefits from each other. Table 5.3 shows the examples of different 
fish prices in the three sites at particular times. It is found that the real price of the two 
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provinces is lower than that of Chiang Mai. It is because Chiang Mai is a big city and a 
big market base in which the transportation cost is less taken into account. Nonetheless, 
the other two provinces have to count on the cost that basically makes the fish price 
lower to complete with the Chiang Mai market. However, fish farmers in Maekaedluang 
gain the highest price. But due to a limited number of lands, they hardly produce the 
fish amounts as much as the market demands all year round like Phan District, Chiang 
Rai and some areas in Bantam Sub-district, Phayao. In case of fish product shortages, 
fish traders in Chiang Mai are able to buy fish from other groups in the village and from 
fish networks in Chiang Rai and Phayao. Two of them are located in Sanpakhee Village 
and Tamphralae Sub-district. The Maekaedluang groups also gain benefits from the 
large fish farmer in Sanpakhee. Because he has a good relationship with the fingerlings 
and feed supplier, they take the opportunity to contact the supplier via the large fish 
farmer in order to get high quality products. 
5.3  Roles of Social Capital on Water-Related Stresses 
In this part, the study highlights how high the interactions of social capital among 
different scale agents can support adaptation to water-related stresses. To lubricate co-
operation, social networks are reinforced when trust, share and exchange with one 
another increase connectedness for collective action. However, it is skeptical that the 
probability of fish loss increases since the water users lack collective action and 
negotiation to access water. Do fish farmers individually facing physical risks prevent 
or cope with the stresses on time? In fact, the structure and fish farmer networks and the 
irrigation systems are different in each village. That takes this study to focus on 
resource access in relation to many stakeholders who are farmers, fish famers with 
different scale operations and the Kae Muang. Utilizing social capital into fish farmer 
network in adapting to the stresses is analyzed based on the three social network 
frameworks identified in figure 5.2. The adaptation of each village is clearer when 
applying the framework of the Muang Fai relationship in Figure 5.6. It is to study how 
the networking social capital in each site differently interacts with the Muang Fai 
group. When facing the stresses, even if the fish groups do not cooperate with the 
Muang Fai, it is necessary to examine how each fish farmer play his/her role to solve 
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the problems. What kind of social capital do they use, either bonding or bridging? This 
part emphasizes two water issues: (1) water scarcity and conflict; and (2) flood. 
5.3.1 Water scarcity and conflict 
The figure 5.6 explains the relationship between bonding of kin and neighbors and 
bridging of fish groups cooperating with external organizations. Muang Fai group are 
embedded in both bonding and bridging because those kin and neighbors are a water 
users in the Muang Fai system, which is under RID. The framework is divided into the 
three types of relationship: (5.6a) bonding of water users in the RID system in 
Sanpakhee; (5.6b) bonding of water users in the RID and Muang Fai system in 
Maekaedluang and (5.6c) non-bonding of water users in the Muang Fai system. Water 
scarcity and conflict become a problem in relation to high water demand and low 
collaboration of the Muang Fai system. It is evident that water conflicts in Sanpakhee 
and Maekaedluang are less radical than that in Tamphralae, even though they are 
pressured by the demand among fish farmers in the community and the surrounding 
urbanization influences. Why that is so will be elaborated below. 
The diagram 5.9a conveys the less resource conflict due to the widespread water 
distribution and the nested bonding of local water users. The RID plays a major role in 
controlling water allocation but assigns the local Kae Muang to work in local activities 
such as informing irrigation news, clearing waterway and streams, and developing the 
street along the local canals. All fish farmers and farmers are a part of the irrigation 
system. The large scale leader of the fish group and other fish farmers with large, 
medium and small-scales in the fish group as well as the ex-fish farmer have to follow 
the allocation plan while participating in the Muang Fai activities. Thus they urge each 
other to take part in collective irrigation activities through kinship and neighborhood, 
not through membership of fish group. The fund of infrastructure development is from 
both raising money from the water users and the sub-district administrative 
organization. Furthermore, the upstream Sanpakhee Village receives water prior to 
others downstream. The regular allocation allows the farmers and fish farmers to do 
their activities throughout the year even during the dry season. Getting water as 
widespread as possible reduces the likelihood of having conflicts, just a-little problem 
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downstream.  But based on bonding ties, they can basically deal with each another and 
make an agreement. 
 
Diagram 5.9b represents the collaboration between local water users and the Muang Fai 
system which is predominated by state irrigation schemes. RID regulates the water 
allocation plan and assigns the Kae Muang to manage the system at the local level. All 
water users who are kin, neighbors, farmers and fish farmers with all farm sizes are a 
part of the Muang Fai system, they have to participate in collective activities and follow 
the irrigation rules. There is one large-scale fish farmer who moved his production base 
to another district; and one ex-fish farmer who is out of the Muang Fai group. They do 
not pay water fees and participate in any Muang Fai activities. Another large-scale fish 
farmer who is in the Muang Fai and fish group pays the water fee, but lacks 
participation in the irrigation activities. The rest of fish farmers with all farm sizes and 
farmers are under the Muang Fai institution. The large fish farmers in the fish group 
lead other fish farmers in any fish group for water negotiations and access. Still the 
a) Bonding of water users in 
RID system ( Sanpakhee) 
b) Bonding of water users in 
both RID and Muang Fai 
system (Maekaedluang) 
c) Non-bonding of water 
users in Muang Fai system 
(Tamphralae) 
Figure 5.9 Bonding and bridging interaction with Muang Fai system 
M = Muang Fai     F = Farmers     L,M,S = Large, medium and small fish farmers   Out = Outsiders 
  = Kinship and neighborhood    = Fish farmer group  E= Fish farmer who exit from fish farming                  
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irrigation situation becomes more problematic than in Sanpakhee, since the Kae Muang 
deals with the system and related problems alone. In reality, he hardly controls every 
single water users on the same track. Some water users refuse to paying the water fee 
and to participate in collective clearing waterway activities. By using a ‘fine’ letter 
drafted by the RID (figure 5.10), the Kae Muang is required to fine the absent person 
who breaks the irrigation rule. In fact, he prefers not using his right and power to force 
such a person to comply because they are all neighbors who are supposed to keep their 
good relationship. 
The communal irrigation leaders often firstly coordinate with large fish farmers and 
other smaller fish farmers and farmers who always follow the rule and participate in the 
activities. He feels comfortable and willing to share with them the information about 
such water allocation and collective action plans. Either farmers or fish farmers who 
participate in the Muang Fai activities are the ones who easily access to get water. 
Moreover, if there is no water, he will not work for the ones who are absent from the 
Muang Fai activities. For instance, one large fish farmer who broke the Muang Fai 
regulation did not know the water allocation information, which made it difficult for 
him to plan water change systems in his farm. Thus, he tried to use the circulating water 
system instead, which increased his costs of investment. Conversely, other smaller fish 
farmers who always join the Muang Fai activities have better water access beneficial 



















Figure 5.10 A fine letter (literally translation from Thai to English version) made by  
the Royal Irrigation Department and run by the Kae Muang 
In the fish farmer cooperative, after receiving information or having a meeting with the 
RID, the large fish farmers chiefly work as news distributors. They share the water 
allocation plan with other fish farmers who lack opportunities to take part in the 
meeting. They also urge other fish farmers to help with the collective activities such as 
paying water fees, clearing waterways and access to water. During low flow periods, the 
water pollution becomes a big issue because of the increasing used poor water from a 
majority of fish ponds. Because of the limited amount of water, the leader and the large 
fish farmers encourage the group members to maintain water quality by using EM and 
reducing feeding. For the sake of all water users, the large operators also lead other 
smaller fish farmers in the group to negotiate with the Kae Muang and the RID to get 
access to water and address the water pollution. After meeting with the fish groups, the 
large operators voluntarily propose the issue to the Muang Fai committees and related 
organizations for further solutions. Due to their neighborhood, they can directly 
negotiate with the causal fish farmers who release polluted water downstream.  Then, 
the farm owners temporarily commit to changing the releasing water time and reducing 
the rate of polluted water. The problems are still not solved unless all stakeholders sit 
and talk to find the way out. 
 
Water User Group of the canal 15th 
Sansailuang Sub-district, Sansai 
District, Chiang Mai 
Date 
Issue: Absent participation in clearing waterway activity 
Dear…………………………………….. 
   Your participation of clearing waterways from …(village name)… to ….( village name)… is 
necessary for all water users. But since you are absent on…. (date)… at….(time)…. Please be informed that 
you are fined at 300 baht/day.  
Respect 
……………… 
(Kae Muang’s name) 
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Diagram 5.9c symbolizes the least level of local collaboration between local water users 
and the communal irrigation system. Even if sub-district municipality manipulates the 
Muang Fai, in fact it is the Kae Muang who manages the system. The sub-district 
municipality allocates yearly financial fund for canal construction and improvement, but 
the money is inconsistent each year. They also hold a meeting before the in-season in 
order to collect a number of land uses and water for agriculture production. In addition, 
the irrigation system of each water source is not linked to other sources, but it is rather 
designed upon each local irrigation leaders’ plan. Anyway, both farmers and fish 
farmers are members of the Muang Fai and have to follow its rules like those in 
Maekaedluang. Muang Fai membership is labeled based on the location of the ponds 
and agriculture lands. For instance, Mr. C and Mrs. D (pseudonym) belong to the Mai 
Yang Weir upon his pond and her rice paddy field settlement respectively. The 
members of each water source have to be responsible for clearing the waterways and 
paying for the water fee and other common irrigation materials. If anyone breaks the 
rule, she/he cannot avoid being fined 10 times of the actual water fee. 
Four groups of water users are divided based on grouping. The first three groups belong 
to the Muang Fai and fish groups. The ones in the fish cooperative are under the 
irrigation regulation. The first group is made up of local fish farmers with all farm sizes 
in the fish group. The second is two small fish farmers and an ex-fish farmer who use 
underground water but still participate in the Muang Fai group. The third is outsiders 
who buy the lands upstream from local people and mostly convert them to fish ponds 
and agriculture lands. They are supposed to be Muang Fai members, but 60% of them 
are not. They get water without paying the fee. Local people then seldom interact with 
the third group. The fourth group is a medium fish farmer who moved from Bangkok to 
marry a local girl and has lived in Tamphralae for more than 15 years. He is not in both 
the fish and Muang Fai groups. He relies on underground water and has no rights to 
water access. He is hence not supposed to pay the water fee and participate in Muang 
Fai activities. Above all, even though fish farmers and farmer are united in the Muang 
Fai group, each fish farmer access water by any means they can such as buying the 
pond upstream and piping the water. Settled above agriculture farming, fish farmers 
mostly take as many opportunities as possible to stock water.  
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Water scarcity and pollution becomes a crisis in Tamphralae due to the reducing water 
level and the weak and separated irrigation system. The water capacity is lower from the 
increasing mass agriculture and fish production. To make things worse, there is no 
measurable record of water capacity in each weir and catchment that results in the 
ineffective water allocation plan to meet the higher demand of water users. Therefore, 
those water users (farmers, fish farmers and outsiders) compete for water with one 
another especially during the dry season. Unfortunately, the Kae Muang role has 
declined since they are too old and too powerless to deal with a great number of 
problems. They cannot control water users to reduce using water and cannot force the 
well-off people to pay the water fee and take part in social irrigation activities. 
“The Kae Muang is no longer respected. No one is scared of or cares 
about his punishment. The existing Muang Fai law is no longer active. 
The more opportunities they have to access water, the more they gain by 
using a big water pipe,” explained an affected fish farmer in Tamphralae. 
Many water users thus no longer value the Muang Fai system and respect the Kae 
Muang and the rules like they did in the past.  In turn, the rule is often broken and the 
overuse of water increase resource conflict among water users. However, the problem is 
not raised because all of them are kin and neighbors. Avoiding blaming those casual 
people directly maintains their relationship in the same community. Two out of three 
large- and medium-scale fish farmers gain efficient water because their farm locations 
are upstream. Furthermore, there is a conflict between the local and outside water users. 
They mostly have fish-ponds and agriculture lands upstream that release polluted and 
poor water downstream. Those well-off authorities and outsiders not only use a large 
amount of water but also break the rule by using big pumps and stock water without 
sharing to others. As a result, farmers and fish farmers destroy their connectedness in 
the fish farmer cooperative. It can be said that the lack of social relationships breaks the 
rules and the creation of trust. 
To solve this issue, both the Kae Muang and affected water users decided to passively 
do nothing. He cannot negotiate and deal with the users and ignores his rights and 
power to manage because he is afraid of the powerful people. The local irrigation leader 
here generally works during the rainy feed season, except for summer. The Muang Fai 
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agreement commands that water during daytime is to be used by farmers and at night by 
fish farmer. But farmers and fish farmers are required to manage the water by 
themselves. At the same time, the fish farmer members do not link and share the news 
about the water problems with each other. Specifically, during the time of stresses, it is 
obvious that the fish farmer members do not gather to negotiate with the Kae Muang to 
address the water shortage. Even worse, most individual farmers and fish farmers 
passively avoid direct negotiation with the large fish farmers and powerful people who 
stock and pollute poor water. For example, poor water from fish-pig farm of the large-
scale fish farmer upstream affects the medium-scale fish farmers whose ponds are 
downstream. The latter does not want to challenge him, but would rather engage in 
hidden action through gossip and complaints in small informal chat groups. 
Furthermore, to release water to their farms, some farmers close the pipes of fish famers 
without asking for permission. Even harder still, some small fish farmers downstream 
individually try to negotiate to use another water source nearby, but their voices are not 
heard by the Kae Muang and sub-district municipality. Notwithstanding, being a part of 
the fish group does not help the members to have access to water, some small fish 
farmers temporarily stopped raising fish and some decided to exit the farming.   
In terms of farming management, facilitating the information transfer from the state and 
university down to the fish farmers is likely to have difficulties in the non-bonding 
communities. Most fish farmers decide not to apply the knowledge to improve the 
farming system, but learn by their mistakes and experiences. Hence, adapting to drought 
and water pollution is so different across the scales. Large operators accessing the water 
upstream have less polluted water problems. They also enable to improve their farming 
systems, reduce fish density and increase the number of fish crops to prevent risks. 
Most large- and medium-scale rely more on advanced modern technology than the small 
-scale. The smaller fish farmers have less ability to own land with access to good 
quality and quantity of water. They have to bear and persist through the low flow as 
long as the rainy season arrives. 
The most affected case is found in a medium-scale operator who is neither a part of the 
fish farmer cooperative nor Muang Fai system. His pond is located in the low-land 
downstream that is prone to low flow and stocked water upstream. During the dry 
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season in 2013, the lower level of underground water and hot weather intensified tons of 
fish deaths. There was no help from any social partners and even the state’s 
compensation since he is not registered to the fish farmer list of the DOF. A year later, 
he started operating an aerator and decreases his fish density to reduce risks but 
vulnerably still faces lower flow periods. To keep the water quantity, he sometimes has 
to reluctantly use overused poor water from other ponds upstream.    
5.3.2 Flood occurrence  
Severe flooding occurred in 2005, 2011 and 2013 in Maekaedluang; and 2005 and 2013 
in Tamphralae, but it never happens in Sanpakhee. To study how social connectedness 
plays an important role in floods, here is the comparison between the strong bonding 
village and the non-bonding village in different aspects. Besides the climate related 
risks, the flood occurrences in Chiang Mai resulted from the mismanagement of related 
organizations and poor Muang Fai communications at the local level. The flood in 2005 
in Maekaedluang was caused by the previous weak water allocation management plan. 
The communal irrigation leaders seldom held meetings with other irrigation leaders and 
water users. The few meetings resulted in ineffective communication and a weak water 
management plan that reduced the water users’ capacities to prevent, and to deal with 
the hazards on time. A vast majority of fish-ponds and agriculture farms were 
uncontrollably damaged and ruined.   
After electing the new Kae Muang, the flood re-occurrence in 2011 was more severe 
than in 2005. It was because the water storage capacity in Mae Ngat Somboon Chol 
Dam was over released to the areas with abnormal allocation and slow communication.  
Some fish ponds with higher levees were safe from the flood. But most of the housing 
areas at the lower lands were affected. With the strong neighborhood, many farmers, 
fish farmers across scale operations and villagers were willing to help each other during 
the time of stresses. At around 6 o’clock, the level of the flood was high by 0.5 - 1 
meter, which obstructed the transportation in some areas. Their neighbors helped to 
move feed and other things up to the second floor. For instance, the chicken farm of the 
medium fish farmer was flooded. When the flood inundated the chicken farm, he 
immediately asked his fish farmer neighbors to move his chickens to their temporary 
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safer place. During the urgent time, many neighbors voluntarily provided trucks to 
transfer the chickens. 
The diagram 5.6b above is used to analyze the social functions on the strategies to deal 
with floods. In Maekaedluang, compensation was fully distributed. In 2011, most fish 
farmers who had registered for the formal fish farmer lists were given compensation at 
about 5,000 baht /0.16 hectare (1rai) from the Department of Fisheries and 2,000 
baht/0.16 hectare (1 rai) from District Agricultural Extension Office. The village 
headman also gave some dried foodstuff to the farmers. On the other hand, one of the 
fish farmer groups in Maekaedluang did not receive the flood compensation. Led by the 
large fish farmer, about 30 fish famers claimed that they were supposed to get money 
because their name was registered on the fish farmer lists. That motivated them to 
negotiate for their rights asking for compensation from the Department of Fisheries and 
the provincial governor. Finally, they received the compensation but the negotiation 
later created an uneasy relationship between the DOF and this group. The group 
subsequently rarely contacted the DOF agencies and was seldom invited to meetings 
unlike in the past. The fish farmer members have to rely on the feed companies and 
their fish farmer friends instead.   
Later flood situations had become safer with better collaboration. Both farmers and fish 
farmers could now prevent the latest flood in 2013. After several flood experiences, fish 
farmers tended to build higher pond dikes and concrete dikes along the canals to the 
prevent flood. High water level occurred for 2 days in 2013, but it was not severe like 
the previous flooding. For the time being, many villagers (farmers, fish farmers and 
villagers) learnt from the past and improved prevention strategies by preparing a large 
number of sandbags given from the sub-district municipality in advance. According to 
the figures 5.11 and 5.12, sandbags were used to prepare for floods at wherever was 
prone to the risks. Fortunately, the high water level was lowered by the Kae Muang who 
ordered the farmers to release water as fast as possible to rescue every water user. 
However, it is noticeable that the fish groups did not cooperate with the Muang Fai 
group to cope with the floods but to just deal with the fish production.  




Figure 5.11 Farmers and fish farmers helped transport the sandbags  
prepared for flooding 
 
Figures 5.12 Sandbags readied for preventing flooding 
The rising level of the flood in 2013 was an obstacle not only for the fish farm owners 
but also for fish traders. Since the water level in the canals increased, releasing the pond 
water was difficult and takes longer. Consequently a lower ton of fish was harvested per 
time from 100 kg to 40 kg per time. It was also hard for the traders to drive along the 
muddy ways heading to the fish farms, which made the fish queue and harvest process 
slower than usual. To reduce the economic loss and to queue the process during 
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flooding, the fish groups were in charge of maintaining the market base and the 
relationship of the fish retailers, wholesalers, and fish farmers with the fish groups. For 
example, while waiting to release the pond water for the harvest, the fish group urgently 
provided other fish sources nearby which were safe from flooding. Again, if the group 
could not provide tons of fish, the traders were allowed to buy from the other two fish 
groups in the area. They sometimes ordered fish from the network in Sanpakhee and 
other groups in Phan; and sometimes from the Tamphralae fish cooperative.  
To compare the social network role towards the flood occurrence, Tamphralae Village 
also experiences flooding.  Flash flood occurred in 2005 and 2013. From diagram 5.6c, 
it is evident that the medium fish farmer who is out of the fish group and Muang Fai 
system are most affected. In 2005, the flash flood spread through his pond compound 
without urgent warning from any related organizations. The heavy flooding damaged 
his ponds within as fast as half an hour since his ponds were made from soil mixed with 
sand, which collapsed easily. Everything was out of control and the fish was suddenly 
gone. He estimated 1,000,000 baht in economic damages and losses. In this regard, the 
Kae Muang did not show up while the sub-district municipality paid him 6,000 baht as 
compensation that could not cover the actual total loss of about 300,000 baht.  
Again in 2013, without any group or association, he faced the difficulties in distributing 
fish in difficult conditions.  He was suffered from the fish death during the long heavy-
rain days.  He asked the fish traders from Phan to harvest fish, but they refused because 
it was not his queue yet. Unfortunately the fish nature was unable to resist to the climate 
uncertainty and died dispersed all over the water surface. He suddenly asked for help 
from his unskilled neighbors in harvesting the fish. Due to poor equipment preparation 
and few laborers, his wife and his neighbors found whatever available boxes for 
freezing the dead fish and retailed them to anywhere around the districts. However, they 
could save just some amount of total fish and reluctantly buried more than a half of his 
fish production. He then got dissatisfied with the Phan fish trader and decided to seek 
for other fish network.   
By the end of October 2013 trigged by the monsoon season, the flash flooding spread 
through some part of Bantam District areas, mostly severe in Tam Klang and slightly in 
Tamphralae Village. Whoever has many contacts has better coping capacity. A large 
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fish farmer afraid of the flash flood in Tamphralae contacted the forest officials. He 
closed the pipes in time and survived the flooding.  A few fish farmers who have ponds 
in the danger areas were affected. Floodwaters from the upland Khun Tam Waterfall 
reached Tam Klang Village and gathered sewage at the bridge across the main canals. 
An amount of water persisted and increased over the canals that forced the bridge 
broken, otherwise the flood might have spread through all the villages, ponds and 
agriculture lands downstream. The flooding badly affected several fish farmers. But fish 
farmers from Tamphralae who located their ponds in the area were safe. Moreover, 
some areas under the Thung Klong Catchment was inundated, still no fish ponds and 
paddy fields were damaged.  
 “There was no flooding for a long time, except for this year. If there is 
heavy rain for 2 - 3 hours, the amount of water from the two local water 
sources will be increasing,” said a large fish farmer whose ponds are 
situated in Tam Klang Village. 
It is incredulous why the flash flooding occurred without any protection mechanism. 
From the situation above, it is seen that kin and neighbors do not play a great role 
helping each other during the time of stresses. Affected fish farmers or farmers and 
villagers face the problems individually, but without help, the situations can turn out to 
be big losses. It is evident that the forest areas under the Khun Tam Waterfall are mostly 
converted for the increasing agriculture lands, fish ponds and housing areas. The land 
conversion results in flooding. However, the Department of Fisheries in Tamphralae 
entirely compensates the flooded fish farm by providing fingerlings. But such a baby 
fish is low in quality and breeding and is not well accepted by the villagers. Above all, 
the Kae Muang or related and affected villagers play a small role in the water 
management and initiate risk warning. As a result, the people have to find their own 
ways for survival that are different from those fish farmers in Maekaedluang. Together 
with the local authorities, the villagers voluntarily assist during urgent situations. 
5.4  Summary 
This chapter strongly claims that the construction of kinship and friendship of the fish 
farmers made by bridging networks with horizontal and vertical links increases their 
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adaptive capacities. Social capital can increase with use. The more it is used, the more it 
regenerates. Most fish farmers set up the organization systems; reduce transaction costs, 
and provide fish-related jobs as well as access to funds, new knowledge and technology 
gained from external organizations and through kinship and neighborhood. The 
differentiation of networking types conveys different problems and responses to the 
stresses. Thus, these lessons are emphasized in the three cases. Bonding without 
bridging is found in Sanpakhee and bonding with bridging in Maekaedluang. Still 
Tamphralae Village denotes no bonding and bridging interaction. If any community 
lacks the bond among kin, neighbors and friends, the fish farmers there have fewer 
capacities in response to all the risks.  
Whether the state supports fish farmers, bonding interaction is more important in 
developing their abilities. The bonding can be constructed through frequencies of trust, 
reciprocity or exchange, regulation and collective action.  How much the vertical state 
supports does not determine achievement unless local bonding is strong. Even though 
fish farmers in Sanpakhee and Maekaedluang face external urbanization and water 
demands, they can maintain their production and better adapt to the stresses. In other 
words, the bonding of fish farmers can reinforce trust, exchange and enables them to 
seek benefits from external networks to share among all the scale operations. The 
attempts increase high social learning and the capacity to access to resources. 
Meanwhile, lower bonding reduces the adaptive capacities of fish farmers.   The large- 
scale gain benefits while the smaller loses, leading to resource conflicts. 
Social connection also plays a great role in water management as a common resource 
needed by farmers, fish farmers and villagers. Whether the resource is efficient for all 
water users depends upon the management of irrigation systems and the collaboration of 
local villagers.  Highlighting drought, water pollution and flood issues, the case studies 
demonstrate that the networks embedded in well-linking social capital play an important 
role during the dry season. Farmers and fish farmers can share water and other 
resources. They are also willing to help each other to rapidly cope with and prevent the 
flooding. On the other hand, due to the loose relationship in the fish farmer community, 
the adaptive capacities are so diverse. Most water users are individually prone to the 
risks and highly affected by the stresses. That is why the problems remain unsolved 
   
211 
 
while the collective solution is rarely made. Neighbors who are suffered from the 
problems would rather stay silent rather than take any action. Some resist the stresses, 
others try to cope with them alone, some stop or exit, and some passively or actively 
negotiate with the related stakeholders. Social capital is supposed to be the significant 
resource for the vulnerability reduction and livelihood of fish farming households and 
communities. Highlighted in chapter 6, there is a need of wider and more in-depth 






Fish, next to rice, is the important food product for people’s livelihoods, and household 
income opportunities for large-, medium- and small-scale fish operators. For the pond- 
based aquaculture that rely mainly on natural resources, destroyed natural resources due 
to climate-related and socio-economic risks have a great impact on the fish farmers’ 
livelihood and well-being. With different scale operations, some fish farmers with 
different capacities can deal with the stresses. Vulnerable fish farmers are unable to 
respond to, resist or recover from the stresses that end up with losses of assets and 
income. Some lose and exit from fish farming. Meanwhile, some can survive and gain 
benefits. However, all scale operators are united into fish farmer cooperatives in 
managing production and marketing. Thus, this thesis emphasizes the adaptation of fish 
farmers in Northern Thailand via social capital.  
This chapter focuses on three distinct dimensions that I have linked together in my 
study. The first is the major findings of my research, while the second is a debate of 
these findings based upon the relevant theories and concepts of risk, vulnerability, 
adaptation and social capital. The third point is the policy implications and 
recommendations in order to develop the adaptive capacity of fish farmers in response 
to change in climate and climate variability. 
6.1 Major Findings  
The findings of my research are discussed in regards to the research questions. The first 
question studies the vulnerability of fish farmers who experience climate-related and 
socio-economic stresses. This addresses how these have impacts on fish farmers’ 
livelihood and well-being. Then I elaborate upon how fish farmers with different scale 




Last but not least, the study highlights the social capital strategies to solve the issues in 
the first two questions. These three questions are: 
6.1.1 Vulnerabilities of fish-pond farming households with scale operations 
Fish pond farming, a centered case study of the research, is sensitive to the variations in 
water supply and demand, as well as water quality and quantity. It is seen that the 
interrelated and multiplied weakness of household and place exposure increases the 
level of vulnerability of fish farmers. Place vulnerability is measured by the relative 
factors between the degree of urbanization and climate-related risk exposure.  It is found 
that peri-urban Maekaedluang, followed by Tamphralae is most prone to floods, 
drought, water pollution, the seasonality of rainfall and resource conflicts. Particularly 
in Maekaedluang, converting land use to residential estate and commercial farming 
causes fish farmers’ livelihood insecurity. Losing their land ownerships and suffering 
from water pollution directly affect fish farmers’ productivity and income. To make 
things worse, water systems nowadays have become fragile due to the loose 
collaboration among water users. Since villagers including offspring tend to work off- 
farm leading to labor shortage issues and dis-socialization among community. 
Undoubtedly, the loose water user networks especially in Tamphralae decline the 
efficiency of water allocation and management, but in turn cause water competition.  
The most vulnerable cases are those who lack capitals, have few social networks and get 
older. Fish farmers in Tamphralae, followed by Maekaedluang, are most vulnerable 
because most of them have uneven access to knowledge and assistances. Some medium 
and most large fish farmers are less vulnerable based on their capital stocks of water, 
labor, land, money and knowledge. By contrast, during the time of stresses, non-
membership in fish networks and other water users is a threat for the smaller- and 
medium-scale operators in dealing with fish death or fish diseases. In addition, most 
small fish famers living possibly exposed to urbanization influences suffer from the 
land use insecurity and the poor water quality and quantity. Moreover, aging generation 
and weak family members in all sites reduce the household’s adaptive capacities.   
Learning scientific knowledge and new technology adoption applied in fish farming is 
too difficult for the small-scale and old fish farmers.  They also have a limited 
knowledge channels,  and tend to just follow their kin and neighbors.  At the same time, 
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the more elderly people and children the households of mostly small fish farmers have, 
the heavier their financial burdens. Supplementary income opportunities are limited 
since those vulnerable generations are required time for care. In addition, their income 
is shared for household consumption and other domestic needs which are a threat for the 
existing and further investment.  
6.1.2 Scale operations of fish farm on adaptive capacities 
Scale operations matter in the adaptive capacity of the fish farmers. Adaptive capacity is 
measured by the capacity to recover from stresses and the productivity. It is found that 
bonding social capital enables the increase of the level of adaptive capacity as proven by 
the fish productivity in Sanpakhee with efficient water, and in the high social learning in 
Maekaedluang. The water users, enhanced with by kinship and supportive 
neighborhoods, can share water and have a talk when water problems happen. Fish 
farmers are ensured that they can raise a high density of fish and a number of pigs. 
Reducing the amount of commercial feed and replacing it with plankton from pig 
manure helps reduce cost of investment. That is why fish production and net profit in 
Sanpakhee are higher than that in peri-urban Maekaedluang and Tamphralae. Social 
capital is crucial in social learning and knowledge implementation. Knowledge for 
effective rearing practices is most practical in Maekaedluang through strong bonding 
among fish farmer members and bridging from feed company agencies. On the other 
hand, even though Tamphralae has a strong bridging with the external state and 
universities, the learning process is not distributed as extensively as possible. Due to the 
fragile bonding among kin and neighbors, the knowledge level is not balanced, but 
restricted in the accessible groups, particularly the large-scale fish farmers. 
In terms of scale operations and social capital stock, it is found that large-scale 
operators, have high financial assets, and more opportunities to gain knowledge from 
other external sources; as a consequence they have less negative impacts than smaller 
operators. Medium and small operators affect more from fish death and diseases. These 
latter operators have fewer financial assets and fewer contacts with external partners.  In 
this regard, well-off fish farmers have more purchasing power over farming system 
management and land use allocation. They are able to buy lands with good water 
quantity and quality access. They can also allocate a piece of lands or build up a water 
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system for water stock used during low flow, whist the smaller fish farmers reluctantly 
rely on the uncertain water in the canals. In addition, the large operators can invest in 
the high cost of qualified fingerlings, nutrient feed and more advanced technology. They 
therefore can prevent stresses and increase fish crop frequencies.  
In the places where bonding is strong, particularly in Maekaedluang Village, most 
large-scale operations mainly raise awareness of risk prevention and distribute their own 
knowledge to other smaller operators via bridging fish farmer networks. For instance, 
large fish farmers introduce maintaining water quality during the time of stresses, 
adjustment feeding, rearing period and adopting aerators for oxygen circulation. In 
addition, they furthermore introduce how to use chemicals and medication properly. 
Thus, there is a high potential of risk prevention and coping capacity across scale 
operations towards fish diseases and death. Undeniably, not only do the large- but also 
the smaller-scale operators in the communities with strong bonding decide to intensify 
their fish farming.  
6.1.3 Adaptation via social capital 
Since the household structure has been changed through urbanization influences, family 
members in these days often live far apart. Thus, bonding social capital between kin and 
neighbors is constructed through bridging fish farmer cooperatives. This relationship 
promises to build co-operational structures in building up the adaptive capacity of fish 
farmers. Fish cooperatives and groups are formed for economic interest. They aim to 
reduce transaction costs; to access to knowledge, technology, labor and money; and to 
increase adaptive capacities. The groups also provide job opportunities such as group 
committees, harvesters, accountants and fish traders.  
The level of social capital has an impact on social innovation to prevent and cope with 
climate variability. In this way, social capital is mobilized by trust, exchange, regulation 
and collective action. Under the construction of kinship and neighborhood embedded in 
fish farmer cooperatives, those fish farmers in Sanpakhee and Maekaedluang 
undoubtedly rely more on horizontal relationships within the groups. The more 
collective activities are generated, the more trust builds up. Sanpakhee locals trust their 
kin and neighbors more than external organizations since they are united by the 
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collective action of fish harvesting and other social activities. Their knowledge, 
understanding and innovation are still mainly implemented and led by the large-scale 
operators. The rest of them tend to follow while some rely on their experiences.  
High levels of social component implementation on bonding ties increase the level of 
knowledge and technology adoption. Having strong bonds is a base to share new 
knowledge. In Sanpakhee, fish farmers trust and share information among clans and 
neighbors. Fish farmers in Maekaedluang prefer trusting the feed agencies as much as 
the large fish operators or the group leader and their fish farmers’ colleagues. Together 
with monthly fish farmer meetings, it is as a space and an opportunity for news updates, 
information exchange, solution finding and peer encouragement in order to develop fish 
productivity. By contrast, at the low kinship and neighborhood ties in Tamphralae, fish 
farmers seek a full support from the Department of Fisheries and universities. In terms 
of farming management, facilitating the information transfer from the state and 
universities down to all fish farmers is likely to have difficulties in the non-bonding 
communities. Indeed, the knowledge implementation does not seem practical since 
trusting and sharing knowledge is rarely made among the group members across scale 
operations.  As a consequence, the possibility of fish loss is high.  
While the fish farmer groups have been constructed, the Muang Fai group is still 
declining, which affects agriculture and aquaculture activities. Meanwhile, the fish 
groups do not fully cooperate with the Muang Fai group. That is why this exacerbates 
competition for water among farmers, fish farmers and villagers. Water conflicts in 
Sanpakhee and Maekaedluang are less severe than those in Tamphralae, even though 
they are pressured by the increasing demand between fish farmers in the community and 
the surrounding urbanization influences. Fish farmers in the strong-bonding 
Maekaedluang attempt to keep benefits for all water users. Thus, the large operators 
chiefly lead other smaller fish farmers to negotiate with the casual fish farmers’ friends 
who pollute poor water, the Kae Muang and the RID. On the contrary, in minimal- 
bonding Tamphralae, most water users including the Kae Muang passively avoid direct 
negotiations with the large fish farmers and powerful people who cause problems. This 
ongoing phenomenon seems to increase water competition and water shortage. 
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6.2 Discussion  
In this study, social capital played an important role on fish farmers’ climate adaptation 
at household and community level in Northern Thailand.  Fundamentally based on 
previous studies, social capital (family, communities, the state, market and civil society) 
can strengthen their access abilities to resources and other types of capital assets 
(produced, human, natural, social, and cultural). The assets can be organized and 
enhanced to capabilities for better living and to change dominant rules to control, 
distribute and transform resources in the societies. Conversely, the study finds new 
dimensions of social capital in the context of fish farming as per the elaboration below.  
Starting from social household ties, under the current economic development and 
environmental variability, livelihood diversification links to the household demographic 
variables (Stard and Johnson, 2004; de Sherbinin et al., 2008). The offspring’s mobility, 
the aging people’s morbidity and’s mortality reduce the human and social capital in 
households and community. But the context of the study is very different. Doing pond- 
based aquaculture relies so much on the water supply that it encourages the aging fish 
farmers to stay put instead. Furthermore, though the young seeking off-farm work cause 
a lack of labor employment, in fact a few people do return to practice fish farming. With 
these factors, in turn, the study strongly claims that the household and community 
structure and relationship are not fixed. Fish farmers with different ages form and 
construct their relationships in the form of the formal fish groups or fish cooperatives. 
The new constructed cooperation role becomes necessary to fulfill the problems of lack 
of funds, information and technology; labor shortage; and aging labor forces. They not 
only reduce transaction costs but also provide fish-related jobs. 
It is noticeable that numerous integrated aquaculture projects supported by the state are 
highly implemented, but it is not so obvious in Thailand. For instance, the DOF in Phan 
encourages the fish farmers to integrate their farming by raising frogs, gardening on the 
pond levees, and raising earthworms for agricultural soil and raising worm for fish feed 
in order to reduce the feed expense.  In fact, those people who attended that meeting 
agreed that the idea is good but, comparing to their integrated pig-fish system, what the 
DOF suggests takes time and increase labor burdens. They were also concerned about 
the cost-benefit ratio and return of investment. Bosma and Verdegem (2011) and 
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Longoni (2011) discuss that intensifying aquaculture production in existing farming is 
most sustainable. They agree that the poor producer can employ new technologies to 
make the financial and social factors more sustainable and more resource-efficient. 
Khondker and Diemuth (2011) also promote that the integrated aquaculture-agriculture 
(IAA) training for small-scale farmers in Bangladesh can increase food consumption 
and better nutrition levels. Bangladesh is a densely populated Asian country with a 
rapidly growing market-based economy. Since there is no further expansion of farming 
areas, improving the productivity of farmed land would be the better solution.  
On the other hand, though the mixed subsistence agriculture and aquaculture in 
Thailand is introduced by the state, it is in fact not widely applied. Without the earlier 
massive state help, the local fish farmers who have long developed the fish production 
and marketing process by themselves particularly in the Sanpakhee and Maekaedluang 
villages does not cooperate well with the state. Moreover, Thailand has a small number 
of fish subsistence systems because the country is a free economy country that requires 
high food production. Its population (66,720,153) is two times lower than Bangladesh’s. 
The commercial feed companies, with little state assistance, can easily extend the 
commercial fish production to respond to the high market demand. Fish-pond lands can 
be transferred to others and expanded based on the fish farmers’ financial capital.   
Patcharawalai et al., 2013, claimed that integrated fish farming is more prone to water 
stratification from hot weather and rain than conventional commercial systems. High 
loads of nutrients and fertilizers cause phytoplankton blooms. They consume a lot of 
oxygen at night and during daytime with no light and post increasing thresholds of fish 
death. The argument is so useful and helpful for fish farmers to manage feed practices 
and waste management, but it is necessary to take into account individual fish farmers’ 
management systems. It depends very much on their stock densities, aerator 
implementations, water access to change water in the pond, and labors. It is riskiest in 
the integrated pond with high density of fish without aerator implementation in the areas 
that do not have enough water. Nonetheless, fish farmers undertaking integrated 
farming have lower risks of income shortages in a particular time. If they lose any fish 
profits, those in Sanpakhee still have monthly pig incomes. Intensive farming is still 
riskier, unless those fish farmers have enough money from other income sources to cope 
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with and recover the fish losses. Above all, it is more helpful if those information and 
knowledge are accumulated and exchanged by learning together in fish groups or 
among their peers. 
It is agreed with that vulnerability can be decreased by technology (Burton, Kates and 
White, 1978) and the interrelation between social learning and self-organization (IPCC, 
2010; and Pelling, 2010; Ford and Smit, 2004; Fabricius and Cundill, 2010; Pretty J. 
and Ward H. 2001).  The young also become key persons who adopt nontraditional 
lifestyles with the new technology (Fabricius and Cundill, 2010). Here it cannot be 
generalized that information and technology distribution are widespread in all kinds of 
households and communities. Even if the fish farmer cooperative is a space of social 
learning, successful information distribution depends upon the type of social relations in 
different contexts. With the help of strong social cohesion, fish farmers with all farm 
sizes are able to extend technology and knowledge with one another for more flexible 
uses of farming. A loose relationship causes the uneven knowledge understanding and 
different ranges of adaptive capacities among fish farmers. 
In terms of farm-size adaptive capacity, the more capitals the stakeholders have, the 
more abilities they have to access resources. Chiep (2001) explores the social relations 
of each scale in obtaining access to fishery resources in Tonle Sap, Cambodia. The 
situation is regulated by the state controls over fishing resources. They allow private 
individuals access and exclude the small- and medium-scale fish farmers from the 
resources. Only the larger scale of operators can benefit. Phong et al. (2007) and Khin 
(2003) also elaborate further that the wealthy farmers with skillful farming and many 
capitals intensify their farming while the poorer farmers diversify more passively and 
stop farming. But this is different from the context of fish-pond farming in Northern 
Thailand. The state role is low whilst fish farmer relationships across scale operations 
are interrelated and more dynamic in benefiting the resource access. 
Fish farmer cooperative and group roles become significant with the collaboration of 
fish farmers with other large-, medium- and small-scale operators. No matter which 
kind of scale operation they have, having a great number of contacts can strengthen 
power relations and negotiations in order to access to resources. Large-scale ones with 
the highest number of networks is the leader of the fish group who is in charge of 
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production and marketing management for the rest of the fish farmer members. In the 
strong-bonding community, for common interest, the inclusion and exclusion relations 
among different scale operations are combined. The large-scale fish farmers support the 
smaller ones with knowledge assistance and money while asking helps from external 
organizations for all the farm sizes. The smaller fish farmers not only defer to the 
regulation of the group, but also support labor and exchange knowledge with the larger- 
scale farmers. Without social fish networks, no one cooperate and help manage the 
process from production to marketing. It is easier for the large-scale or the external 
organizations including middlemen and feed suppliers to gain benefits than the ones out 
of the fish groups. 
Most researches on social capital do not take into account social capital components 
(Pretty J. and Ward H., 2001) on bonding and bridging (Putnam, 1993) and vertical and 
horizontal dimensions. Bonding is necessary but bridging is still needed via trust, 
exchange, regulation and collective action. Kinship and neighborhood relationship 
constructed by fish farmers through bridging networks with horizontal and vertical links 
strengthens adaptive capacities to deal with climate-related risks. In this way, social 
capital becomes self-reinforcing when reciprocity and exchange increases 
connectedness between people, leading to greater trust and collective action (Prusak, 
2014; Nahapit and Ghoshal, 1998, Putnam, 1993 cited in Fu, 2004). The more the 
frequencies of social contacts increases, the more trust, exchange and collective action 
are well enhanced. The willingness to learn, to share and to help also increases the 
innovation towards better adaptive capacity. For instance, even though fish farmers of 
all farm sizes in Maekaedluang face external urbanization and resource exhaustion, they 
can develop advanced technology to maintain their production. 
Living in a strong group is sometimes a problem (Granovetter, 1973). For example, 
retelling rumors through the strong group can be more distorted than through the 
fragmented person with weak ties. The rumors may be true but not in the arena of pond-
based aquaculture of which fish farmers trust and work together via formal groups, 
kinship and neighborhoods. The claim depends on the types of fish farmer groups. Fu 
(2004) proposes that trust increases the willingness of participation in social exchanges 
and interactions that in turn enhance social capital. Retelling by a trusted person in the 
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close group with transparency and participation, reminds and ensures other fish farmers 
about the good care and willingness to let them increase their fish production.  
In loose networking communities, lack of trust from loose regulation, rare sharing or, 
exchanges and collective action can distort social capital and exclude benefits from 
some individuals. If the group members do not have the willingness to sincerely share 
with others, the information might be distorted through time and persons.  In this sense, 
the smaller fish operators like those in Tamphralae are not allowed to speak out on the 
group’s decision-making by the larger fish farmers who are in the group committee. In 
addition, having kinship and neighborhood ties are obstacles to negotiation for their 
rights. They cannot negotiate for access to water or ask people who caused problems to 
take action. To reduce the dissatisfaction among the clans who have lived together for a 
long time, they decide to keep silent and let the problems continue.  
In terms of linking types between horizontal and vertical social capital, Putnam (1993), 
Pelling (1998) and Belton (2012) argue that horizontal bonds are more important than 
vertical ties. But, Woolock (2001), Pretty and Ward (2001), Bebbington and Perreault 
(1999) claimed that vertical relationships are able to influence a wider range of resource 
access than are available within the community. The vertical social ties from external 
organizations are useful in themselves. But its implementation at local levels might not 
be helpful for some individuals if the horizontal bonding is weakened or fragile. In this 
way, uneven resource distribution reduces the level of trust as argued by Pelling and 
High (2005). Less interaction across all scale operations does not return any benefits to 
small-scale operators (Granovetter, 1973). On the other hand, being different scale 
operators in close networking communities do not have very different access to 
information. To consistently participate in the fish group activities; many small fish 
farmers can raise fish better than some medium fish farmers because the smaller ones 
improved their farming system.  Moreover, even though the small aging and divorced 
fish farmers are most vulnerable in Maekaedluang, they do not decide to exit from fish 
farming. It is because they cling to the interaction among group members and the 
financial benefits they draw on. 
Water is necessary in pond-based aquaculture. Poor water leads to fish stresses, diseases 
and losses. Yet, few studies focus on the cooperation between water users comprising of 
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fish farmers, other farmers and irrigation institutions. The kinds of relationship among 
the stakeholders and their power relations can be taken into account to improve further 
water management. For better social capital implementation, the connectedness of 
horizontal and vertical ties is necessary when the bonding tie is strong. Again, the social 
capital role works well in the place in which kinship and friendships are reconstructed 
through bridging fish networks. The cohesion dimensions effectively increase their 
adaptive capacities and abilities to access resources.  
6.3 Recommendations 
6.3.1 Academic contribution   
Many researchers suggest that subsistence integrated agriculture and mixed aquaculture 
with fruit, rice and livestock help especially the small-scale fish farmers to increase their 
food consumption and economical sustainable natural resources (Phong et al., 2007; 
Khondker and Diemuth, 2011; and Longoni, 2011). However, few studies focus on the 
social capital between intensive, integrated and semi-subsistence freshwater 
aquaculture. Examining its strengths and weaknesses might bring about the effective 
land utilization and resource maximization. Intensive freshwater aquaculture systems 
mainly focus on investment returns, but do not examine the risks of market uncertainty. 
High financial returns encourage a large number of fish farming expansion that needs a 
large amount of water. The intensive farming actually suffers from high risks of climate 
variability and largely causes environmental and social impacts. For instance, a lack of 
water leads to water, social and financial competition among the water users.   
Many researches focus on the implementation of pond-based aquaculture as a new 
mainstream income source using new technology and scientific knowledge. It would be 
great if local knowledge takes social relationships into consideration in order to develop 
the fish productivity while conserving the environment. In this way, local livelihoods, 
the way of life and beliefs would be directly affected while the existing local knowledge 
gradually disappears. The local knowledge actually derives from traditional beliefs, 
culture and social norms and can be used as a strategy to enhance the social cohesion 
and conserve the environment. For example, praying to, and worshiping the spirits in 
the farm compound clears our minds to respect the environment and lead us to use bio-
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friendly products. This track is totally opposite to the way of thinking of commercial 
fish farming. Chemicals, technology and other external artificial inputs are undeniably 
used to produce rapid output, which leads to social and environmental impacts.  
6.3.2 Limitation of methods and study design 
Contextualizing the dynamic concept of social capital is requires us to spend a long time 
immersing in these case studies to understand complex links and their interactions. But 
taking comparative studies of 3 sites is hard for the researcher to create understanding. 
The relationship and power relations cannot be taken for granted because they are 
inconsistent and shifting all the time. For instance, Tamphralae fish farmer cooperative 
elects the new group leader long after I interviewed the previous leaders. Thus, I also 
have to take into account the new role of the leader. In addition, one action can impact 
other ties to which the researcher has to link. For instance, fish groups holding a 
meeting has an impact on the participant’s information and knowledge scheme. We 
should follow the results and further reactions of the fish farmers. Not being in the 
situation, collecting this sort of data limits the researcher’s ability to critically link the 
situation and relationship. Asking them to recall might create distortions that I have to 
cross check with other villagers.  
Bonding and bridging is interrelated. There is no clear boundary because they overlap. 
For instance, the Kae Muang in Maekaedluang works as the irrigation cooperative while 
he is a member of the fish group and a kin of some fish farmers. So his status is the 
bridging of the RID and the fish group as well as the bonding with clans. Even if his 
responsibility is to collect the water fee and manage water allocation, he does not want 
to cause social dissatisfaction among kin and neighbors who do not pay the fee and 
rarely join in the collective activities. He then uses his membership right in a fish group 
meeting to voice out the problems. So understanding the concepts clearly before 
collecting data is helpful.  
Collecting trust data is challenging for me because it is intangible and hardly 
measurable. Counting and weighting the number of contacts of each fish farmers are not 
enough, exchange, voluntary help, regulation, and collective action are taken into 
account. The analysis is so complex when applying the concepts into the different scale 
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operations in different types of networks. It is also necessary to link those contacts to 
understand particular situations such as drought, water negotiation and so on. Moreover, 
each situation includes many diverse stakeholders who have different kinds of 
networking and draw different trust payoffs. Thus, it is better to set a scope of the study 
to understand trust embedded in very dynamic and complex relationships and situations. 
Furthermore, since I am an outsider of Sanpakhee and Tamphralae, those case studies 
might find it difficult to reply to some questions about personal relationships, either 
good or bad. As a result, before getting implicit information from them, building trust 
with voluntary help for longer time than just 3-4 days each time in the fields is highly 
required.  
6.3.3 Further researches 
Water, labor, knowledge, money and social capital are key factors to achieve the 
successful rearing practices. Achieving all the factors of production is made possible by 
the abilities of each fish farmers, sites and social contexts. One way to access those 
resources is via social capitals, which enhance people’s relationships and encourage 
their knowledge-sharing. On the other hand, in the arena of fish-pond farming, it is 
found that social learning is left unmentioned by Phong et al. (2007); Chiep (2001); 
Bosma and Verdegem (2011); Khondker and Diemuth (2011); and Longoni (2011). 
Learning can be a key tool to reinforce transformative and social processes that occur in 
the communities. How the learning processes among the stakeholders should also be 
studied.  
Additionally, the impacts of chemical and medication use in farming and fish farming 
should be taken into account. What kinds of chemicals affect the fish production? In 
what way is the chemical absorbed into the soil or water? It is necessary to study 
whether the chemicals used in farming has a great impact on fish farming, so that the 
fish farmer can plan to prevent the risks. In this regard, social learning among 
households and communities should be further studied. In what way do the fish farmers 
in different places gain, apply and distribute that knowledge from one place to another? 
How is this information distorted or enhanced through knowledge transmission? How 
does the outcome affect the communities? 
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6.3.3 Policy suggestions  
Micro and macro levels of adaptation of policy should be taken into consideration. That 
adaptation from locality in response to climate-related and socio-economic risks 
discloses the uncertainty of the climate and the need for external help. It implies that the 
farmers try to adapt their life to the new situations. They also voice out to the policy 
makers about what really happens in freshwater aquaculture and how we should adapt 
ourselves to climate-related risks. With hope, the strengths and weaknesses identified in 
each network-type matter for related organizations especially the Department of 
Fisheries and the Royal Irrigation Department to deal with the knowledge gap, low 
quality input and unsolved issues.  
Prior to promoting any fish and water-related projects, place-based extension should be 
taken into account.  The projects should be more differentiated and specific. Knowledge 
distribution depends upon local contexts.  In the areas without high bonds, the sense of 
belonging and shared experiences, local collaboration with external organizations is not 
effective and difficult for new knowledge adoption. Sometimes useful knowledge is not 
practically used and resource allocations are not widespread. Supporting the fish 
farmers without zoning, for instance, urges the fish farmer to scatter from upstream to 
downstream. The farmers downstream face troubles of water shortage and pollution. 
Some of them lose their profits and think it is better to move off-farm, leave the land or 
convert to agriculture farming. By contrast, in a place with strong community bonding, 
fish farmers can share, exchange and volunteer for collective action. The knowledge 
distribution is applied into practice. Thus, to support any fish and water-related projects, 
the DOF officials should slowly and consistently build trust by often visiting, asking for 
their demand and working with the local fish farmers. This close collaboration will help 
the officials understand the real situations and find the solutions for the fish farmers to 
better cope with the stresses.  
Although fish farmers can form their own groups, external organizations are required to 
widen their knowledge and improve their farming management more effectively. The 
organizations such as the DOF, universities and feed companies should be cooperating 
and playing a role in fish famer cooperatives. Those organizations with various kinds of 
fruitful researches can create farmers’ understanding on crucial problems such as fish 
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diseases and the use of chemicals. In this way, local people should participate in the 
knowledge distribution. It is because they know well how to distribute knowledge and 
most people trust the ones who often visit and take care of them. For example, local 
people take part in calculating the quantity of water in the ponds in order to plan water 
use in different seasons. This encourages local fish famers and water users to see the 
overall picture of the linking problems and to come up with the solutions.  
The third parties should support knowledge and technology. To improve the 
institutional fish farmer cooperatives, the related organization cooperation should fund 
the fish committees and their members to pay other fish groups a visit. Some groups can 
generate as much knowledge and information as possible to other fish members. They 
can examine the strengths and weaknesses of the groups in order to fill the gaps and 
develop the group systems and management. Furthermore, since fish death results from 
the low rate of oxygen, aerators are important. But since most small fish farmers lack 
extra funds for investment, it is better to fund them via fish farmer cooperatives with 
different incentives. For instance, they will get reducing aerator prices, if they defer to 
the fish group regulation. Their buying incentive is also increased by way of increasing 
encouragement and trust within the group.   
Fish death and fish diseases are big issues for fish farmers. Hence, knowledge models 
used for fish farming is important for better coping capacities. So far, most fish farmers 
lack knowledge and understanding on how to deal with fish diseases and fish death 
properly. They mainly follow the suggestions of their neighbors and kin, which might 
lead to misuse of the chemicals and application techniques. For instance, some unknown 
chemical contaminated with metal is at risks of polluting the soil. Some chemicals can 
solve fish diseases in a short term but leave side effects in the long term. That is a 
reason why the knowledge model or toolkit about fish death management is useful in 
the first place. This way of sharing knowledge is convenient and easy to use since most 
of fish farmers are aging and have lower than high school education. Information and 
messages presented to fish farmers should be conveyed via pictures, videos or short 
messages so that they are able to easily differentiate the various kinds of fish diseases, 
parasites and other conditions. Moreover, guidance on how to use chemicals is very 
useful in reality. To cope with fish diseases, some fish farmers decide urgently to buy 
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certain chemicals no matter how expensive based on hearsay from other fish farmers. In 
this way, the misuse of chemical substances does not help and wastes money. If the fish 
diseases cannot be addressed, the DOF or related organizations with technical machines 
should be ready for this important role. 
Fish production standardization should be more differentiated by dividing into two 
levels: extension at the local level and export at the global level. It is because the GAP 
standard generalizes every types of fish farming for export-led development. 
Undoubtedly, the farmers of integrated fish-pig farming are not allowed to export and 
basically persuaded to give up. It is because the state is afraid of the contamination of 
food with toxic substances. In fact, even though, the fish product cannot be given the 
export standard, it is allowed for domestic consumption. These kinds of farming are the 
way to save costs of investment and earn a living for those fish farmers’ households. 
Still, to be responsible for customer health, the fish farmers should carefully use 
chemical substances registered by the DOF and within the safe period before harvesting. 
Local water users generally cannot solve water issues alone; therefore they need the 
help of the relevant institutions. To deal with water pollution from fish-ponds, extensive 
academic knowledge from external organizations is important. So far, there are a few of 
these projects, but they have not been implemented in the real sites successfully and 
consistently. It is because some of these are short-term whereas the new projects do not 
develop from the existing ones. Some are also not applicable in practice. For example, 
the purification of water is tested in the lab under controlled conditions. In fact, there 
are external factors which make the test more difficult. The real scale is bigger and 
needed, with adjustments made with the help of the local. It is because they understand 
the situation and are able to maintain and possibly develop the fish- and water-related 
projects.  
Local Muang Fai groups are weakening while the role of the communal irrigation leader 
is being taken over by the RID. In case of resource conflicts, the Kae Muang is 
powerless and unable to deal with individual water users. Some of them are too old to 
take on such hard work and voice out the problem to the policy makers; and some claim 
that the low salary is not encouraging them to work for social service. Moreover, the 
RID assigns the Kae Muang to collect land use by using GPS, but in fact, it is beyond 
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his capacity and understanding. Thus, the Kae Muang role should be adjusted to be like 
that of the water irrigation coordinator and negotiator. Due to the replacement by the 
RID, it is necessary to value the Kae Muang’s role, increase their salary and persuade 
young people who can work hard and are able to understand and communicate well with 
water users. If it is so, the collaboration of water users and the willingness to participate 
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